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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the dissertation is to investigate the degree of compatibility of two 
fields: phenomenology and computational cognitive science. The former field proposes to 
explicate all structures of conscious experience in terms of conscious experience. The 
latter proposes to explicate all structures of consciousness partly in terms of unconscious 
causal factors. These endeavors have been seen as mutually exclusive, insofar as each has 
endeavored to claim autonomy for itself in terms of theoretical completeness. I put 
forward the thesis that the acknowledged founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, 
did not claim theoretical completeness; and therefore that the original formulation of 
phenomenology may be seen to have a computational theory of mind (possessing the two 
modern theses of syntax + causality) in the background. To this end, I put forward the 
following thesis in the first chapter: that the founder of phenomenology articulated, prior 
to founding phenomenology, a computational theory of mind in terms of its two modern 
theses: (1) syntactic representations, and (2) their causal generation and interaction. 
Insofar as I am able to provide sufficient evidence for this thesis, I am theoretically 
licensed to proceed to trace its influence on the founding of phenomenology proper. 
On the above textual basis, I proceed in the second chapter to discuss Husserl's 





there show how my compatibility thesis may be true; indeed, I demonstrate that formal 
evidence is the causal product of what Husserl calls “unsere Denkmaschine” – a thought-
machine that manipulates syntactic symbols. 
The third chapter discusses an objection to the compatibility thesis: for the 2nd 
Logical Investigation has been interpreted as demonstrating an incompatibility between 
causal-explanatory accounts of idea generation and phenomenologico-descriptive 
accounts of idea classification. I show that this interpretation is incorrect. In particular, I 
detail several arguments against (Humean) associationism, and by extension against 
(Churchlandian) connectionism, and show that they demand in their stead 
computationalism, both on account of the nature of the explananda as well as for the sake 
of theoretical completeness. 
In the fourth chapter, I discuss, with a view to deepening my interpretation, the 
much-celebrated property (since Chomsky) of productivity. This leads to a discussion of 
the methodological relation between “universal grammar,” as it appears directly in the 
4th Logical Investigation, and the computational theory of mind; I herein show that 
Husserl anticipated Chomsky in claiming that there is an explanatory (psychological) 
component in linguistics, and argue that this entails a computational component, since 
nothing else causally explains the property of productivity (a true fact to this day). 
In the fifth chapter, I discuss how Husserl’s descriptive treatment of the 
propositional attitudes (as act-matters & act-qualities) may be supplemented on the 
explanatory side by a language of thought. And since Husserl’s semi-famous categorial 





necessary for the explanation of categorial intuition (i.e. phenomenology). Hence I 
conclude that the phenomena of the Logical Investigations must seek their explanatory 
supplement in a computational language of thought, which, however, the first chapter 







One may occasionally observe scholars wondering whether Freud poses a threat 
to the domain integrity of phenomenology. For instance, Lind (1985) interprets Ricoeur’s 
Freud and Philosophy (1970) as putting forward the view that “the Freudian unconscious 
invalidates the ability of Husserlian phenomenology to explicate human psychology” 
(325). This is because the mechanism of repression in Freud's theory is inaccessible to 
phenomenological “explication.” It’s inaccessible because the mechanism is causal, and 
causality lies outside the purview of phenomenology. Yet this mechanism is directed 
toward certain contents of consciousness (those mental states to be repressed); and it is 
therefore not irrelevant to phenomenology, especially insofar as this latter has 
explanatory pretensions with regard to said contents. 
With the above in mind, we might consider Searle’s recommendation that the 
mind ought to be “like a scanning machine that is capable of scanning any of [its] 
intentional states” (276). It is very important for this picture to be correct, if 
phenomenology is to have explanatory force, for “[w]ithout this proviso – that is, without 
the assumption that an Intentional state is capable of being brought to consciousness – the 
ascription of Intentionality to beings as part of the explanation of their behavior would 
lose most of its explanatory force" (ibid). 
Freud represents the idea that Searle’s picture is misguided. Hence it is not 
surprising that the early phenomenologists attacked Freud in defense of this picture. But 
according to Rudolf Bernet (2003), phenomenologists aware of the danger, like Ricoeur 





suggests that these philosophers (along with Scheler), “cannot be spared the objection 
that they criticized Freud's discovery of the unconscious too quickly and reasoned it 
away" (200). Many of the arguments of Merleau-Ponty, for example, sound dogmatic: 
“All thought of something is at the same time self-consciousness, failing which it could 
have no object” (371). These sorts of arguments are directed against mechanisms of the 
mind, which might be causally, and not self-consciously, directed. The problem, I think, 
is that we have good reason to suppose causal mechanisms, which interact with 
intentional content, exist. 
The problem seems pressing because, arguably, the discovery of causal 
mechanisms which interact with intentional content is what cognitive science is all about; 
and cognitive science is, in this respect, an extension of Freudian theory (and rather better 
placed scientifically). Consider Fodor’s words on this topic: 
 
It used to be universally taken for granted [e.g., Merleau-Ponty] that the problem 
about consciousness and the problem about intentionality are intrinsically linked: 
that thought is ipso facto conscious, and that consciousness is ipso facto 
consciousness of some or other intentional object. [….] Freud changed all that. He 
made it seem plausible that explaining behaviour might require the postulation of 
intentional but unconscious states. Over the last century, and most especially in 
Chomskian linguistics and in cognitive psychology, Freud’s idea appears to have 





decreasingly oxymoronic. The experimental investigation of unintrospectible 
thoughts is now the bread and butter of cognitive scientists […]. (1991, pg. 12) 
 
If Bernet thinks the phenomenologists did not succeed against Freud, would anyone think 
them to have possibly fared any better against Chomsky? Perhaps sensing the difficulty, 
modern phenomenologists make no attempt to engage with the problem – despite the fact 
that it is not at all clear what a Husserlian phenomenology might be in relation to all 
this. There is, for instance, a journal, run by Gallagher & Zahavi, called Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences. Searching its back issues, I could not find any discussion of 
this topic. Tito (1991) and Welsh (2002) see the Freudian problem (and the former the 
connection to Chomsky), but not that it is generalizable to computational cognitive 
science as a whole (as Fodor insists). 
The motivation behind my dissertation, therefore, is to examine Husserl's texts 
anew in light of the above problem. The logic of the problem may be spelled out in this 
manner: if the Freudian unconscious is problematic for / destructive of phenomenology, 
then computational cognitive science is problematic for / destructive of phenomenology; 
the former is; so the latter is. This argument is sound only if the two domains are 
considered as competitive. That is, if phenomenology has explanatory pretensions, the 
argument goes through. Part of the aim of my dissertation will be to show in what way 
they may be considered as complementary; and this on the basis of Husserl’s texts. Hence 





My solution is to show that the explanatory apparatus which gives rise to the 
Fodorian intuition above can actually be found in the founder of phenomenology's early 
work (1891). It is therefore possible that only Husserl can reconcile the two, given a 
methodological distinction at the forefront of his Logical Investigations (1900-1). This is 
the motivation of my project. I will now attempt to provide an overview of why I think 
this might be a plausible approach. 
Ever since Thales, and especially since Aristotle’s biological treatises, it's been 
understood that we not only can appreciate that something is the way that it is (ὅτι), but 
also how that something came to be the way that it is (διότι). Consider, for instance, 
Darwin's Origin of Species (1859). This book has two main theses: the fact that evolution 
has occurred (and this can be discovered through natural history); and the cause of its 
occurrence, namely, by means of the principle of natural selection (and this is properly a 
scientific hypothesis - beyond the purview of perception). We find the same division 
closer to our field (though not our subject) in Plato's Meno (circa 380). This dialogue 
demonstrates not only that we have a priori (that is, pure) knowledge; it also suggests 
how we came to have such a priori knowledge, namely, by means of the principle of pre-
existence. The first divisum is precisely the domain of phenomenological description. The 
second divisum is of course the domain of genetic explanation. 
Husserl, in the Logical Investigations, restricts phenomenology to the domain of 
the first divisum - the domain of description. Why he does this, what his motivations are 
precisely, are questions all but unanswered. Indeed, Donn Welton (2003) calls the move 





divisum (the domain of causal hypotheses in the Natural Sciences). Husserl attempts to 
not cross over into the causal domain, although he is intimately aware of the causal 
factors which enter into psychological laws governing mental processes. 
We know this, that he is not just aware, but intimately so, because of the first 
chapter of my dissertation. Therein I show that Husserl discovered a causal mechanism 
which interacts intimately with intentional contents of consciousness. So one half of the 
problem posed above is solved. The other half is figuring out how this mechanism fits 
into a phenomenology. 
My solution is to exploit the description vs. explanation distinction in the Logical 
Investigations so as to interpret this work in terms of Husserl’s own computational 
mechanism. Husserl originally termed this work as a 'descriptive psychology’ because he 
was aware of the difference between the first and second divisa. For the first divisum 
corresponds to descriptive psychology, which is theoretically incomplete without the 
second divisum (corresponding to explanatory psychology). Hence Husserl says, "the 
word ['description'] should of course not be so understood as if descriptive sciences 
aimed at mere description, which would contradict our guiding concept of science" 
(Prolegomena, section 64, italics added). Of course, Husserl's "guiding concept of 
science" is the only one we've ever had; with respect to this, Aristotle and Darwin are in 
total accord: namely, that there's a distinction between the fact that something is (e.g., 
that we have a priori knowledge) and the account of how it came to be (e.g., Plato's 
principle of pre-existence). The former is the task of description. The latter is the task of 





That's why, according to Husserl, "[t]he possibility of taking on the function of 
explanation is an obvious consequence of the essence of a theory in our absolute sense" 
(ibid, section 63, italics added). For Husserl this "possibility" means that descriptions 
must ultimately be derived from basic laws which explain the arising of what is being 
described in consciousness - and these laws will, with respect to our experience, be 
psychological laws. These basic laws, however, cannot be Hume’s or Wundt's laws of 
sensation and association in totum, because they do not explain the logicality of our 
mental processes. However, this is explained (at least in part) by a computational theory 
of mind; and in the first chapter I try to show Husserl had one. 
Now it's clear that there are unexplored possibilities here. For Husserl fully 
accepts that associationism may be behind some of the sensuous data in the first divisum; 
and by parity of reasoning, one can expect explanations of categorial data in terms of a 
formal generative system in the second divisum (which I show Husserl had in the 1st 
chapter). Consider this one passage from LI VI, which alludes to Husserl's acceptance of 
associationism with respect to sensuous aspects of perception. After stating, pace A.D. 
Smith (2008), that the difference between perception and imagination is "an internal 
difference", that is, one of "interpretative form", Husserl goes on to identify gradations of 
fulfilment with this internalistic interpretative form: "From this point of view many 
elements of fulness count for us - quite apart from anything genetic, for we know full 
well that these, like all similar differences, have an associative origin - as final 
presentations of the corresponding objective elements" (section 37, my italics; cpf. 





imagination. Consider, rather, this passage as evidence that Husserl considered 
empiricism of the Wundtian variety the only explanation on offer for the arising of 
sensuous contents. That's to say that empiricistic association is, on Husserl's view no less, 
the sole available account of how perceptions of objects with sensuous features come to 
be. What Husserl is maintaining "apart from anything genetic" is that, nevertheless, 
gradations of fulfilment are descriptively something other than the material, sensuous 
elements of an object. For me, this is an entirely typical pattern of reasoning in the 
Logical Investigations: empiricistic explanations are inadequate to the phenomena on 
hand. 
Now one can take almost any page of the Logical Investigations and see how the 
source of formal relations in intuition is methodologically kept out of view. Consider this 
passage from LI VI:  
 
Sensuous concepts find their immediate basis in the data of sensuous intuition, 
categorial concepts in the data of categorial intuition, purely with regard to the 
categorial form of the whole categorially formed object. If, e.g., the intuition of a 
relation underlies an abstraction, the abstractive consciousness may direct itself to 
the relational form in specie, so that everything sensuous in what underlies the 






Clearly that is not psychologically how categories "arise." For the "data of categorial 
intuition" are in as much need of psychological genesis as "the data of sensuous 
intuition,” which we saw above may be accounted for, according to Husserl, in terms of 
associationism. By parity of reasoning, we might ask, in light of our guiding concept of 
science, for the genesis of the "data of categorial intuition.” Husserl is not on principle 
opposed to this task - otherwise he would not have had a computational theory of mind. 
Part of my task is, therefore, to propose and make plausible associationism's (and 
connectionism’s) main contender, computationalism, as the explanatory force possibly 
underlying these other intuitions. This will solve the other half of the problem posed 
above: how might a (Husserlian) computationalism relate to a Husserlian 
phenomenology. But first let us discover computationalism at the beginning and as the 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Contents 
DEDICATION.................................................................................................................. iv 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... v 
PREFACE ....................................................................................................................... viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................. xvi 
Chapter One: How Do Mental Processes Preserve Truth? Husserl’s Discovery of the 
Computational Theory of Mind ....................................................................................... 1 
Section I. Concerning the Necessity of the Inadequacy of Associationism for the Truth of 
My Thesis................................................................................................................ 9 
Section II. Exposition of the Essay on Signs, Interpreted in Accordance with My Theses 
(Part I) ................................................................................................................... 12 
Section III. Exposition of the Essay Interpreted in Accordance with My Theses (Part II)
............................................................................................................................... 28  
Section IV. Conclusion: Husserl’s Epilogue and Discussion of my Results .................... 35 
Chapter Two: Descriptive Sciences Necessarily Transform into Explanatory 
Sciences: Why the Essence of Science Demands the Logical Investigations Serve as 
Propaedeutic to the Computational Theory of Mind .................................................. 40 
Section I. Explanation = Causal Explanation According to Husserl in the Logical 





Section II. The Explanatory Component of Phenomenology as a Scientific Theory ....... 49 
Section III. The Denkmaschine Passage ........................................................................... 52  
Section IV. On Unconscious Intentionality & Psychologism ........................................... 61 
Section V. Critique of Horst ............................................................................................. 68 
Section VI. Critique of Searle ........................................................................................... 80 
Section VII: Conclusion .................................................................................................... 88 
Chapter Three: Causal Explanation: Associationism, Computationalism, & 
Connectionism ................................................................................................................. 90 
Section I. Transition to an Examination of the 2nd Logical Investigation ........................ 95 
Section II. Computationalism and Logical Distinctions in Consciousness ...................... 97 
Section III. Arguments Against Associationism (/Connectionism) in the 2nd Investigation: 
Part I .................................................................................................................... 103 
Section IV. Arguments Against Associationism (/Connectionism) in the 2nd Investigation: 
Part II .................................................................................................................. 108 
Section V. A Methodological Objection to Associationism/Connectionism.................. 121 
Section VI. Conclusion ................................................................................................... 126 
Chapter Four: Formal Semantics & Empirical Explanation in the 4th Logical 
Investigation .................................................................................................................. 127 





Section II. The Explanatory Component in the 4th Investigation ................................... 135 
Section III. Reading Husserl’s Formal Semantics with an Explanatory Supplement..... 141 
Section IV. Critique of Loar ........................................................................................... 153 
Section V. Critique of Kriegel ........................................................................................ 160  
Chapter Five: A Language of Thought Explanation for the 5th & 6th Logical 
Investigations ................................................................................................................. 170 
Section I. A Language of Thought Explanation for the Productivity of Act-Matters & 
Act-Qualities ....................................................................................................... 173 
Section II. Critique of Cobb-Stevens & Zahavi (& 'All Phenomenologists') ................. 186 
Section III. A Language of Thought Explanation for Nominalization ........................... 193 
Section IV. A Language of Thought Explanation for Categorial Intuition .................... 196 
Section V. Objection: Doesn't the Empty/Filled Distinction Refute the Possibility of a 
Language of Thought? ........................................................................................ 203 
Section VI. The Foundational Relation between the Language of Thought & 
Phenomenology................................................................................................... 207  
Works Cited ................................................................................................................... 212 






Chapter One: How Do Mental Processes Preserve Truth? Husserl’s Discovery of the 
Computational Theory of Mind 
This chapter will try to demonstrate two things: first, that Husserl recognized the 
original problem of computational cognitive science: how do mental processes preserve 
truth (Fodor 2000, p. 4; Milkowski 2013, p. 2); and second, that Husserl solved this 
problem by attributing to the mind – in addition to an associative mechanism of 
reproduction -- "a mechanism of symbolic inference" (“natürlichen psychologischen 
Mechanismus des symbolischen Schließen”) (Hua XII, p. 363/1994, p. 42). I'll show that 
this Husserlian mechanism bears the properties of an automatic formal system, defined as 
a system whose formally designated tokens are manipulated without recognition of their 
semantic denotations. This formal manipulation of symbols is what I will understand by 
the word “computation.” A computation, in other words, is a formal operation on 
syntactic symbols. A computational theory of mind therefore is the view that there is a 
causally determined mechanism of the mind which performs such formal operations on 
syntactic symbols, with or without conscious intent. If without conscious intent, then the 
mechanism bears the properties of an automatic formal system (Haugeland 1981). 
The postulation of such a mechanism solves a problem which Husserl himself 
poses on page 358 of Husserliana XII in his 18911 essay “On the Logic of Signs 
(Semiotic)”: how truth can be deduced in everyday mental processes without conscious 
direction or intent. He raises this problem directly after going over the process of the 
                                                          





mechanism of association, noting that this mechanism does not solve the question 
concerning truth (Hua XII, p. 358/1994, p. 37), since associations are neither true nor 
false. Judgments, however, introduce, over and above associations, the concept of truth. 
And the mechanism of symbolic inference is postulated to guide our judgments from true 
thoughts to true conclusions. I will show that Husserl thinks this mechanism bears the 
hallmarks of a formal system which, in its computations, is automatic, since it operates 
not through conscious direction but through “blind causality” (Hua XII, p. 364/1994, p. 
43). 
The main thesis, then, will be this: since the notion of an automatic formal system 
conceived of as a “spontaneously generated” (“naturwüchsige”) mechanism of the mind, 
subject to causality because mechanical (“mechanische”), is just what the computational 
theory of mind is, I necessarily conclude that Husserl's “mechanism of symbolic 
inference” is an early version of the computational theory of mind (Hua XII, pp. 361-
363/1994, pp. 40-42). 
Perhaps the two most famous champions of the computational theory of mind 
(CTM) in the last twenty-five years have been Jerry Fodor and Steven Pinker. So that you 
may compare my definitions with theirs, I’ll provide some citations. Pinker says that the 
computational theory of mind consists of: 
 
arrangements of matter that have both representational and causal properties, that 





of physical events. Those events make up a computation, because the machinery 
was crafted so that if the interpretation of the symbols that trigger the machine is a 
true statement, then the interpretation of the symbols created [or inferred] by the 
machine is also a true statement. The computational theory of mind is the 
hypothesis that intelligence is computation in this sense. (Pinker 1997, p. 76) 
 
I understand Pinker to be isolating – and I will understand Husserl to be isolating -- two 
key features of the mechanism: (1) its “representational” or semantic properties which 
factor into true judgments; and (2) its “causal” properties. Pinker says that (1) and (2) 
combined “make up a computation.” This is so for reasons that have to do with all 
automatic formal systems: if the premises are true, and the symbols are lined up in 
accordance with a logical rule, then the inference will be true, even though the 
mechanism did not semantically intend a true statement. In other words, if you fix the 
syntax of the mechanism, “the semantics will take care of itself” (Haugeland 1981, p. 45). 
If there is a mechanism of the mind which computes in this sense, then, according to 
Pinker, we are talking about the computational theory of mind. I will try to show below 
that Husserl thought of his “mechanism of symbolic inference” in this way. 
Notice, before we move to Fodor’s definitions, that Pinker’s definitions are accepted by 






CTM consists in two main theses. The first thesis is a representational account of 
the nature of intentional states. [....] The second thesis is a computational account 
of the nature of cognitive processes [....] in which the presence of one representation 
can serve as a partial cause of the tokening of a second representation. Just what 
causal roles a representation may play in the generation of other representations 
and the etiology of behavior is determined by its syntactic properties, and not by its 
semantic value. (Horst 1996, p. 37) 
 
Obviously Horst’s “first thesis” corresponds to Pinker’s “representational properties” for 
semantic evaluability. And Horst’s “second thesis” corresponds to Pinker’s “causal 
properties.” These theses, as Pinker says, “make up a computation” in the sense that a 
mechanism causally processes symbols which have representational properties by means 
of the syntactic properties of the symbols. When one ascribes such a mechanism to the 
mind, one has a computational theory of mind. 
All of the above corresponds to Fodor’s descriptions. In Psychosemantics, Fodor 
observes:  
 
[T]here is a striking parallelism between the causal relations among mental states, 
on the one hand, and the semantic relations that hold among their propositional 
objects, on the other; and that very deep properties of the mental -- as, for example, 





suggests a plausible mechanism for this relation: [...] the trick is to combine the 
postulation of mental representations with the ‘computer metaphor.’ Computers 
show us how to connect semantical with causal properties for symbols.(Fodor 1987, 
p. 18, italics added) 
 
The reason why “computers show us” about the connection between Horst’s two theses, 
or Pinker’s two kinds of properties, is because computers are causally, not consciously, 
determined to infer meaning via syntax. If you put in the right code, then, so long as the 
code corresponds to reality, the formal operations the computer performs will result in 
true conclusions. The wonder of Husserl’s realization of these two components is that 
Husserl didn’t need Turing machines in order to provide a theoretical indication. There 
are many questions surrounding this issue which are not unrelated to Centrone’s (2006) 
work on Husserl’s possible insights into recursive properties, which, if I am correct, 
would be exemplified by the mechanism in question. However, I will restrict myself here 
to the exegesis of the 1891 essay and the defense of my theses.  
Before we begin, one might ask whether anyone has previously thought that 
Husserl had a computational theory of mind (CTM). Hubert Dreyfus (1982) once pointed 
out that Husserl was, in virtue of his interest in formal rules governing mental states and 
processes, a precursor to the employment of the computational theory of mind in 
cognitive psychology. For CTM is primarily concerned with specifying the formal rules 





determined cognitive processes. Dreyfus, however, never directly attributed a 
computational theory of mind to Husserl:  
 
Whether in fact Husserl held what Fodor calls the computational theory of mind -- 
that is, whether according to Husserl, unlike Frege, the predicate-senses do their 
job of representing objects under aspects, and of unifying diverse experiences of 
the same objects, strictly on the basis of their shapes (i.e. as a syntactic system 
independent of any interpretation) -- cannot be so easily determined. (Dreyfus 1982, 
p. 10) 
 
I shall attempt to contradict Dreyfus and show that the determination of “[w]hether in fact 
Husserl held what Fodor calls the computational theory of mind” may be rather easily 
determined, since Husserl apparently hypothesized in 1891 a causally driven mechanism 
of symbolic inference which, indeed, functions "as a syntactic system independent of any 
interpretation" – i.e., independent of awareness of the meanings of the tokens during the 
causal performance of the formal (not simply associative) operations. Dreyfus wrote the 
above sentence in 1982, but the essay which I consider as containing the best evidence 
for the attribution of CTM to Husserl was not translated into English until 1994, by 
Dallas Willard. That fact might have something to do with the novelty of my assertions. 
In an interesting response to Dreyfus, McIntyre attempted to lay out the evidence 





removed). McIntyre believes that “[w]hat is seriously at issue between Husserl and 
computationalists is the notion of meaning itself and its role in mental representation” 
(1986, p. 107). In particular, McIntyre argues that Husserl’s “noematic Sinne” – though 
they “are like Fodor’s mental representations in several significant respects” – 
nevertheless do not “have meanings; rather, noematic Sinne are meanings (hence, 
‘Sinne’)” (1986, p. 106). As a result, Husserl solves the problem of intentionality in a 
way that differs from the computationalist’s solution. According to McIntyre, he 
“appeal[s] to a ‘semantics of reference’ quite different from the causal account. A mental 
state is intentional in character by virtue of its relation to a noematic Sinn” (1986, p. 108). 
Now, I agree with McIntyre concerning the problem of intentionality and Husserl’s 
solution. But it is not clear that this differs in any way from Fodor’s account, since Fodor 
also believes that an intentional mental state is intentional “by virtue of its relation to” a 
meaning, which is independent of its (causal) instantiation or token instances. That is 
how Fodor avoids psychologism and attains content identity as opposed to content 
similarity (Crane 2014, p. 10). The computationalist’s problem is something different: 
namely, how do mental processes preserve truth? As Fodor shows, the answer to this 
question does not result in anything incompatible with multiply instantiable meaning-
types and their use in the explication of intentional mental states. As a result, McIntyre’s 
view that the Husserlian and computationalist accounts are opposed on this point is, I 
think, incorrect. 
All of the evidence presented, moreover, against the computationalist reading of 





McIntyre’s evidence mostly relates to a specific interpretation2 of Ideas I (1913). I 
believe it is reasonable, however, to suspend one’s preconceptions about Husserl’s views 
concerning mental representations while reading the essay “On the Logic of Signs 
(Semiotic).” That’s because, as Dallas Willard points out, “in ‘The Logic of Signs’ the 
[mental] representation is treated strictly as an object, never as an act” (1994, p. xxiii). 
This is because Husserl is uniquely examining, from page 358 to page 365 in Husserliana 
XII, the causal consequences of syntactic form, and so treating a mental representation as 
a syntactic “object” capable of manipulation by causality as opposed to a conscious “act.” 
A final note: one might reasonably wonder what motivates the computational 
theory of mind as an explanatory framework. One could answer this question by pointing 
to Husserl’s motivations, or one could turn to others’ motivations. I have already 
mentioned that I think the primary motivation in Husserl’s 1891 text derives from his 
desire to find a solution to the psychosemantic problem of how meaning is formally 
inferred by a causal mechanism. However, there is evidence that Husserl also thought the 
mechanism of symbolic inference, which we will identify as a computational mechanism, 
genetically explains the “origination” through “natural thought” of the sign systems of 
language and arithmetic (Hua XII, p. 368/1994, p. 46). In this respect, Husserl’s 
motivations anticipate Chomsky’s speculation concerning the originative power of the 
                                                          
2 Charles S. Brown contests this Fregean reading as encouraging the computationalist reading of Husserl. 
He wishes to show that as we leave the Fregean reading behind, we will come “closer to a so-called 
connectionist model” (1990, p. 65). Besides the fact that CTM and connectionism are not incompatible 
theories (Cummins 2010), Brown is incorrect in believing that the computational theory of mind is 
committed to a Fregean thesis concerning abstract Sinne. Fodor’s (1998) endorsement of meaning-
publicity, which is the same as Hopp’s (2011) instantiation model of meaning, is technically a separate 
thesis, though eminently compatible with CTM. Moreover, Dreyfus already noted that the computational 





computational mechanism (of Merge) for language and arithmetic (Chomsky 2012, p. 
15). Hence one possible motivation is the explanation of all sign systems from their 
sources in the computational mechanisms of the mind. 
All of the above will hopefully become clear in the course of further research. For 
now, I want to advance to the task of discovering the defining problem of 
computationalism in Husserl’s 1891 essay, and then show that Husserl’s solution is to 
attribute a causally driven computational mechanism, or an automatic symbolic 
procedure, as a “naturwüchsige” component of the human mind (Hua XII, p. 361).  
Section I. Concerning the Necessity of the Inadequacy of Associationism for the 
Truth of My Thesis 
Before I turn to the essay, I’d like to emphasize that the inadequacy of 
associationism is absolutely critical to the attribution of CTM to Husserl. If I cannot show 
that Husserl regarded associationism as inadequate for solving the problem of how 
mental processes preserve truth, my view must be incorrect. Because if associationism is 
the only mechanism of the mind on offer, then the formal structures exhibited “[i]n the 
process of the rapid flow of thought” (“[i]m Verlaufe des rascheren Gedankenflusses”) 
must be reducible to associative structures (Hua XII, p. 354/1994, p. 33). If they are 
reducible, there is no residual question about how those trains of thought are truth-
preservative, since associations are neither true nor false. Judgments and their truth-





For example, my ability to make transitive judgments improves in direct 
proportion to my experience of (relevantly similar) transitive relations. Husserl refers to 
this mechanical ability, which improves with each experience, as "the imperceptible 
motive force" of our trains of thought (Hua XII, p. 362/1994, p. 41). This corresponds to 
what we now think of as neural pathway building. This motive force is merely causal and 
not in any way semantically evaluable. But Husserl is, over and above this, asking the 
question, “What is the basis for that status as truths which is enjoyed by the results of 
these natural mechanisms?” (Hua XII, p. 362/1994, p. 40). This “basis” however is not 
justificatory: “[W]e do not inquire into the logical justification of these symbolic modes 
of procedure” (Hua XII, p. 361/1994, p. 40). Between memory (implementation) and 
justification (consciousness), Husserl posits a computational level. He refers to this level 
as a "natural psychological mechanism of symbolic inference" which, though it is 
powered by causality and the associationistic "mechanism of reproduction,” has the 
peculiar properties of a formal system inasmuch as it typically yields truth in virtue of a 
computational process involving mental representations with a linguistic format (Hua 
XII, pp. 363-364/1994, pp. 42-43). 
I want to begin to secure this point before we fully head into the exposition. 
Husserl, at one point in the essay, has this to say: 
 
[I]t is the power of the association of ideas which is the imperceptible motive force 





conclusion sentence is not produced in one stroke, in one act. For that would 
presuppose that we had already repeatedly drawn exactly the same conclusion from 
the same premisses, whereas it is precisely the characteristic mark of the 
[computational] procedure that it is applied mechanically and with success to each 
new case. The reproduction comes about indirectly, under the mediation of the 
form. We understand by this something like what formal logic does when it speaks 
of “forms of inference.” (Hua XII, p. 362/1994, p. 41) 
 
The words "wholly unique fashion" refer to the computational nature of the procedure, 
which is over and above, and therefore distinct from, the “association of ideas.” This is 
why bare-bones associationism is inadequate for solving the problem of why we typically 
arrive at true judgments in our non-logical everyday life. The properly rationalist solution 
is to say that our brains are, in some obscure way, hard-wired not just to remember but 
also to compute -- hence our ability to deal with “new” cases. 
Another way to say this is that the logical forms of thought are not constituted by 
the causal relations they enter into. Since the forms are not constituted by causal 
relations, they are not reducible to causal relations. Fodor makes this point: “The logical 
form of a propositional attitude [or thought] is not (repeat: is not) reducible to the causal 
relations among its constituents [...]. This is a fundamental difference between rationalist 
and empiricist psychologies: whereas, according to the latter, the structure of a thought is 





according to the former, it is an independent parameter” (Fodor (2000) 17). Part of the 
burden of proof in what follows, therefore, will be to show that specifying “the structure 
of a thought” is, for Husserl, just such an independent parameter. 
Section II. Exposition of the Essay on Signs, Interpreted in Accordance with My 
Theses (Part I) 
In what follows, I’m going to go through (ab initio) Husserl’s essay "On the Logic 
of Signs (Semiotic)" (1891) in order to see that Husserl had a computational theory of 
mind: a theory of (1) mental representations which are computationally processed (2) by 
means of causality. He uses this hypothesis to solve the problem of how truth can be the 
result of a blind, causal mechanism within “the rapid flow of thinking” (“im raschen 
Flusse des Denkens”) (Hua XII, p. 357/1994, p. 36)3. This is sometimes referred to, in the 
literature of cognitive science, as the problem of “rational coherence” in trains of thought 
which are too rapid to be under conscious control (Cain 2016 p. 36). 
At the outset of the essay, Husserl wonders how the concepts of the sciences (both 
a priori and empirical) are almost entirely removed from our direct and "authentic" 
experience (Hua XII, p. 340/1994, p. 20). How can our knowledge of the world be 
essentially divorced (essential due to "the essential imperfections of our intellect" 
                                                          
3 Husserl first raises the question of how a “logically unjustified procedure” – i.e. a causal mental 
mechanism – can arrive at truth, which Husserl understands as a function of judgment, on page 358, some 
18 pages into the essay as a whole (Hua XII, p. 358/1994, p. 37). Within the context of the essay as a 
whole, then, Husserl begins with the discussion of (in)authentic representation or “symbolic representation” 
(Hua XII, p. 340/1994, p. 20) and leads up to the discovery – within the context of the question of how 
mental processes preserve truth - of inauthentic judgments, i.e., judgments not present before consciousness 
(Hua XII, p. 361/1994, p. 39). This judgmental process within the mechanism of symbolic inference is then 
explicated in terms of the deductive structure of an automatic formal system and the question is then 





(“wesentlichen Unvollkommenheiten unseres Intellekts”)) from anything with which we 
can come into direct conscious contact (Hua XII, p. 349/1994, p. 29)? The scientific 
revolution of the 17th century had highlighted this problem with their incredible 
discoveries, which for all time confirmed the gap between our knowledge of the world 
and our experience. Despite this gap, or perhaps because of it, knowledge is possible. But 
how? The answer is: by means of inauthentic representations. 
It is natural, therefore, that Husserl's essay should begin by dividing concepts into 
two species: authentic representations, which present their objects directly without 
alteration; and inauthentic representations, which present their objects indirectly under a 
symbolic aspect (Hua XII, p. 340/1994, p. 20). We are, through the latter type of 
representation, referred to an object beyond the representation, which may or may not be 
presentable or even imaginable (“unvorstellbar”) (Hua XII, p. 356/1994, p. 35). All 
higher psychic life (e.g., natural science) is conditioned, according to Husserl, by the 
existence of such inauthentic representations. For by means of inauthentic representations 
"the human intellect raised itself to a new and truly human level" – and this assertion has 
been vindicated by relatively recent work on animal communication (Gallistel 1993; Hua 
XII, p. 350/1994, p. 29). As inauthentic representations are manipulated with greater 
finesse, our knowledge increases: "the progress of intellectual development runs parallel 
with progress in symbolic technique" (Hua XII, p. 350/1994, p. 29). Indeed, the 
aforementioned scientific revolution of the 17th century is given as an example of the 
salutary effect of liberation from authentic representations: Husserl singles this out for 





Husserl, having underlined their importance, next proceeds to a proper analysis of 
the various types of inauthentic representations. There are two types of inauthentic 
representation, with two sub-types for the second type: 
 
The inauthentic representation can [...]: 1) Serve as mere intermediary for the 
production of the authentic representations corresponding to them. In this manner 
there function for example conventional markings, mnemonically designed 
sequences of words, mechanically learned verse, and the like. 2) But the 
inauthentic representations can also completely take the place of the authentic 
ones as surrogate representation. Here again two cases are to be distinguished: A) 
The inauthentic representations serve merely as convenient replacement for the 
authentic ones in carrying out some higher level psychical activity. As “higher” 
psychical activities in this respect we count: representing in phantasy as opposed 
to sensation; representing of more abstract as opposed to concrete contents [....]. 
(Hua XII, pp. 351-352/1994, pp. 30-31) 
 
The first type (1) of inauthentic representations partially replaces what corresponds to 
them (e.g. "conventional markings", memorizing catechisms). Only partially because it is 
clear these substitutes cannot totally obscure the contents they refer to -- indeed, they 
essentially serve as mere bridges to those contents. Hence it is clear how these 





representations corresponding to them" (Hua XII, pp. 351-352/1994, pp. 30-31). An 
interesting development occurs with the second type (2). These do not serve as mere 
intermediaries; hence these do not merely partially obscure the contents they intend. This 
type of inauthentic representation "completely" obscures its content. And there are, 
furthermore, two sub-types of (2) to be considered: (A) referred to above, and (B) which 
we will get to. 
The first sub-type (A) of the inauthentic representations which effect a total 
eclipse of any authentically represented content serves as mere "convenient replacements 
for the authentic [representations] in carrying out some higher level psychical activity" 
(Hua XII, pp. 351-352/1994, pp. 30-31). The word "convenient" here is significant; for 
the difference between (A) and the yet-to-be-analyzed (B) representations will precisely 
hinge on the meaning of this word. Husserl contrasts, throughout his essay, convenience 
with nature. Anything "convenient" is to be understood as coming under "the influence of 
the will" (Hua XII, p. 345/1994, p. 24). Hence (A) representations are purposefully set up 
with a view to replacing the corresponding authentically represented contents with which 
we are in principle familiar. Hence under this sub-type we find representation in 
imagination "as opposed to sensation" which represents the source of the imaginative 
contents; and representation of abstract contents "as opposed to concrete contents" with 
which we are more familiar. 
It should be noted that Husserl begins precisely here, in his discussion of (A) 
representations, to speak about a forgetting of the act of replacement. Husserl says, "In 





inauthentic representations of the type here considered prevail to an extraordinarily high 
degree" (Hua XII, p. 352/1994, p. 31). Some extremely interesting reflections, 
anticipating Jackendoff (2012, Ch. 36) on the fragmentary nature of thought in relation to 
the unconscious, follow: 
 
Words or letters, accompanied by indistinct and unclear phantasms, and, in and 
with these latter, isolated and fragmentary qualities [Merkmale], the rudimentary 
beginnings of higher psychical activities, and so on -- all without a fixed content or 
continuity, now contracting into the mere word images, and now approximating (in 
this or that respect) to the clarity of a genuine representation: -- when closely 
examined, these are our thoughts. And so perfectly and assuredly do they surrogate 
for the concepts really intended, that in the majority of cases we do not notice the 
distinction between the two at all, in spite of the huge gulf separating them. The 
signs and fragments of experiences stand in place of the genuine concepts, but that 
they do so is unnoticed by us. (Hua XII, p. 352/1994, p. 31; italics added) 
 
Since the "rapid flow of thought" here described as fragmentary and unclear is genuine 
thought ("these are our thoughts”), it follows that thinking is not identical with 
consciously directed thinking. Hence the surrogation of "signs and fragments of 
experiences" in the place of "genuine concepts" is, in the process of thought, "unnoticed 





this is how we end up deciding that our unconscious mental life is largely rational. The 
basic point here, however, is that thinking in the first instance occurs without our notice. 
This will prove important for the ascription of computational processes to the mind 
insofar as they are causally directed, i.e., the computational theory of mind. 
Up to now, twelve pages into his essay, Husserl has dealt merely with inauthentic 
representations which, upon being asked about their meaning, we could in principle 
"unfold" for the hearer, i.e., tell the hearer what we mean with authentic contents. In other 
words, the inauthentic representations up to now are compatible with very strict 
empiricist origin stories; origin stories, for instance, that respect Hume's copy principle, 
or semantic theses which dictate that all representations must be realizable. This is not the 
case for the majority of the representations which fall under Husserl’s sub-type (B):  
 
B) The class of surrogate representations that we have dealt with up to now is 
characterized by the fact that the authentic representations which the surrogates 
replace are at our disposal at any moment. Where the controlling interest can only 
be satisfied through those authentic representations themselves, they quickly 
reappear from memory. It is also clear that the prior existence of these authentic 
representations forms the presupposition of those inauthentic representations which 
here serve as substitutes. It is wholly otherwise in these respects with symbolic 
representations of the second class. These do not subserve a mere convenience of 





that are easily reproducible in any moment. The symbols here, quite to the contrary, 
refer to facts whose authentic representation is denied us -- whether at the time, or 
permanently... [O]bjects of [this] latter type remain forever inaccessible to would-
be authenticizations. (Hua XII, p. 354/1994, p. 33) 
 
Notice, to begin, the reappearance of the word "convenience." It is convenient to use a 
sign, i.e., an inauthentic representation, in the place of, or as a deputy for, an authentic 
representation, with which we are familiar or have had experience. The possibility of 
convenience, hence also the possibility of forgetting about what the signs represent, 
cannot properly characterize sub-type (B) representations because "the prior existence of 
[the relevant] authentic representations [do not even] form the presupposition of" the 
representations under discussion. Hence there is no possibility, with respect to those 
representations which are "permanently" as opposed to momentarily "denied us," of 
actualizing the representation, whether via memory or perception for the benefit of 
oneself or an interlocutor. And this is virtually everything we know – all of “the concepts 
of the sciences” fall under this class (Hua XII, p. 355/1994, p. 34). 
Directly after his analysis of inauthentic representations, Husserl proceeds to 
speak about matters "of greater importance" concerning all types of inauthentic 
representation (Hua XII:357/1994:36). This is where the essay really becomes interesting 
for our theses. Husserl immediately reminds us of our “unnoticed” mental life (Hua 





the inadequacy of associationism in dealing with the truth-evaluability of representations. 
"We begin,” Husserl says, “with a distinction which we have already pointed out. One 
must, namely, not confuse the fact that surrogate representations are being used with 
being aware of that use. The latter is absent in many, if not most, cases: The fragmentary 
contents and signs surrogate, but that they do so, we do not notice" (Hua 
XII:357/1994:36). This is something Husserl already said when he referred to our 
thoughts in the "rapid flow of thought" as "fragmentary" (Hua XII:352/1994:31). A few 
lines down he repeats the phrase "rapid flow of thought" as "rapid flow of thinking" (Hua 
XII:357/1994:36). But now, in the very next line, as a way to introduce truth-evaluation 
into the discussion, he wishes to introduce the fact that judgments are automatically being 
made in this "rapid flow": "Inauthentic representations are [in this context of the rapid 
flow of thought] the basis of our common practice of forming judgments" (Hua 
XII:357/1994:36). By "common practice of forming judgments" Husserl means our 
everyday practice of judgment formation (in the manner of the intuitive judgment 
formation of Sherlock Holmes), as opposed to making scientific judgments with an 
explicit and conscious view toward knowledge and formal validity (in the manner of 
Euclid sitting down with ruler and compass). Hence Husserl says that "it surely is not 
logical motives - i.e., motives toward knowledge - that guide judgment activity in 
practice but rather blind psychological laws" (Hua XII, p. 357/1994, p. 36). Notice 
especially Husserl’s point about "guid[ing]" - we are not consciously guiding the 
formation of our "judgments" in the "rapid flow of thought.” As with Sherlock Holmes, 





accuracy. Hence Husserl concludes that "inauthentic representations" are "the basis of our 
common practice of forming judgments”4 (Hua XII, p. 357/1994, p. 36). Just to be clear: 
these “psychological laws” are "blind" precisely because these are mental processes of 
which we are not aware: it is causality which is directing the flow of our mental 
processes, as opposed to conscious intentionality (Hua XII, p. 357/1994, p. 36). Hence, 
it’s causality which is guiding and acting upon the inauthentic symbolic representations, 
insofar as we have these, toward judgmental outcomes. The wonder for Husserl (and 
Fodor 1987) is that these judgments are typically true. 
This fact is extremely strange for Husserl because one naturally wonders how 
blind judgments could be so accurate (without invoking teleological metaphysics). And it 
is not the fact that blind judging typically leads to correct assessments that we are 
motivated to engage in such judging -- that would be to get the facts backwards. For, 
again, we judge as a result of, in Husserl’s phrase, "blind psychological laws” (Hua XII, 
p. 357/1994, p. 36). Husserl characterizes this paradoxical situation: 
 
We thus do not operate with signs instead of with the facts because we made an 
induction [on the basis of the fact that] abundant experience has taught us that signs 
and facts stand in such a relationship that a procedure for forming judgments which 
is based upon signs always proves correct for the correlative facts. No. We proceed 
                                                          
4 “Die uneigentlichen Vorstellungen sind die Grundlagen unserer gemeinen praktischen Urteilstätigkeit” 





without reflection, and thus without induction also. The true situation is far simpler. 
We follow in judgment the train of the association of ideas, which, depending upon 
the course of our interests, reproduces now this, now that group out of the 
associative complex belonging to the concept. (Hua XII, p. 357/1994, p. 36) 
 
Because inauthentic symbol manipulation is not based on "induction," it cannot be on the 
basis of experience with judgment that we engage in our everyday judging. Since 
inauthentic symbol manipulation is not based on "reflection," it cannot be on the basis of 
conscious and explicit thought that we judge. Instead, blind psychological laws guide us. 
Here Husserl alludes to the blind psychological laws known to the empiricists -- the 
associative laws -- which determine "the train of the association of ideas.” This train of 
thought is not consciously guided. That was, indeed, the whole point of associationism: to 
acquire an explanatory apparatus which had psychological plausibility but whose laws 
were as automatic and brute as physical laws (Newton being the inspiration for Humean 
associationism). 
The problem with the brute physicality of associationism is that here, as in Fodor, 
you cannot, by its means alone, properly illuminate the quasi-logical aspect of cognitive 
thought processes in the "rapid flow of thought.” Specifically, you cannot get a rational 
mental life that respects truth to emerge out of associationism. For, according to 
associationism, the nature of judgment, and so our access to truth, must be reducible to 





satisfied with [this] illumination of the factual [associationistic] psychological state. With 
the judgment a perspective comes into consideration which is lacking with the 
representation: namely, concerning the two-fold question about justification and about 
truth" (Hua XII, p. 358/1994, p. 37). Husserl here reveals why he introduced the concept 
of the judgment into the discussion: to discuss the "two-fold question about justification 
and about truth." But justification (quid iuris) does not arise in the case of unconscious 
mental mechanisms. Hence Husserl quickly determines that in our unconscious symbol 
manipulation "we proceed without any justification; we are guided, not by a motive of 
knowledge, but rather by a psychological mechanism" (Hua XII, p. 358/1994, p. 37). 
But this does not settle the question about truth; and truth is an essential 
component of knowledge. And yet, with respect to the mechanism, explicit knowledge-
motives are absent. We therefore have a puzzle, which associationism did not solve: if 
we're not guided by motives of knowledge, but by a blind "psychological mechanism," of 
whose operations we are not conscious, we are still presented with the problem of why 
we nevertheless typically arrive at truth without consciously intending to, and therefore 
without any justification. Husserl describes the situation: 
 
Indeed, a logically unjustified procedure can quite well lead in the end to true 
results. One such case -- and in fact quite a strange one -- here lies before us. It 
certainly would be quite well conceivable apriori [sic] that a psychological 





or predominantly to error, and only exceptionally to truth. In reality matters stand 
just the opposite. On the average we get along very well with judgments in terms 
of surrogates (and the overwhelming majority of all judgments are of this type). 
This is a very interesting fact metaphysically. Here one could, extending a Humean 
reflection, go on to say that it conforms to the general of nature to secure by a 
mechanical instinct an activity of soul so essential to the survival of the human race. 
This activity then remains on the average free from error in its effects, holds valid 
right from the beginnings of life and thought, and is independent of the laborious 
and fallacious proofs of reason, which first become possible at a more mature 
period of development. Recently it is perhaps preferred to explain this teleological 
trait of our nature by means of Darwinian principles. (Hua XII, p. 358-359/1994, 
p. 37) 
 
Recall that Husserl had earlier referred to our "common practice of forming judgments" 
in the "flow of thinking" -- hence not consciously determined (Hua XII, p. 357/1994, p. 
36). He refers again to this "common practice" now as "our practical (extralogical) 
judgment." It is "extralogical" because the symbol manipulation here involved is not 
conscious, and so does not come under the direction of our rational will, which is 
conscious. He notes that "a psychological arrangement of our nature" might have 
"force[d]" our automatic judgments predominantly toward error. Instead, our nature is 
such that our automatic judgments typically yield truth. He then supposes one could 





either "the general wisdom of nature" or "teleology." However, one would then entirely 
explain away, under the aspect of a mythic Normality, the logical nature of our properly 
non-logical judging. Such a solution would prevent a computational theory of mind from 
arising. But the interesting thing for Husserl (as opposed to Hume) is that we get truth out 
of a blind, causal mechanism. I think Husserl rejects the Humean and Darwinian 
responses to this fact because these responses do not respect the logical aspects (the truth-
respecting aspects) of the properly non-logical “mechanism of symbolic inference” (Hua 
XII, p. 363/1994, p. 42). In other words, there is a non-reducible logical aspect to the 
blind judgments of the mechanism which must be vindicated. 
Having dismissed both associationism and Humean/Darwinian teleology for the 
explanation of the fact that our automatic psychological mechanism of judgment typically 
arrives at truth without explicit intentional guidance, we still must seek an explanation 
which does justice to the logical character of this admittedly "extralogical" mechanical 
process: 
 
What we do and must strive for is a logical illumination of the state of affairs. "How 
so?" one will ask. "A logical illumination of a procedure recognized to be non-
logical? Is that not a contradiction?" It will not be difficult to make clear the 
soundness of our aim. If a characteristic type of judgment process, although not 
guided by motives of knowledge nevertheless leads to correct results then we still 





transparent to us -- the grounds why it is suited to produce truth (although not 
knowledge). In other words, it must be possible to state a parallel logical process 
which explains the mechanism of this type of judgment process logically, and 
conceives of it, so to speak, as if it had been rationally devised by means of that 
logical process. (Hua XII, p. 359/1994, p. 37-38) 
 
Notice here that the inquiry seeks the "inner structure" of the “spontaneously generated 
(naturwüchsige)” automatic "judgment process" (Hua XII, p. 361/1994, p. 40). We are, 
then, looking at an internalist inquiry. We are investigating an "inner structure" of our 
unconscious mental life "in case that really is something transparent to us." It may not be. 
Hence, we must hypothesize concerning a hidden mechanism. Husserl's hypothesis is 
based on the belief that "it must be possible to state a parallel logical process which 
explains the mechanism of this type of judgment process logically" even though it is, in 
itself, extralogical -- even though, that is, we are talking about an "inner structure" 
governed by "blind causality" (Hua XII, p. 364/1994, p. 43). The question then is, how 
does "blind causality" respect the intentional/semantic property of "truth." We need to 
characterize a spontaneously generated (“naturwüchsige”) system internal to our nature 
which follows rules which respect the syntax of symbols, with the result that we typically 
arrive at true thoughts, i.e., correct results (Hua XII, p. 361/1994, p. 40). Husserl's hunch 
is that we should be able to reconstruct this automatic formal procedure, which in itself is 






Husserl is, therefore, talking in a rudimentary manner about a nativist symbolic 
procedure which, though causally determined, is nevertheless directed toward truth. 
Computational cognitive science asks the question how is this possible (Milkowski 2013). 
The solution for Husserl, as for computationalism, lies in the fact that "it must be possible 
to state a parallel logical process which explains the mechanism of this type of judgment 
process logically, and conceives of it, so to speak, as if it had been rationally devised by 
means of that logical process" (Hua XII, p. 359/1994, p. 38). The "as if" is crucial: as in 
Fodor's Psychosemantics we are hypothesizing by means of a metaphor -- in our day we 
call it "the computer metaphor" or "the picture of the mind as a syntax-driven machine" 
(Fodor 1987, pp. 18, 20). This is a level of reality -- an idealization -- and so not the most 
concrete reality (which may indeed be better described in associationist-connectionist 
terms). The reason why we need this idealization though is because we want a theory of 
thinking that respects logical forms. Specifically, we want a theory of thinking which 
explains "very deep properties of the mental - as, for example, that trains of thought are 
largely truth preserving" (Fodor 1987, p. 18). We have already discovered that Husserl is 
interested in explaining this phenomenon. 
So far, then, we have determined that Husserl was animated by the defining 
problem of computational cognitive science. Since Husserl intends, so far as we have 
proceeded in the text, to solve this problem by hypothesizing that "it must be possible" to 
extract the logical features out of the "inner structure" of an essentially blind and 
“spontaneously generated” mental process which typically yields truth, what we have, 





genuine thinking in the fully conscious sense, is yet the source of such thinking: "In 
every case," as Husserl says, "the source for the conventional modes of procedure lies in 
the natural ones" (Hua XII, p. 366/1994, p.  44). That's why computationalism is an 
explanation: it characterizes a "source." It explains where other phenomena (such as 
logic, arithmetic, and language - any computationally relevant sign system according to 
Husserl) come from (Hua XII, pp. 367-368/1994, p. 46). 
We proceed, therefore, to a close-reading of the most important sections of "On 
the Logic of Signs" wherein Husserl presents his solution to the problem of how mental 
processes preserve truth. The solution will come through Husserl’s discovery of the 
computational theory of mind. My argument for the following section will be this: 
Computationalism is the idea that the mind comes prepackaged as, or is endogenously 
constrained to be in certain respects, an automatic formal system: this explains why trains 
of thought without logical intent naturally resemble arguments exhibiting deductive 
structure with logical intent. Automatic formal systems yield true results provided that 1) 
the syntactic symbols with which they compute are univocal and are semantically 
evaluable, and 2) the mechanized inferences they perform are valid and truth-preservative 
(Haugeland 1981; Cummins 2010). These two conditions describe a computational 
cognitive process: the first condition connects representations to syntax (corresponding to 
Pinker and Horst’s first thesis of CTM), and the second condition uses the syntax, in 
inauthentic judging, to arrive at true conclusions through blind causality (corresponding 
to Pinker and Horst’s second thesis of CTM). Now, in point of textual fact, these are the 





inference" which typically yields true results (Hua XII, p. 363/1994, p. 42). It follows 
from this attribution that Husserl uses the notion of an automatic formal system to 
characterize the mind. Since an automatic formal system attributed to the "internal 
structure" of the mind, and guided by blind causality, just is the computational theory of 
mind, it follows that Husserl had a computational theory of mind (Hua XII, p. 359/1994, 
p. 38).  
Section III. Exposition of the Essay Interpreted in Accordance with My Theses 
(Part II) 
We must now proceed to those sections of Husserl’s text which explicitly attempt 
to answer the question of how mechanical processes of the mind, too rapid for conscious 
control, can nevertheless yield truth (Hua XII, pp. 359-364). We will proceed in the text, 
therefore, from the place where we left off, on page 359 of Husserliana XII. 
Husserl, having proposed to explicate the "inner structure" of the "natural 
psychological mechanism of symbolic inference," proceeds in preliminary fashion to note 
two classes of judgmental process "for the purposes of a response" (Hua XII, p. 
359/1994, p. 38). One class (1) is an authentic judging, with symbols which are "not 
specifically noticed"; the other class (2) is an inauthentic judging ("the judging itself is 
inauthentic") (Hua XII, p. 359/1994, p. 38). The second class is important for solving the 
computational problem because it represents the possibility of inference as mechanical, 





The first class of cases is easy enough to understand. With (1), since the judging 
is authentic, the symbols, though not noticed as such, are yet guided by "the interest of 
judgment" (Hua XII, p. 360/1994, p. 39). If our authentic judging is, say, seeking to 
identify some otherwise unknown object as such and such, provided it has a certain 
property, then "from a logical viewpoint" a "schema is presupposed" which is equivalent 
to modus ponens: if it has the property, it's such and such; it does; it is. But, of course, 
"not a trace of such [explicit] logical reflections is to be found in the natural course of our 
thinking" (Hua XII, p. 360/1994, p. 39). Why? Because we are, in our common practice 
of judging, "unencumbered by the question of justification." Indeed, we are being guided 
by blind causality. Nevertheless, this causality respects semantic relations, and 
consequently we can theoretically ascertain why the judging, insofar as it is carried 
through in a valid manner, may lead to a true result; and therefore "we see that the non-
logical process must yield the same result as the logical one" (Hua XII, p. 360/1994, p. 
39). 
The second class of cases is harder to understand, since the inference itself is 
inauthentic. It is, therefore, more difficult to see how truth, which is a semantic notion, is 
being aimed at, since this kind of judging is purely syntactic; whereas the previous class, 
since the judging was authentic, was still properly semantic. Husserl proceeds to examine 
the second class of cases where the judging is "externally inauthentic" (Hua XII, p. 






Sensible signs (e.g., names) of the representations are combined with sensible signs 
of acknowledgement and rejection; sentences originate [somehow]; systematic 
sequences of sentences symbolize deductions; and the judgment process consists, 
then, in allowing an external progression along the chain of signs to surrogate for 
genuine inference. (Hua XII, p. 361/1994, p. 39-40) 
 
Notice that this is a description of the actual judgment process within the causal nexus. 
This process nevertheless respects syntactic relations. For "sensible signs" are being run 
over externally5 as being "combined with sensible signs of acknowledgement and 
rejection." The “externally inauthentic” judging is, in other words, capable of registering 
the truth or falsity of the syntactic units without consciously being aware of the truth-
values (Hua XII, p. 361/1994, p. 39). Hence the "external progression,” which is being 
motivated causally, nevertheless respects formal-syntactic marks and relations (e.g. 
negations). Once one has "systematic sequences" of such marks and relations one can 
"symbolize deductions." Consequently, since we’re describing the operations of an 
internal mechanism, we're able to show how "inference" can be mechanized. Inference 
therefore can be treated as a syntactically determined computational process. 
The logical schemata, given as examples by Husserl, which explicate the causal 
process with respect to this second class of cases, are transitive relations and equivalence 
relations expressive of transitivity (e.g., "a=b, b=c, c=d, d=e, and thus a=e") (Hua XII, p. 
                                                          





361/1994, p. 40). These belong to the class of logical rules called “rules of replacement.” 
Since these rules are “transformation” rules, we may note that Husserl countenances 
causally determined inauthentic “transformations” of mental representations, even for 
“new” cases (Hua XII, p. 361/1994, p. 41). 
Husserl intends the above analyses to illuminate the "natural psychological 
mechanism of symbolic inference" (Hua XII, p. 363/1994, p. 42). By analogy with his 
explications of judgments by means of logical schemata, he now thinks, given the 
analyses, that finally "it will be possible to construct the parallel logical procedure, which 
resolves our question [about the apparent teleology] and provides us with the explanation 
of why that mechanical process must produce correct results" (Hua XII, p. 363/1994, p. 
42). Notice that the construction of “the parallel logical procedure” is a reference back to 
Husserl’s original characterization of how the problem is to be solved: “[I]t must be 
possible to state a parallel logical process which explains the mechanism of this type of 
judgment process logically, and conceives of it, so to speak, as if it had been rationally 
devised by means of that logical process” (Hua XII, p. 359/1994, p. 38). Four pages later, 
with the above analyses in hand, Husserl proceeds toward his “explanation” of how 
mental processes in the causal nexus preserve truth by stating two conditions which are 
logically necessary for formal inference; and he claims that these two conditions are 






First of all, it is in the nature of the linguistic designators that come into play that 
they be univocal -- if not under all circumstances, yet within the systematic 
combinations which show up here. The systematic forms of conjunction for the 
words [i.e. syntax] must precisely reflect those present in the thoughts; otherwise 
the former never would be able to become regular surrogates for the latter. The 
ambiguities would, in spite of all the powers of reproduction [i.e. associationism], 
always force us to actualize the genuine representations, judgments, and inferences; 
and a mechanism would be impossible. (Hua XII, p. 363/1994, p. 42 – italics added) 
 
By "systematic forms of conjunction for the words" Husserl is referring to (what we 
would call) formal patterns of syntactic symbols. The crucial insight here is that the 
syntax of lexical symbols can "precisely reflect" the "thoughts" qua syntactic deductive 
structure (i.e. logical patterns). Notice also that Husserl is attributing logical (syntactic) 
form not only to the linguistic designators that are processed by the mechanism, but also 
to the thoughts, since he says that those “forms of conjunction […] must precisely reflect 
those present in the thoughts.” Hence Husserl is saying that thoughts have syntactic form. 
It would appear, then, that Husserl endorses the language of thought thesis: that mental 
representations have a language-like format6. Now for truth-preservation to actually 
obtain in the case of the linguistic "surrogates" reflecting the quasi-linguistic thoughts 
themselves, the symbols must of course be all "univocal.” This condition -- the condition 
                                                          
6 “[C]oncepts are a lot like words…. [and t]hat is the substance of the ‘language of thought’ (LOT) 





that the symbols employed be exact and unchanging (i.e. not fluid) -- corresponds to the 
digital, as opposed to the analog, nature of all automatic formal systems (Haugeland 1981 
p. 42). Hence the first condition of the mechanism is that the discrete, linguistic symbols 
processed by the mechanism of symbolic inference must be semantically evaluable in 
univocal fashion, and must precisely reflect the discrete, quasi-linguistic mental 
representations (i.e. the thoughts). 
The second condition for the mechanism to operate properly is the purely formal 
determination of the conclusion by the premisses. Husserl explains this second condition, 
and how the conjunction of the first condition (univocality of discrete symbols) with the 
second condition (formal determination of the conclusion by the premisses) fully solves 
the problem of how mental processes preserve truth, in the following manner: 
 
[T]here is yet another and more specific characteristic which the sign-system must 
possess [...]. Obviously the one part of the system which contains the premisses [...] 
must determine [...] the conclusion sentence, in a purely formal (and, of course, 
univocal) fashion. [....] All of which leads to an important consequence. If, namely, 
a determinate form of inference [...] fulfills all requirements [univocality and formal 
determination], then the knowledge of that state of affairs puts us in position to 
replace [...] genuine inferring with a symbolical inference. [....] The univocality of 
the linguistic expression and the univocal determination of the inference by the 





necessary and sufficient conditions for the blind mechanical procedure, on the one 
side, and for the logical mechanical procedure, on the other. In this manner is our 
problem resolved, and the apparent teleology of the natural process is completely 
illumined. (Hua XII, pp. 363-364/1994, p. 42) 
 
Husserl here isolates the two essential properties that any sign-system productive of 
deductive inference (resulting in truth) must possess. He then reasons that these 
properties apply just as much to the "blind mechanical procedure" observable in our 
unnoticed mental life as to the consciously devised "logical mechanical procedure" 
insofar as both mechanically preserve truth. Their commonality in this respect allows us 
to use the latter as a model for the former: for what is logically done "for reasons of 
knowledge, is done by the mechanism [...] out of blind causality" (Hua XII, pp. 364/1994, 
pp. 42-43). Because we see that the blind causality of our thought processes typically 
respects formal inference patterns, we must assume, in order to explain this phenomenon, 
that the consciously devised sign systems can be used to model the otherwise unnoticed, 
because causally determined, natural mechanisms. I therefore conclude that Husserl not 
only had a computational theory of mind but also anticipates its use as an explanatory 
apparatus: he connects logical forms with causality by means of syntax in order to 
explain the directedness toward truth of unnoticed mental processes, thereby avoiding 
Humean and Darwinian reduction. For Husserl these alternative explanations miss the 
quasi-logical problem of how mental processes preserve truth. That problem is solved 





tracking truth, formal validity supervenes7 upon causally manipulated mental 
representations that have a quasi-linguistic format (i.e. a syntax)8. 
Section IV. Conclusion: Husserl’s Epilogue and Discussion of my Results 
After Husserl discovers the computational theory of mind, he asserts that it is the 
psychological foundation for logical procedure. He says, “For in fact logical procedure is, 
vis-à-vis the corresponding natural one, not something toto genera different. Both 
processes make use of the psychological laws of our nature; and, to a considerable extent, 
they make use of the same ones” (Hua XII, p. 365/1994, p. 44). However, there is a 
difference. Logical procedure is consciously directed toward knowledge. As a result, 
there is less error and greater assurance of the correctness of the results: “[T]he logical 
procedure therefore serves in the assuring of knowledge” (Hua XII, p. 366/1994, p. 44). 
The natural logical procedure is also limited in scope: it is concerned with everyday 
judgments. But out of this fertile soil, the sophisticated conventional modes of procedure 
arise, which serve to expand knowledge in a consciously scientific fashion. Hence the 
consciously directed logical procedure also “serves in the expansion of knowledge” (Hua 
XII, p. 366/1994, p. 44). 
But one must not forget that “[i]n every case, the source for the conventional 
modes of procedure lies in the natural ones” (Hua XII, p. 366/1994, p. 44). Formal logic 
                                                          
7 For Husserl’s views on psychophysical supervenience, see Yoshimi (2011). The supervenience of 
conscious mental states on Husserl’s CTM is a mind/mind supervenience, not a mind/body supervenience 
as in the case of psychophysics. 
8 This accords with Fodor: "The tendency of mental processes to preserve truth [is] to be explained by the 
hypothesis that they are computations, where by stipulation a computation is a causal process that is 





is psychologically founded in the computational mechanism, as is arithmetic and 
language, since all are sign-systems involving the symbolic transformation of elements 
(Hua XII, pp. 367-368/1994, p. 46). With this insight, Husserl anticipates Chomsky’s 
(2012) speculations concerning the source of both arithmetic and language as having their 
originative source as sign-systems (as opposed to conventional markers) in the 
computational theory of mind (specifically, the computational mechanism of Merge): 
 
The single signs themselves are conventional. [….] But from the single signs there 
arose, in the manner of a natural development [natürlichen Entwicklung] system of 
language, with its finely articulated grammatical structure. And the purposiveness 
and elegance of this systematization is so conspicuous, that the thought that it could 
be a product of blind natural laws already presupposes a high development of 
psychology. It is the same with arithmetic. The single signs are inventions. [….] 
And nonetheless the system of arithmetic as a whole, with its wondrous structure, 
is not a product of intentional foresight, but rather is a natural development 
[natürlichen Entwicklung]. (Hua XII, p. 368/1994, p. 46) 
 
From such passages as these, it seems clear that Husserl conceived of the mechanism of 
symbolic inference to be rich in consequences. In particular, as a computational 
mechanism of the mind, it naturally produces formal systems through “blind natural 





computational theory of mind (qua explanans). It is clear therefore that, although Husserl 
uses the computational theory of mind, as I hope to have demonstrated, to solve the 
question of how mental processes preserve truth, he also believes that it explains the 
origin of the formal structures of sign-systems that spring from our minds without 
“intentional foresight.” I hope to expand upon these insights in future research, the results 
of which I believe will converge with at least some of the results of Bianchin (2018). 
The existing literature on this essay has not hitherto noticed that Husserl asks the 
defining question of computational cognitive science (e.g. D’Angelo 2013, Ierna 2008, 
Majolino 2012, Zuh 2012). Consequently, Husserl's discovery of the computational 
theory of mind, embedded in a language of thought, has also been missed, since this is 
the answer to Husserl’s question of how a causal mental process can preserve truth (“why 
the non-logical process must nonetheless have the effect of a logical one”) despite 
inferring blindly (through a hidden mental mechanism) (Hua XII, p. 359/1994, p. 38). 
The description of inauthentic judgments occurs as part of the answer to this (and only 
this) question – and this fact is missed in Byrne (2017). Sometimes the fact that Husserl 
is talking about a mechanism will be noticed (e.g. Fisette 1999), but not that the 
mechanism is a "spontaneously generated" mental mechanism of symbolic inference 
which exists as a "lawlike tendency of our nature" which “holds valid right from the 
beginnings of life and thought" (Hua XII, pp. 361, 365, 358/1994, p. 40, 43, 37). In future 
work, I hope to spell out the relationship of this mechanism to Husserl's later work. But 
for now, we can start to realize that Dreyfus' computationalist reading of Husserl (based 





McIntyre 1986, Brown 1990). For Husserl discovered (long before Ideas I) both the 
defining problem of computational cognitive science as well as its classic solution: 
mental processes preserve truth through a computational mechanism that causally 
processes semantically evaluable symbolic mental representations. As Willard (1994) 
notes, this is the only time in Husserl’s corpus that mental representations are treated as 
objects. 
I am, in conclusion, forced by the evidence to put forward the view that the 
mechanism of symbolic inference is a computational mechanism in a language of 
thought. It's a computational mechanism because it transforms symbols in the form of 
inauthentic mental representations. And it's in a language of thought because the 
representations ‘transformationally’ processed "precisely reflect [the] systematic forms of 
conjunction" -- i.e. the syntactic form -- of the thoughts. If thoughts did not have 
syntactic structure, Husserl argues, the mechanical nature of the mechanism of symbolic 
inference would fail, and we would always have to consciously infer to get the same 
results. Interestingly, this argument for the necessity of a language of thought, i.e. a 
combinatorial system of syntactically transformable mental representations, is unique to 
Husserl. Fodor's (1975) original argument is that computational processes require a 
medium of computation -- a system of representations. And since computations are 
syntactic by definition, these representations would have to be syntactically amenable. 
Husserl's argument, by contrast, is that, if there weren't a language of thought, then 
thinking would always have to be actualized. But this contradicts the phenomenology of 





flow of thought" to be considered under conscious control. It is, according to Husserl, on 
the basis of this evidence that we posit a language of thought. Hence Husserl supplies -- 
as distinct from Fodor's appeal to scientific realism -- a properly phenomenological 
argument based on lived experience for a computational language of thought. Further 






Chapter Two: Descriptive Sciences Necessarily Transform into Explanatory 
Sciences: Why the Essence of Science Demands the Logical Investigations Serve as 
Propaedeutic to the Computational Theory of Mind 
As we saw in the last chapter, I interpret Husserl as a proto-computationalist. This 
is because he actually had a computational theory of mind; indeed, the very one which is 
alive and well as an explanatory paradigm in cognitive science (Milkowski (2013); Cain 
(2015)). Contrast my approach with Yoshimi's (2016), who interprets Husserl as a proto-
dynamical-systems theorist (11). This latter approach is much more daring, since 
dynamical systems theory in the late nineteenth century held, in my opinion, no prospects 
for the study of the mind (as opposed to the study of the physical trajectories of bodies). 
The same is not true of computationalism, as was actually pointed out by Horst (1999), 
since syntactic systems (e.g. Hilbert's geometry) and psychophysics were being explicitly 
developed in this period (348). To combine these two elements was a very natural move 
on Husserl's part. I have, however, nothing to say against Yoshimi's approach - I am 
entirely conciliatory toward it, and hope real knowledge may be gained from the 
endeavor9 
I'd like, nevertheless, to emphasize that Husserl was explicitly anti-empiricist (in 
the Prolegomena) and considered associationism, the explanatory apparatus of 
empiricism, descriptively inadequate (in the Second Investigation). I will explore these 
points in the following chapters. But here let us note that, since dynamical systems theory 
                                                          
9 "It is a commonplace in science to attack different problems from the perspective of different explanatory 





(DST) plus mental representations (RTM) is connectionism, and since connectionism is 
just associationism with neural plausibility, I think that DST plus RTM is empiricism. 
Consequently, this interpretive approach will conflict with Husserl's rationalism. Indeed, 
insofar as this empiricist approach is competitive with computationalism, it will 
necessarily be inadequate to the phenomenology. For phenomenology reveals key facts of 
our mental life which can only be non-reductively explained in computationalist terms 
(e.g. the syntax manifest in categorial intuition). Hence any attempt to create a direct link 
between connectionism and phenomenology will cause a reduction of the defining 
elements of phenomenology (e.g. intuitions of identity will reduce to similarity). But 
besides the fact that from the perspective of current science such a reduction is hardly 
available (Gallistel & King, 2010, p. 276), there is no evidence that Husserl ever could 
have sympathized with reductive consequences. Part of the burden of proof of this 
dissertation will be to show that computationalism is the only adequate and non-reductive 
explanatory approach to the phenomenology. 
Although I believe Yoshimi's project cannot be an accurate interpretation of 
Husserl, since it violates, inter alia, Husserl's explicit anti-empiricist tendency, 
nevertheless it is perfectly scientific to develop whatever insights may be gleaned from 
Husserl in terms of an explanatory framework which appears to be yielding genuine 
scientific insight. It is simply no objection to Yoshimi that Husserl did not refer to 
network nodes or vectorial representations, just as it is really no objection to Fodor that 
Turing seems not to have considered his insights to have any bearing on the theory of 





But no one said the two couldn't meet, and, in my case, they do: for I combine 
science and exegesis insofar as I offer a close reading of Husserl which is not only 
consistent with the computational paradigm in cognitive science but even directly 
anticipates it. The explanatory paradigm Husserl anticipated, which connects syntax with 
causality to achieve semantic results mechanistically, was not to be realized by able 
researchers in his lifetime; this perhaps has to do with the fact, following Fodor (1981), 
that the physical realizability of computational systems, the possibility of their brute 
mechanical instantiation, did not become apparent until Turing's work in the 1930's. In 
the meantime, Husserl, according to my interpretation, contented himself with pointing 
out phenomena that empiricism, as represented by Wundt's school of experimental 
psychology, could not explain10. Many of these phenomena, however, are now 
explananda from the point of view of cognitive science; and some of them may even be 
best approached in Yoshimi's terms. 
If, however, Yoshimi and I are at all on the right track, it follows that 
phenomenology is by no means an autonomous theory (hence Yoshimi's "unifying 
account"). Indeed, it is precisely not a theory; and this is actually Husserl's own view 
from the Logical Investigations. To make it a theory, phenomenology must be 
                                                          
10 The failure of Wundt's school, which is presupposed by Husserl’s Crisis (1936), caused psychology to 
split into the gestaltist and behaviorist camps. This divide was definitively overcome by the cognitive 
revolution in the 1950's as a result of Chomsky’s critique of Skinner. It wasn’t until Chomsky’s Aspects 
(1965), however, that this started to become clear, since in Aspects Chomsky introduces the 
description/explanation distinction, and proposes unconscious transformations to explain the 
phenomenology of well-formedness. It then became clear that both gestaltists/ phenomenologists and 
behaviorists were only collecting data for a future science (in Chomskyan terms, these schools of thought 
were ‘pre-Galilean’). A collection of papers released at the same time reveals that the revolution had yet to 





supplemented by an explanatory apparatus. The purpose of this chapter is to see how the 
computational mechanism of symbolic inference - and the language of thought in which 
it is embedded - could fit into the explanatory component of a full theory of 
phenomenology. The rest of this dissertation explores how it does. 
Section I. Explanation = Causal Explanation According to Husserl in the Logical 
Investigations 
Explanation in the Logical Investigations means 'causal genesis'. Causal genesis 
refers to the "origin and perishing" of "conscious contents" - the "causal patterns and laws 
of their formation and transformation" (2001(II):89). Phenomenology studies these 
conscious contents in isolation from the causal nexus out of which they arise. For 
phenomenology is pure description. Despite this idealization, Husserl believed that the 
theoretical aim of studying conscious contents, abstracted from the causal nexus is 
ultimately to study their causal genesis (ibid). That is, we get closer to reality through this 
idealization called phenomenology. The point of supplementing the phenomenology 
would be to show how we have access to the phenomena revealed in description (e.g. 
well-formedness by means of the principles governing linguistic computation). That the 
phenomena of phenomenology “could be the product” of the computational theory of 
mind is countenanced by Husserl in the Prolegomena (Hua XVIII:A67-B67/2001(I):50). 
The reason why the theoretical aim of studying conscious contents is to study 
their causal explanation is due, according to Husserl, to the essence of science 
(2001(I):147). Just as Schopenhauer (2010, p. 43) complained that Goethe "delivered ... 





Husserl claims that "pure description is merely a preparatory step towards theory, not 
theory itself" (2001(I):176). Hence causal explanation transforms the data into a theory. 
The reason behind Husserl’s claim here derives from the essence of science: "The 
possibility of taking on the function of explanation is an obvious consequence of a theory 
in our absolute sense" (2001(I):147). This is a general scientific truth according to 
Husserl. With respect to the description of conscious contents, “the function of 
explanation” means causal genesis - an account of the (individual and ontogenetic) 
mechanisms of their arising and perishing through causality (2001(II):89). For 
description leads to laws which lead to explanation in terms of causal mechanisms which 
implement laws. This view is common in cognitive science (Fodor (1994); Simon (2000); 
Carey (2009); Milkowski (2013)). 
Now the explanatory question that divides rationalists and empiricists lies in the 
nature of the mechanism11. We saw in the 1st chapter that Husserl is on the side of the 
rationalists with respect to the nature of the mental mechanisms behind formal contents 
and systems. For we saw that Husserl’s mechanism of symbolic inference must be 
characterized as computational over and above any associative (or connectionist) 
mechanisms. This is why my position contradicts, though it shares common ground with, 
Yoshimi's (2016). 
                                                          
11 In particular, are mental representations “process- relevant”? If so, there will be symbolic algorithms 
which it will be the duty of LOT to specify, and which will explain the arising of conscious contents, 






According to Husserl, phenomenology, as a scientific enterprise, must be capable 
of "taking on the function of explanation" (2001(I):147). Hence phenomenology, 
understood as a descriptive enterprise, must be understood as leading to an account of 
causal genesis: it describes a certain domain of objects (namely, conscious contents) with 
a view toward giving an account of the causal mechanisms that underlie their arising and 
perishing. Pointing out all this is not my thesis. My thesis, rather, is that the causal 
mechanisms that underlie Husserlian phenomenology are specifically computational in 
nature, and it is the principles that govern these mechanisms that unify the domain of 
objects of which phenomenology consists. Initially, however, this domain is fixed 
empirically, without an explanatory principle:  
 
[T]he unity of description is fixed by the empirical unity of the object or the class, 
and it is this descriptive unity which... determines the science's unity. But the word 
should of course not be so understood as if descriptive sciences aimed at mere 
description, which would contradict our guiding concept of science" (2001(I):148).  
 
For "our guiding concept of science" aims at theory, which essentially according to 
Husserl includes empirical explanation with respect to the phenomenological description 
of conscious contents. Certain classes of (logical) phenomena - derived from 
phenomenological intuition (e.g. productivity) - will be the bedrock for this explanatory 





whose genetic connections the science wishes to pursue, also form the substrate for those 
fundamental abstractions in which logic seizes the essence of its ideal objects and 
connections with inward evidence" (2001(I):176). Hence phenomenology will mediate 
between psychology, as a theory of mental processes, and logic. Phenomenology will 
oppose the empiricistic/psychologistic reduction of logic to mental processes, which 
results in identity being reduced to similarity (as in prototype/connectionist theories of 
concepts (Churchland (2012)). Phenomenology according to Husserl performs the role of 
data-gatherer, since it essentially feeds into the account of the "empirical explanation and 
origins" of logical phenomena in experience (e.g. productivity) (2001(I):177). At the 
same time, it discovers such phenomena for the sake of pure logical or mathematical 
study (e.g. Chomskyan linguistics, which is, in an a priori aspect, a branch of 
mathematics). 
Husserl's point of view here - that description offers itself for the discovery of 
explanatory mechanisms which are ipso facto causal to explain their arising and perishing 
- is by no means peculiar. I would even go so far as to say that it is the standard, received 
view of science. This includes the relationship between description and explanation12. As 
                                                          
12 To take a random example from Simon (2000): "Insofar as it identifies a kind of mechanism, the germ 
theory of disease is an explanatory theory. Insofar as it simply describes the causative agent without 
indicating how it works... it is not much more than a descriptive theory" (40-41). This methodological 
distinction is, I think, not controversial. What is controversial, perhaps, is that this distinction plays a 
crucial role in the founding document of phenomenology as a research discipline. But what is certainly 
controversial is that there are computational mechanisms that fit into the explanatory component of 
Husserl’s framework. But this is not how it should be. As Fodor (1994) says, "The explanatory paradigm of 
laws and implementing mechanisms is familiar, and I take it to apply in psychology as elsewhere. What is, 
however, controversial is the suggestion that the immediately implementing mechanisms for intentional 
laws are computational. Classical materialism, by contrast, almost always assumed that they are biological" 
(Fodor 1994 p. 8). If I’m right, this would explain part of the difference between Husserl’s ideas on 





Hempel and Oppenheim (1948), the progenitors of the modern discussion of the topic, 
note: "[S]cientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description 
of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates" (135). 
Hempel's student, Jaegwon Kim (2010), echoes this sentiment: "The mark of a theoretical 
science [...] is precisely that it aspires to go beyond 'phenomenological descriptions' of 
observed regularities and provide us with explanatory insights, an understanding of why 
things are the way they are" (168). Phenomenology, according to Kim, stops short at "the 
way [things] are." But, I think, we do not "understand" why things are the way they are 
until they've been explained. For instance, I do not begin to understand why green is the 
after-image of red by simply observing that green is the after-image of red. 
Phenomenology stops, however, at this mere description. But I think I understand why as 
soon as I know that these colors are lawfully related in the nervous activity of the retina. 
Understanding, I think, results when we have some grasp of the causal facts underlying a 
given phenomenon13. And in the case of the phenomena of consciousness, like color 
phenomena, this is going to causally relate to the nervous activity of the organism. 
With respect to the explanation of the apprehension of logical phenomena, the 
situation is more complicated. Productivity is a mathematical fact, given in 
phenomenological (non-sensuous) intuition. Husserl's Logical Investigation IV says 
language is productive because meaning is productive, and this is given with 
                                                          
13 Schopenhauer (1907) even identifies understanding (as opposed to reason) with the apprehension of a 





phenomenological evidence (2001(II):70). The source of this intuition lies in the rule-
governed nature of the syntactical combinations of meaning-contents. 
Now what is the empirical explanation of this fact? What mechanisms might 
explain the causal origination of the phenomenology without reduction to causal 
constitution? Husserl fully allows these questions consistent with the phenomenology. 
Interestingly, this fact alone significant. For in allowing there to be an empirical 
explanatory component behind the a priori well-formedness of linguistic structures, 
Husserl directly anticipates Chomsky (1965) in a way that has not been noticed 
(Bundgaard (2004) & Bianchin (2018)). Indeed, it should be said that Husserl never 
denies (indeed he explicitly affirms) that causal mechanisms underlie the arising of 
conscious contents and their formations and transformations. That is the point of the 
Denkmaschine. Now my proposal is simply to identify the Denkmaschine as a language 
of thought (LOT) mechanism; and we need this to explanatorily account for the 
phenomenology. A language of thought (LOT) is an explanatory theory of mental states 
and processes. In particular, LOT says that mental representations, which are 
computationally processed, are language-like. As a result, only LOT can explain the 
causal origin of productivity (Fodor (2008) 19). Connectionism, for instance, 
discountenances the causal powers of mental representations (hence of their logical 
forms); but this causal component is necessary for explaining productivity in the 
proprietary sense (Fodor (2008) 7; McLaughlin (2014)). Even when connectionism is 
interpreted as a representational theory with causal powers, it cannot explain productivity 





contrast, LOT assumes mental representations with the right format for productivity 
(Fodor (2008) 21). Now we discovered in the last chapter that Husserl assumed mental 
representations with just this format being processed by a causal mechanism (hence 
language-like symbols are ‘process-relevant’ for Husserl). As a result, it is not surprising 
that Husserl explains the appearance of language "with its finely articulated grammatical 
structure" as arising out of the unconscious/causal computational mechanism of symbolic 
inference (whose symbols are syntactically structured), as opposed to this being a 
conscious/intentional achievement (Hua XII:368/1994:46). 
It might seem, to put it mildly, rather surprising that Husserl countenances mental 
causation. It might seem even more surprising that such causation occurs via a 
computational (as opposed to a biological) mechanism. And it might seem simply 
astounding that this mechanism is physically causative with respect to the syntactic form 
of the symbolic mental representations being computationally processed. Are we not 
flying in the face of Searle's objection that syntax isn't physics? Does not this fly in the 
face of Horst's objection that all symbols are conventional? And what does all this have 
to do with Husserl's descriptive phenomenology? We hope to settle these questions in 
reverse order. 
Section II. The Explanatory Component of Phenomenology as a Scientific Theory 
Consider the process by which we move from description to explanation. 
Description: water freezes when suitably cooled. We recognize this to be a law. And the 
law is implemented by a mechanism. This mechanism, when appealed to, constitutes the 





mechanism has to do with the causal interaction of molecular structures. Similarly, we 
have various phenomenological descriptions. Through these descriptions, we glimpse a 
peculiar form of evidence which translates immediately into laws. And now we ask: what 
is the mechanism that implements these laws and explains the phenomenological facts? 
That such explanations are countenanced by Husserl in the Logical Investigations 
should not be controversial (see above). Again, this is not my thesis. Explanation with 
respect to conscious contents, according to Husserl, means causal genesis, and this is 
always plainly possible. Moreover, description, according to Husserl, aims at explanation 
in virtue of the essence of science. The description of conscious contents, therefore, 
necessarily aims at an account of their causal genesis. But part of the lesson of the 
Logical Investigations is that the explanatory mechanism of associationism is inadequate 
to the phenomena. In part, this is because associationism reduces logical form to causal 
constitution, which, in the event, has absurd consequences (evident even today 
connectionism: see Fodor & Pylyshyn (2015)). We are therefore compelled, given the 
above Husserlian assumptions, to seek another explanatory mechanism which qua 
mechanism is causal. 
Our first chapter demonstrated that Husserl himself had the resources to supply 
our present deficiency. The thesis of this chapter is that Husserl's computational theory of 
mind constitutes the explanatory mechanism for the causal genesis of the logical 
phenomena that go beyond the explanatory powers of mechanisms of association. We are 





setting of a new explanatory agenda, the causal-mechanical possibility of which14 had 
already been present to Husserl's mind (in 1891). That is why he had already explained 
the arising of the systems of arithmetic, logic, and language by appeal to a computational 
mechanism. This new explanatory agenda, I would argue, anticipates the cognitive 
revolution, which began with an emphasis on the logical phenomenon of productivity, a 
key theme of the Logical Investigations as we shall discover. 
The historical motivation for erecting a new paradigm of explanation - the 
computational paradigm - through the descriptive enterprise of the Logical Investigations 
lay in the fact that, in one form or another, associationism was the only explanatory 
mechanism on the market. Beyond the description of conscious contents, and the 
descriptive recognition of the justificatory relations holding among them (for the sake of 
epistemology), lies the explanatory mechanisms that give rise to the conscious contents in 
question. Husserl methodologically limits himself to the descriptive (justificatory) level 
throughout his investigations. This becomes very clear in his criticism of Hume, for 
example. After citing Hume concerning causal genesis through associative mechanisms - 
which constitute the explanation for all Humean 'cognitive' phenomena - Husserl says, 
"We need not here proceed to analyse [these passages] critically, since genetic problems 
fall outside the limits of our task" (2001(I):293). I ask the reader to consider the meaning 
of this methodological claim. It is plain, I think, that Husserl conceives of his task as 
lying in the descriptive realm of justificatory relations. Consequently, Husserl does not 
                                                          





conceive of his task as lying in the explanatory realm of causal mechanisms. It therefore 
falls to us to see whether Husserl's own explanatory mechanism can fit into the 
explanatory component for the cognitive phenomena that he investigates. We will attempt 
to make clear (such is the purpose of this chapter) that this a real possibility through the 
famous Denkmaschine passage. (And we will attempt to make good on this possibility in 
the rest of the dissertation.) 
Section III. The Denkmaschine Passage 
Concerning the reality of computational inference, Husserl says that "[t]he 
circumstance or conditions (in the strict sense), from which the inferential act of 
judgement follows with causal necessity, are entirely hidden from us" (2001(I):74). 
Notice the prescient willingness on Husserl’s part to treat inference as a causal process 
“entirely hidden from us.” But it is not so much prescience as remembrance; for with 
respect to this very question, Husserl struck gold in 1891, almost ten years prior to the 
above sentence. He discovered possibly the most important fact we currently know about 
minds: that causally determined mental processes, despite their unconscious 
determination, are nevertheless truth-preserving. Husserl reasoned that, if this is true, 
intentionality and its laws must, in a real sense, be prefigured by a computational 
mechanism (see Ch. 1). Similarly, Fodor (1994) argues (without knowledge of Husserl's 






There is a well-known and, in my opinion, completely convincing argument for 
viewing the implementation of psychological laws in th[e computationalist] way: 
It is characteristic of the mental processes they govern that they tend to preserve 
semantic properties like truth. Roughly, if you start out with a true thought, and you 
proceed to do some thinking, it is very often the case that the thoughts that the 
thinking leads you to will also be true. This is, in my view, the most important fact 
we know about minds; no doubt it's why God bothered to give us any. A psychology 
that can't make sense of such facts as that mental processes are typically truth 
preserving is ipso facto dead in the water. (8-9) 
 
I argued in the 1st chapter that Husserl recognized this fact - that mental processes tend to 
preserve truth - and solved the problem of their status by reference to an innate 
computational theory of mind embedded in a language of thought. A computational 
theory of mind has, by consensus, two components: (1) a causal component and (2) a 
syntactic-representational component (Horst 1996; Pinker 1997; Fodor 2000). What it 
says with respect to (1) is that mental representations can cause, and be caused by, one 
another; that is, there is such a thing as mental causation. This would appear to be evident 
from the merest inspection of one's own mental processes - even, as Husserl argues, the 
associationistic ones. But now if we take a deeper look, as Husserl and Fodor have done, 
and go beyond associationism, we see that our mental processes also typically result in 
true propositions, without, however, being consciously guided by considerations of truth-





properly unconscious causality is consciously directed by anything semantic. As Husserl 
says in the Prolegomena: "If [true results] are not discovered by insight, but naturally 
developed, one must ponder the question of their possibility, as to how the operation of 
blind mechanism can coincide with the demands of insight" (2001(I):128). I have argued 
that Husserl and Fodor have answered this "question" in the same way: they both 
assumed, to explain the phenomenology of our thought-processes, that our mental 
representations must have a language-like format. The solution, then, is the view that 
logical form supervenes on the syntax of mental representations which are 
computationally processed by an unlearned mechanism. This is the genetic-causal 
explanation of the arising of formal systems in human mental life. 
The concordance between Husserl and Fodor on this point is perhaps unexpected. 
Klaus Held (2003), for instance, insists that for Husserl, "[t]he mechanics of a calculator - 
or the electronics of a computer (i.e., hardware) - follows a completely different set of 
laws (namely, physical laws) [from] the chains of symbols that one calculates with the 
machine (i.e., software)" (11). Held is taking a stand on the distinction, which he claims 
is Husserl's, between unconscious or non-conscious algorithmic processing - i.e., what a 
computer can do - and conscious reasoning with symbols. Interestingly, Held says that 
the "set of laws" in each case is "completely different." This is interesting because it 
directly contradicts Husserl (whom Held is nevertheless attempting to interpret) since 
Husserl evidently claims rather explicitly that the very same "necessary and sufficient 
conditions" are involved in the "blind mechanism" as in the conscious "logical 





(Jackendoff (2012) 147). The reason, according to Husserl, is that "logical procedure is, 
vis-a-vis the corresponding natural one, not something toto genere different" (Hua 
XII:365 / 1994:44). This assertion is something many phenomenologists, like Klaus Held, 
are perhaps keen to deny. Strikingly, however, the founder of phenomenology 
emphasized the relation between unconscious symbol processing and logical thought, 
going so far to call the former a "foundation" for the latter, as well as a "source" (Hua 
XII:364 / 1994:42-43). 
I have been preceded in some of my observations by Theodor Adorno. In his 
commentary on Husserl’s philosophy, Against Epistemology (1956), Adorno reflected on 
the passage about calculators from the Logical Investigations. Adorno, like Held, notes 
that "[c]alculators are constituted by 'natural laws'" (62). But then Adorno follows 
Husserl more closely: "The same applies to man. He of course also has 'insight' into the 
correctness of what is thought through an 'other' law-governed thinking, perhaps another 
machine. His thought apparatus as such, however, functions no differently from that of 
the calculator" (62). Note that Adorno is interpreting Husserl. Now, if one compares 
Adorno’s words with Husserl’s above, one will see that this is a more correct 
interpretation of Husserl's thought, both for the essay examined above, and for the 
Logical Investigations. But this is so surprising that Adorno incredulously notes that 
“[Husserl] sees no scandal in the paradoxicality of 'thought machinery'" (65-66).  I 
suggest that Husserl’s reference to “thought-machinery” is a hold-over from his 1891 
essay, where he first put forward the thesis of a computational mechanism manipulating 





illuminate the consistency of the 1891 essay with the method of the Logical 
Investigations, let’s take a closer look at the specific Prolegomena passage on which 
Adorno comments, the Denkmaschine passage. 
Husserl begins this section (number 22) of the Prolegomena attacking certain 
views of Theodor Lipps. The psychologistic view is put forward that “the laws of thought 
count [merely] as natural laws characterizing the peculiarity of our mind qua thinking…” 
(2001 (I) 48). Such a view would reduce laws of thought to “causal laws” (ibid). But 
Husserl pointedly asks, “[H]ow should one have insight [Einsicht] into causal laws?” 
(2001 (I) 49). Since it is impossible to have insight into causality, as Hume pointed out, 
and since insight is necessary for thought, it follows that thought cannot be reduced to 
causality. Husserl, however, is not saying that causal laws do not govern our thought-
processes – he admits they do. Rather, what is at issue is the confusion of “the ideal with 
the real,” in which case “the law [itself] appears as a governing power in our train of 
thought” (1970: 49). The only “governing power in our train of thought” is a causal 
power, manipulating mental representations, not a logical power. Logical law can only be 
said to supervene on the causal mechanism of “our train of thought.” 
Husserl’s views here, I think, are consistent with the “logical illumination” of the 
causal mechanism of symbolic inference (Hua XII:359/1994:38). For recall that Husserl 
does not say that the unconscious mechanism is logical. Rather, he says that one must 
hypothesize concerning its “inner structure [….] as if it had been rationally devised by 
means of [a] logical process” (Hua XII:359/1994:38; italics added). Since the mechanism 





any mechanism, is guided by causality. Nevertheless, it requires a logical characterization 
due to the fact that it preserves truth, which, for Husserl, is a property of logical relations. 
But the key point is this: the mechanism of symbolic inference is consistent with 
Husserl’s separation of ideal insight from real causal relations. 
The consistency of a computational mechanism with the phenomenology of the 
Logical Investigations becomes clearer when Husserl compares our innate computational 
mechanism with the computational mechanism of a “computer” (2001 (I) 50). Echoing 
his previous points, Husserl notes that “[c]ausal laws, according to which thought must 
proceed in a manner which the ideal norms of logic might justify, are by no means 
identical with those norms” (2001 (I) 50; italics added). This is why Fodor (2000) says 
that logical form cannot be constituted by causal relations (as with associationism) – it is 
an “independent parameter” (17). Hence logical forms, as ideal laws, are not causally 
“explanatory” of any “being’s constitution” (2001 (I) 50). This is demonstrated by a 
comparison of human minds with computers: 
 
The arrangement and connection of the figures which spring forth is regulated by 
natural laws which accord with the demands of the arithmetical propositions which 
fix their meanings. No one, however, who wants to give a physical explanation of 
the machine’s procedures, will appeal to arithmetical instead of mechanical laws. 
The machine is no thought-machine, it understands neither itself nor the meaning 





very well function similarly, except that the real course of one kind of thought 
would always have to be recognized as correct by the insight brought forward in 
another. This latter thinking could be the product of the same or other thought-
machines, but ideal evaluation and causal explanation would none the less remain 
disparate. (Hua XVIII:A67-B67 / 2001:50) 
 
Notice that Husserl distinguishes “ideal evaluation” and “causal explanation.” I argue that 
“ideal evaluation” corresponds to ‘description’ and “causal explanation” corresponds to 
‘explanation.’ This explains why we can evaluate conscious contents phenomenologically 
while saying nothing about their arising in the mind. Nevertheless, the two sides are 
linked for Husserl, since phenomenological “insight…. could be the product of… 
thought-machines.”  Clearly, then, Husserl puts forward the hypothesis, common in 
cognitive science, that “our own thought-machine might very well function similarly” to 
a “computer” and this might explain the arising of phenomenological distinctions in 
consciousness (Jackendoff (1987) (2012)). There is, however, one important caveat: a 
computer “is no thought-machine.” Rather, we are the thought-machines. The reason for 
Husserl is that, unlike computers, we have thoughts15. Hence, “our thought-machine” 
genuinely has thoughts, despite our thought-processes always being mechanical. In other 
words, the computational theory of mind is genuinely a theory of thinking – though only 
                                                          
15 Notice that this consideration immediately puts to rest skeptical objections concerning the ease of 
applicability of computational analysis to natural or artificial systems (Searle (1992); Milkowski (2013)). 
For Husserl, if these systems (e.g. Searle’s wall implementing WordStar) cannot be said to have thoughts 





“of one kind of thought.” There is “another [kind of thought]” – namely, of insight into 
evidence – which is brought to bear on the computational “kind of thought.” Likewise, 
description is brought to bear on the causal explanation of phenomena. The ideal-
evaluation kind of thought “could be the product” of the computational kind of thought; 
hence, as in 1891, they are still “not toto genere different” (Hua XII:365/1994:44). The 
correctness of the computations or derivations is recognized as correct by consciousness. 
But the symbolic thoughts with which “our thought-machine” computes are nonetheless 
thoughts. Hence computation doesn’t just look like thinking. Husserl is no Denettian 
instrumentalist about CTM. Husserl is a Fodorian realist about CTM. 
Notice, further, that the similarity between our minds and computers would have 
to lie in the way in which “the arrangement and connection” of our thoughts is similar to 
“the arrangement and connection of the figures which spring forth” in a computer (Hua 
XVIII:A67-B6 /2001 (I) 50). This recalls the syntactic mirroring which is required in the 
1891 essay: “The systematic forms of conjunction for the words must precisely reflect 
those present in the thoughts” (Hua XII:363/1994:42). Though a computer can process 
“words” – and therefore their ”systematic forms of conjunction” – a computer cannot 
process “thoughts” because computers do not have any. Nevertheless, “our thought-
machine” is like a computer in that it too can mechanically detect the “systematic forms 
of conjunction.” (The process by which our minds do this is called ‘externally inauthentic 
judgment’ by Husserl.) In other words, what our minds and computers have in common is 
syntactic processing power. Interestingly, this is Husserl’s own view: the mind has a 





I suggest that the “thought-machine” of the Prolegomena is identical to the mechanism of 
symbolic inference of “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic).” If so, then the Denkmaschine 
might be the “causal explanation” for the arising of conscious contents which yield “ideal 
evaluation” (phenomenological evidence). 
Assuming for the moment that this is correct, we can see precisely how the 
computational theory of mind fits into the methodology of the Logical Investigations. For 
the Logical Investigations has a double-sided methodological scheme: on the one hand, 
there are phenomenological descriptions, yielding insight into justificatory relations (for 
example, deductive validity). On the other hand, there are explanations of causal genesis, 
yielding accounts of the causal relations which give rise to what appears to consciousness 
(for example, true conclusions). We believe two further things: (1) phenomenology is 
limited to the former, descriptive side; it cannot decisively pronounce upon the latter, 
explanatory side (i.e. it can only reveal inadequacy). Nevertheless, phenomenology does 
(2) theoretically aim at the latter - i.e., an account of causal genesis. In particular, it aims 
at its improvement (i.e. adequacy to the descriptive phenomena). Now associationism is 
an account of causal genesis. Associationism, however, cannot track truth; for 
associations are neither true nor false. Therefore, a different causal-genetic account is 
required for semantic phenomena that go beyond associationist relations. This account is 
the computational theory of mind (the Denkmaschine embedded in a language of 






Section IV. On Unconscious Intentionality & Psychologism 
But questions arise at this point. If we do insert the computational theory of mind 
into the explanatory component of Husserl's methodology, as the telos towards which his 
descriptions are tending in virtue of the essence of science, one may wonder what Husserl 
has to say about unconscious intentionality, not to mention whether psychologism 
follows. For is not the computational theory of mind a psychological hypothesis? 
First, a word about unconscious intentionality. Husserl discovered the 
computational theory of mind (Ch. 1). But the computational theory of mind seems to 
involve the disputed psychological property of 'unconscious intentionality.' This property 
seems to be discountenanced, in particular, among those who are sympathetic with 
Husserl's thought. What, then, are we to say of Husserl's thought with respect to this 
property? 
The answer is that he obviously countenanced the property, though not the name. 
For inferential processes seem to be intentional processes. Consequently, if some 
inferential processes are unconscious, that is, carried out by a causal mechanism in a 
language of thought, then some intentional processes are unconscious. But if so, it would 
appear that unconscious intentionality is a real property. “For in fact,” Husserl says, 
“logical procedure is, vis-à-vis the corresponding natural one, not something toto genera 
different” (Hua XII:365:1994:44). Unconscious intentionality, therefore, is apparently a 
species of the same genus as conscious intentionality – hence “not something toto genera 





‘unconscious intentionality,’ – that is, we may choose to defy Plutarch and avoid calling 
spades spades. 
But, now, as "words are wise men's counters," whereas "they are the money of 
fools," we cannot think avoiding the term 'unconscious intentionality' of much 
importance (Hobbes’ Leviathan (1998) p. 24). We adhere to nominal designations insofar 
as they serve us well in our reasoning. As soon as they do not, we may cast them aside. 
This is true of all of the nominal designations bequeathed to us by our native language, as 
well as the common-sense prejudices associated with these (contra Kriegel (2011)). As 
soon as they do not serve us well in our reasoning, we may neglect them; and the history 
of science would add: we may neglect them with profit. Hence Cummins (2010): 
"Physicists created a sense for 'force'; they didn't just discover the reference of an 
ordinary concept or term. We can expect psychologists to do the same" (84). If 
philosophers succeed in opposing psychologists in this endeavor, then "philosophers will 
quite rightly be perceived as having won a petty squabble over semantic territory at the 
price of cutting themselves off from serious empirical research" (68). Even so, we may 
tiptoe around the use of the term ‘unconscious intentionality’ and refer to the property 
with Husserlian terminology like ‘externally inauthentic judgment’; or we might, in more 
modern dress, use circumlocutions like ‘the computational manipulation of unconscious 
contents.’ This is, in any case, a terminological dispute, not worthy of serious 
consideration, as Hobbes and Cummins insist. 
A more substantive issue is the following: if the computational theory of mind 





jeopardize our theory, since it was access to ideal validity that we were intending to 
explain. We cannot explain our access to ideal validity by nullifying the phenomenon in 
question, in the manner of associationism/connectionism. Fortunately, computationalism 
is not involved in any such reduction. The basic reason, I argue, is that computationalists 
are not empiricists, psychologism being essentially linked with empiricism (see Husserl 
on this issue: 2001(I):59). The reason why every empiricist is psychologistic is given by 
Husserl as follows:  
 
The empiricistic 'theory of abstraction'... suffers from the mixture of two essentially 
different scientific interests, one concerned with the psychological explanation of 
experiences, the other with the 'logical' classification of their thought-content or 
sense, and the criticism of their possible achievement as acts of knowing. (2001 (I) 
246)  
 
Empiricism, in other words, allows psychological explanation to overtake 
phenomenological description. It disregards descriptive adequacy in favor of a plausible 
explanatory account. 
By contrast, the computationalist theory begins with achieving descriptive 
adequacy (e.g. consciousness of universals, a computational problem) and then 
determines what must be psychologically necessary for this to be a (phenomenological) 





consciousness of universals (Ch. 3). Hence it "rapidly dismiss[es] the descriptive content 
of the abstractive consciousness [and] directs its main concern to unconscious 
dispositions and hypothetical associative linkages" (2001(I):247; italics added). This is 
why Husserl, in the Prolegomena, has the following:  
 
The basic question (Die Grundfrage) [concerning psychologism] is whether ideal 
objects of thought are... verbal abbreviations whose true content merely reduces to 
individual, singular experiences, mere presentations and judgements concerning 
individual facts, or whether the idealist is right in holding that such an empiricistic 
doctrine, nebulous in its generality, can indeed be uttered, but in no wise thought 
out, that all attempts to reduce ideal unities to real singulars are involved in hopeless 
absurdities, that its splintering of concepts into a range of singulars, without a 
concept to unify such a range in our thought, cannot be thought etc. (2001(I):120) 
 
Now a computational theory of mind, embedded in a language of thought, has the 
resources to avoid this reduction (Crane 2014). It is indeed the only psychological theory 
currently on the market that has the resources to avoid the psychologistic reduction, 
which directly follows from "empiricistic doctrine" both past and present. Since we 
learned that an account of causal genesis was originally in view with regard to 
phenomenological description, I would like to understand Husserl's commitment to 





theory of mind for the sake of avoiding psychologism. For if we methodologically adhere 
to what is descriptively given (e.g. consciousness of universality) we will be in a better 
position to explain how this consciousness arises causally (e.g. by means of the tokening 
of one and the same mental representation, the identity of which is guaranteed by my 
language of thought). This top-down approach is precisely the methodological procedure 
of the computational theory of mind. Consequently, the computational theory of mind, in 
accordance with its anti-empiricism, says nothing about reducing ideal validities to real 
mental particulars, by which reduction one might psychologistically derive the ideal from 
the real. For it is not interested in deriving ideas from sense. But if there's no such 
derivation, there's no psychologism16. 
It is, therefore, acknowledged in the literature that the greatest defender (and 
critic) of the computational theory of mind, Jerry Fodor, was "anti-psychologistic" (Crane 
2014 p. 14). For Fodor consistently makes, throughout his oeuvre, a non-reductionist 
                                                          
16 One might think that there is a relevant distinction to be addressed here between concept empiricism and 
epistemic empiricism. Concept empiricism says that all our concepts are derived from sense- experience. 
Epistemic empiricism says all our knowledge is derived from sense-experience. The distinction is relevant 
for empiricists who want to admit the a prioricity of certain propositions but nevertheless argue that the 
concepts through which we think these a priori propositions are all a posteriori because empiricism denies 
the existence of innate a priori concepts. Now one might think that Husserl's anti-psychologism is 
concerned to reject epistemic empiricism but not concept empiricism. However, there is no basis in the 
Logical Investigations for this distinction. Husserl says (above) that the "basic question" (Grundfrage) 
concerning psychologism is whether ideal unities - their true content - can be reduced to "singular 
experiences" - matters of fact - which would entail "the splintering of concepts into a range of singulars" 
(2001(I):120). Now the problem with concept empiricism is precisely this "splintering of concepts into a 
range of singulars." For concept empiricism builds concepts through the experience of more or less similar 
instances. This directly results in psychologism because similarity never achieves unity, and as a result the 
ideal unity is reducing to a "range of singulars" more or less similar (e.g. hot-spots in connectionist 
networks). Hence the "basic question" concerning psychologism has force against both kinds of 
empiricism, since we are clearly talking about both "ideal unities" whose propositional content is a priori 
and "concepts." Hence it is incorrect to think that the arguments against psychologism are arguments 
against epistemic empiricism and not concept empiricism. Husserl makes no distinction between these and 





distinction between ideal contents and their real instances. Noting this distinction, Walter 
Hopp (2011) points out that, though "the instances of contents are psychological entities," 
yet this obviously "does not entail that logic is a branch of psychology" (34). Hence "it in 
no way follows from Husserl's (or Fodor's) position that psychological states are either 
the truth-makers of logical propositions, or the evidential bas[es] of our knowledge of 
them" (ibid). On the other hand (and herein lies the point of confusion): "psychological 
states" are in fact the real "bas[es]" or foundations of "our knowledge of [logical 
propositions]" - that really is entailed by the computational theory of mind. I therefore 
would argue that Husserl and Fodor hold the computational theory of mind to be the real 
(in part causal) basis of our access to logical propositions and their entailments. 
However, it's not the evidential basis of our knowledge of them. 
The evidential basis of our knowledge is formed by ideal contents. Husserl is - as 
he himself claims - an idealist in this epistemological sense. Accordingly, Husserl says, 
"To talk of 'idealism' is of course not to talk of a metaphysical doctrine, but of a theory of 
knowledge which recognizes the 'ideal' as a condition for the possibility of objective 
knowledge in general, and does not 'interpret it away' in psychologistic fashion" 
(2001(I):238). This passage refers to the "basic question" (Grundfrage) concerning 
psychologism. So long as an explanatory theory does not reduce ideal contents to their 
real, sensuous instances, it is not psychologistic. Hence we see why CTM (or LOT) does 
not entail any form of psychologism: it’s a theory of the causal mechanisms underlying 
real instantiated contents (and their movement), not a description of the Ideal laws 





a certain kind of mechanism - the computational (Fodor 1994). One may note here that 
only the computational kind of mechanism is suited to warding off psychologism. For 
only the computational theory provides a mechanism for the instantiation of unities of 
thought, as opposed to approximations to unities on the basis of similars 
(associationism/connectionism). This point will be developed in Ch. 3. 
For the sake of completeness, it may be noted that Husserl descriptively moves 
around psychologism by distinguishing acts or intentional experiences, contents, and 
objects. Contents, which are not psychological, are instantiated in acts, which are 
psychological. And through these instantiated contents, as part of a representational 
theory of mind (RTM), we are intentionally directed toward objects of experience. 
However, we only realize that contents in the head are the directive force in intentional 
experiences when we reflect on our acts. That’s because first-order intentional 
experiences are preoccupied with their intentional objects, and the relation seems to 
consciousness to be direct17. This tripartite division (acts, contents, objects) is operative 
at the descriptive level of the Logical Investigations. 
On the explanatory level, however, we have seen, along with Dallas Willard 
(1994), that acts or intentional experiences themselves can be treated as objects, subject 
to blind (unconscious) causality. As a result, we infer the conclusion that Husserl 
recognized the phenomenon of unconscious intentionality, although he respectfully 
                                                          
17 Indeed, it was the error of the Aristotelian theory of perception to take this seeming as the literal truth, 
with the result that objects were thought to waft their forms into our eyes, instead of our eyes constructing 





reserved the term 'intentional' for conscious experience. This aspect of the total picture is 
methodologically kept out of view throughout the course of the Logical Investigations. 
The following 3 chapters, however, will explore the scene behind the epistemological 
curtain, and will try to argue that LOT can best be seen as an explanatory supplement, 
giving rise to certain conscious contents essential to phenomenology, which would 
otherwise not be available on a strictly associationist view of the explanatory mechanisms 
of the mind. 
Section V. Critique of Horst 
If this chapter's argument is correct, then the computational theory of mind needs 
to be defended, especially against its phenomenologically oriented detractors; for 
phenomenology and the computational theory of mind seem to many to be incompatible, 
even though they are, as the example of Husserl's oeuvre shows, eminently suited for 
each other18. Although Husserl is aware that the descriptive level of science cannot 
directly attack the explanatory level, this methodological point has been somewhat 
neglected in modern philosophizing, which often argues from epistemology to 
metaphysics19. In any case, I propose to criticize, in this section and the following, the 
computational theory of mind's main detractors. I shall, then, attempt to show how I 
                                                          
18 Much more so than phenomenology and neuroscience, though this has not stopped Shaun Gallagher 
(2012) and neurophenomenology generally. Gallagher recognizes the incompleteness of phenomenology 
but does not seem to recognize the anti-empiricist/anti-reductionist spirit of properly Husserlian 
phenomenology. Then again, perhaps this is recognized, but at the same time maintained that 
phenomenology is not to be governed by Husserlian strictures. 
19 Fodor (1994) calls this “the persistent bad habit of trying to run epistemological or semantic arguments 





perceive their arguments to be misguided or incorrect, instead of formally charging them 
with an ignoratio elenchi on methodological grounds. 
Horst’s critique of CTM (1996) is perhaps the most important for my project and 
must therefore be considered at length. Horst takes the computational theory of mind to 
be essentially dependent on the existence of non-conventional symbols. I think that's true. 
But, according to Horst, all symbols are conventional - that is, they are established by 
behavioristic "practices" or "language games" for the express purpose of communication 
(79-122). A symbol, therefore, that is not conventionally established for some 
communicative purpose is not a symbol. It follows that computationalists are confused 
when they use the concept of a symbol in a non-conventional sense. According to Horst 
(1996), computationalists aren't using the concept of symbol, but, rather, something else, 
which, however, they have not specified; consequently, their arguments are vitiated 
through and through by equivocation. This is the main thrust of Horst's critique of the 
computational theory of mind. 
Now I hope to make apparent to the reader that Horst's argument is involved in 
quite a large petitio principii. Actually, Horst kindly admits this and imagines a would-be 
critic saying the following: "The decision to confine yourself to conventional examples 
seems to be a matter more of fiat than of principle; and as a consequence, the analysis is 
question begging if it is presented as a general account of symbols and symbolic 
meaning" (147). This is the mainstream point of view of cognitive science. Horst's 





at the level of convention. As a result, Horst’s analysis reveals what he had previously 
assumed: all symbols are conventional. 
Horst apparently does not believe symbols could be established by anything other 
than convention. Consequently, Horst denies my point of view and claims he is the one 
on solid ground: "[T]he critic would have to justify the criticism of my choice of 
paradigms by pointing to things that were said to be 'symbols' and to have 'syntax' and 
'meaning' in the same sense in which these things are said about utterances and 
inscriptions, yet which were susceptible to non-conventional analysis" (149, italics 
added). I am ready for this challenge; though in one sense, of course, Horst’s demand is 
impossible to meet. A symbol in a non-conventional sense will necessarily not have "the 
same sense" as a symbol in a conventional sense - for these are evidently two different 
senses. A more charitable reading might say that Horst is just wondering whether there 
are non-conventional symbols. Hence Horst is asking for evidence concerning the 
existence of non-conventional symbols. Cognitive science, of course, thinks there is such 
evidence: computational systems are found in organisms (e.g. human beings), and the 
symbols, with which they compute, are of course not instituted by conventions, but are 
rather conceived of as mental representations serving a symbolic role in computations. 
There are many examples. To take one example from Gallistel & King (2010): if 
there are symbols in the heads of bees over which they compute the trajectory of the sun, 
as is experimentally well-confirmed, we might interpret Horst above as wondering 
whether the bees get those meaningful symbols in their heads by means of conventional 





the question, we see the answer: bees are genetically programmed to encode symbolic 
representations of the course of the sun because bees are genetically determined to 
compute its trajectory. Since symbols are the very stuff of computation, there is no 
computation without symbolic representation (as Fodor (1975) originally claimed). But 
the computational abilities of bees are well-documented. Since the symbols with which 
bees compute are neither conventional inscriptions nor conventionally determined 
utterances, hence are not possibly 'conventions' in Horst's sense, it would appear that bee 
symbols must be non-conventional symbols20. But if so, I have met Horst’s challenge. 
Therefore, by Horst’s own criterion, Horst has begged the question. 
One need not have recourse to computational science to find non-conventional 
symbols. Husserl's account of semiotics (see Ch. 1) raises the issue of "the origination of 
conventional surrogates" in "natural signs" which are dependent on "psychological 
preconditions" as opposed to conventional ones (1994:25). Husserl’s natural thought-
process instantly refutes Horst in this passage. The simplest example of such 
“origination” for Husserl lies in the case of "the number signs" which is evidenced by the 
fact that "in most languages the word 'five' means the same as 'a hand'" (ibid). Husserl 
suggests that this convergence was by no means conventional: the hand is a natural 
symbol for the number '5' because the assigning of the meaning to the symbol occurs 
automatically by our nature: we see hands as denoting the number five without any 
                                                          
20 If one has misgivings about whether these mental representations are representations, as opposed to mere 
indicators, we are confirmed in our supposition that they are genuinely mental representations by 
considering the fact that the representation is still active in the absence of the stimulus (which is not the 
case with indicator semantics). This is demonstrated by the existence of the waggle dance, used to 





mediating convention. Hence hands are interpreted by us to mean 'five' intrinsically (or 
endogenously). By contrast, conventional symbols (like the ones I'm currently 
manipulating) are used by the same mechanisms that use the hand in reasoning toward an 
arithmetical result: I can compute with hands as I can with conventionally instituted 
English words. But it is extrinsic to the meaning of 'five' that it be denoted by the English 
word 'five' as opposed to the German word 'fünf.' As it happens, it is this extrinsic 
conception of conventional meaning that Horst takes to be both basic and exhaustive. 
Horst insists that this is the only way in which symbols have meaning, i.e., through an 
arbitrary act of consciousness. It follows that there cannot be any such thing as symbolic 
mental representations (a fortiori there cannot be any such thing as innate symbolic 
mental representations). Of course, we know why he wants to insist on this: because only 
then can he argue against Fodor that symbols cannot be used to explain the semantic 
properties of mental states21. This, then, is why Horst claims that Fodor cannot use the 
derivative meaning to explain the original case of meaning. Hence Horst wants to claim 
that consciousness is bedrock for any theory of content. Of course, by now, the subject of 
pre-conscious decision-making is very well-established experimentally. I think this shows 
that consciousness isn't the ground-floor for acts of decision-making, meaning-bestowal, 
etc. - just as, I believe, Schopenhauer, Freud, Chomsky & Fodor have all claimed in their 
own ways. 
                                                          
21Presumably Horst means conscious mental states. Fodor's whole point is that the semantic properties of 





One might here note that Horst (1996) believes his analysis agrees with Husserl's 
(43). Horst’s belief therefore opposes the thesis of this chapter: that Husserl might have 
left theoretical room for hypotheses concerning mental mechanisms of precisely the kind 
that Fodor defends. We cannot blame Horst for being unaware of what we unearthed in 
our last chapter: that the computational nature of these mechanisms is regarded by 
Husserl as foundational in a psychological sense for the analyses which appear in 
phenomenological consciousness. 
Nevertheless, Horst has a deep appreciation of the theoretical appeal of 
computational psychology. For Horst at one point notes the central issue of the present 
dissertation, and of this chapter in particular:   
 
The attitude-content distinction [i.e., the act-quality, act-matter distinction of the 
Logical Investigations] is itself only a distinction of analysis. CTM [i.e. the 
computational theory of mind] fleshes this distinction out in a way that no previous 
theory ha[s] done. Attitudes are interpreted as functional relations between an 
organism and its representations, and content in terms of the semantic properties of 
the representations. CTM thus both retains and clarifies a central feature of the 
standard analysis of intentional states. (44)  
 
The computational theory of mind relates to the attitude-content distinction as an 





consciousness. One is (reflectively) aware that one has certain judgments, desires, etc., 
which are the "attitudes." One is also (reflectively) aware that these judgments, desires, 
etc., are about things, which are the "contents" of the attitudes: I judge, for instance, that 
Husserl had a computational theory of mind; you desire, for example, that the 
computational theory of mind is false, etc. The computational theory of mind tries to 
explain, inter alia, how these two basic elements of awareness - attitudes and the contents 
they are about - come together (Fodor (1975)). As Jackendoff (1987) expresses the 
theory, "Every phenomenological distinction is caused by/supported by/projected from a 
corresponding computational distinction" (24). According to Jackendoff, then, the 
phenomenological distinction between act-qualities (attitudes) and act-matters (contents) 
is "caused by/supported by/projected from" their syntactic/symbolic equivalents in the 
computational mind. This explains the productivity of the attitudes. 
Regardless of how one feels about this explanation of the productivity (see Ch. 5) 
of the attitudes, it is, as far as I know, the only one available that takes the 
phenomenology of the attitudes seriously (and non-reductively). That's why Horst says 
that a virtue of this account is that it "retains" intentional psychology - instead of 
reducing intentional psychology to neurons or neuron-like nodes in a weighted network. 
Nevertheless, Horst believes computational explanations are not only implausible - 
they're impossible. That's because representations as symbols cannot serve in the 
explanation of intentionally directed cognitive states, since, according to Horst (1996), 
there is a one-way explanatory relationship from meaningful cognitive states to symbols. 





comes exclusively "from conventions" and "thus CTM has the relationship... precisely 
reversed" (63). Horst calls this the 'conceptual dependence' objection (73). The defense of 
the key assumption of conceptual dependence consists of an analysis of the concept of 
'symbol' which begins from the assumption that all symbolic meaning is conventional 
(79-122). Throughout this section of Horst's text, the possibility of the existence of 
natural symbols is not considered. Horst, therefore, makes a solid foundation for his 
argument by ignoring one half of the analysis. He then tries to use this analysis, which is, 
as he admits, question-begging, to refine his 'conceptual dependence' objection. This 
objection is really just the assumption that all symbols are derivative of deliberate acts of 
conscious will and so are all conventional. It can take the form of an extended modus 
tollens with respect to computation. If there are computational processes in minds, then 
there are symbolic mental representations (as Fodor contends in The Language of 
Thought (1975)). But, Horst declares, there are no symbolic mental representations, 
because all symbols are conventional. Therefore, by modus tollens, there are no 
computational processes in minds. So CTM is false. This modus tollens, however, relies 
on the (behaviorist) assumption that symbolic mental representations do not exist. 
Cognitive science, however, has no a priori commitment to the thesis that all symbols are 
conventional. Therefore, cognitive science cannot follow Horst in denying the consequent 






To see this, let us consider Horst’s understanding of the relationship between 
Fodor, cognitive science, and Husserl. Consider the following passage, where Horst 
(1996) attempts to contrast Husserl and Fodor:  
 
On the one hand, philosophers like Husserl (1900) and Searle (1983) have argued 
that the intentional and semantic properties of symbols are to be explained in terms 
of the intentional and semantic properties of mental states. As we have already seen, 
however, Fodor's view is quite the reverse: namely, that it is the semantic and 
intentional properties of mental states which are to be explained, and they are to be 
explained in terms of the intentional and semantic properties of symbols - 
specifically, symbols that serves as the objects of the propositional attitudes. While 
Fodor does acknowledge that written and spoken symbols get their semantic 
properties from the states that they express, he nonetheless holds that 'it is mental 
representations that have semantic properties in, one might say, the first instance; 
the semantic properties of propositional attitudes are inherited from those of mental 
representations...'. (43, italics added)  
 
Notice that Horst ascribes an explanatory aim to Husserl in 1900 which supposedly rules 
out Fodorian explanation. This is interesting since we have tried to emphasize how 
Husserl was very explicit that his concern was descriptive, i.e., he wasn't trying to explain 





cognitive science. (In this respect, Husserl was laying the groundwork for Chomsky’s 
revolution.) As a result, the view expressed by Fodor, that conscious and explicitly 
noticed propositional attitudes are somehow connected to mental representations in a 
language of thought, is nowhere denied by Husserl in 1900. Arguably, this is because 
Husserl knew first-hand of the possibility of a computational theory of mind in a 
language of thought - the main engine of explanation in cognitive science (however, see 
Aizawa (2014)). We therefore see a confusion in the above of the description/explanation 
distinction. This confusion is entangled in another confusion between conscious and 
unconscious mental states. These confusions cause Horst to claim that "Fodor's view is 
quite the reverse" from Husserl’s. These are simply two different levels of reality - one 
being a level for ideal description, the other for causal explanation. That's why Fodor 
says "it is mental representations that have semantic properties in, one might say, the first 
instance" - because by "mental representations" Fodor means the "unconscious, 
unnoticed genetic grounds" (to use Husserl’s phrase) of the propositional attitudes (2001 
(I) 303). 
Horst is right, I think, that someone might not want to explain 
phenomenologically given mental phenomena. One might desire to aesthetically sit with 
the phenomena, like Goethe22. But as we saw above, Husserl, like Schopenhauer, 
understood the nature of science: descriptions are gathered for the sake of explanation 
(secundum scientiam). Descriptions are not gathered for their own sake; and if we have 
                                                          





just descriptions, we have scientifically failed. It follows that the descriptions of the 
Logical Investigations do not in themselves qualify as explanations of anything. To use 
Husserl as a stick with which to beat Fodor is, I think, to misunderstand both. 
To return to Horst’s main line of argument: Horst is sure that computational 
theories are equivocating on certain key terms. Horst thinks this ultimately because of his 
belief in a 'conceptual dependence' - if representation qua symbol is conceptually 
dependent on representation qua mental state, then the sense of the latter is the literal 
sense, and the sense of the former is metaphorical. Hence "terms such as 'meaningful' and 
'intentional' cannot be predicated univocally of symbols and mental states, and hence any 
theory that depends upon the univocal application of such terms is conceptually 
confused" (65). He therefore charges the computational theory of mind with a 
homonymous or equivocal use of terms. This is revealed when he takes note (though only 
for two paragraphs) of the "alternative paradigm of nonconventional symbols in mental 
representation" which, of course, is the paradigm of cognitive science (152). This 
"alternative paradigm" – namely, the representational theory of mind (RTM) - goes back 
at least to Descartes, if not Plato. Only behaviorism ever seriously opposed RTM in the 
history of thought, and this opposition was quickly crushed by Chomsky in 1959. But 
Horst claims that "this approach is either a case of homonymous usage or else it is 
question begging" (152). I defiantly assert that it is neither. Consider the possibility that it 
is a case of “homonymous usage.” For there to be a case of homonymy, the meanings 
mustn't be "related at all" (Jackendoff (2012) p. 31). For example, the word 'bank' in 'I 





stream' are true homonyms. What Horst has in mind is actually polysemy - essentially 
related senses. Symbols in the conventional sense and symbols in the nonconventional 
sense share a common core of meaning: both symbolically represent things. The question 
that science asks is which comes first in the nature of things? The question is not which 
comes first in the view of common-sense, or – more precisely – common-sense from the 
point of view of 20th century English-usage influenced by the behaviorist paradigm in 
psychology? It may well be that these two questions are answered differently. But that 
does not amount to “homonymous usage.” The first horn of Horst’s dilemma is therefore 
not an argument against the symbolic character of mental representations. 
Nor, however, does this "alternative paradigm" beg the question. Cognitive 
science thinks it has empirical evidence for the existence of mental representations which 
play a symbolic role (i.e., enter into computations). Horst is allowed to give an 
explanation of the facts which does not invoke RTM. The fact is that no one tries these 
days to give a behaviorist analysis of bee computation - most philosophers agree, 
according to Searle (2002), that behaviorism is dead (204). But Horst, in putting forward 
the possibility that RTM is a petition principii, denies this. He wants an analysis of 
behavior without mentalism. Anything less would be begging the question (153). But 
begging the question doesn't mean assuming what needs to be assumed in light of the 
empirical evidence. Begging the question means arguing for a principle while assuming 
the truth of the principle. Mentalists argue for the existence of symbolic mental 





It's perhaps true that common sense has no notion of symbolic mental 
representation. But common-sense at any historical juncture is not science. Common-
sense, for example, has no notion of the sun as a stationary object in our solar system. 
Does that mean heliocentrism is begging the question? By Horst's criteria, it must be, 
since it departs from common usage. Or take the case of the genetic code. The existence 
of the genetic code in biological organisms is not in doubt. Yet, by Horst's reasoning, the 
genetic code is either a case of homonymous usage or it is begging the question. We can 
answer this dilemma in the same manner as we did above. 
I have attempted to show that Horst’s critique of CTM reduces to the bare 
assumption that all symbols are conventional. But Horst (2007), resting on his laurels, 
believe he has shown something more substantive, namely that computation cannot even 
in principle buttress conscious subjectivity in any explanatory fashion (87). Jackendoff 
(1987, 1992, 2012) has, I think, convincingly argued that this cannot be true. In any case, 
let us stress that Husserl would not have agreed with Horst, since Husserl in fact had a 
computational theory of mind embedded in a language of thought. 
Section VI. Critique of Searle 
John Searle is the most famous critic of the computational theory of mind. For our 
purposes, he is a much more formidable opponent than Horst, since Searle goes beyond 
ordinary language prejudices in order to bring forward some interesting arguments based 
on simple fact and logic. Nevertheless, what the Greek word 'symbol' is to Horst, the 






In any case, Searle (2002) actually recasts Horst's argument for the conceptual 
dependence of computational entities on conscious mental states. Distinguishing between 
"those features of reality that are intrinsic and those that are observer-relative," Searle 
promptly categorizes computations as observer-relative:  
 
Computation does not name an intrinsic feature of reality but is observer-relative, 
and this is because computation is defined in terms of symbol manipulation, but the 
notion of a 'symbol' is not a notion of physics or chemistry. Something is a symbol 
only if it is used, treated or regarded as a symbol. [In particular]... [s]omething is a 
symbol only relative to some observer, user or agent who assigns a symbolic 
interpretation to it. (17)  
 
To say that something is "observer-relative" is to say that it's dependent on 
consciousness. As Searle later remarks, "[W]e cannot explain the notion of consciousness 
in terms of information processing and symbol manipulations" because these latter 
properties are conceptually dependent on the former. Of course, this is just to deny 
outright what is at issue: that symbol manipulation could be "intrinsic to the biology of 
nervous systems" (34). For if there are endogenous processes which encode objects in the 
environment as symbols, which in turn are manipulated by causality (as opposed to 





how this reasonably well-formulated empirical question23 becomes impossible in 
principle is nowhere spelled out by Searle (or Horst). 
Searle has a substantive point though: symbolic syntax does not denote an entity 
in "physics or chemistry." Prima facie, this is both true and irrelevant: computational 
cognitive science does not pretend to be as well-grounded as physics or chemistry. But 
Searle's deeper point is this: the explanation of mental properties, as opposed to their 
description, is going to involve causality. And causal relations subsume physical entities. 
But computations aren't physical. So they're not properly explanatory (cpf. Searle (1992) 
p. 207). 
The literature on this argument has already put forward a good objection. 
Milkowski (2013) has this to say: "As Chalmers has noted, Searle commits a simple 
fallacy: he confuses the thing which is realized (an abstract specification) with its 
realization (basically, a physical process) (77)." This is all the more ironic, considering 
what Searle says about the possibility of explanation in the mental sciences: "[W]e can 
give genuine causal explanations that are not at the bottom level, not at the level of 
neurons, etcetera, because the higher levels of explanation are also real levels. Talk of 
them is not just a manner of speaking or a metaphor" (107). But if Searle believes this, 
why does he impugn computational explanations for not being "physics or chemistry," 
i.e., for not explaining mental states and processes "at the level of neurons"? Hence, at 
one time he says one doesn't need to give explanations only at the level of neurons; at 
                                                          





another time, computational cognitive science is to blame for invoking entities at "higher 
levels of explanation" than the physics and chemistry of neurons. This seems to be an 
inconsistency in Searle's position, which has not hitherto been noticed. 
I believe that Searle's ordinary language (empiricist) prejudices get in the way of 
his consistency. For Searle believes minds are real. But then why not the things minds 
do? One doesn't concede that atoms are real, but then go on to qualify that our hypotheses 
concerning the nature of atomic states and processes must be illusory. For what is at issue 
here is the nature of certain mental states and processes, namely, the hypothesis that 
certain mental states and processes are determined by mechanisms which are sensitive to 
syntactic form. If there are such mechanisms, then those mechanisms produce processes 
which are computational in nature. There's no reason to get cold feet. 
Unless, of course, one adheres to methodological dualism. And Searle may be 
symptomatic of this trend. As Chomsky (2016) points out, with application to Searle:   
 
We should understand enough by now to dismiss the interpretation of theoretical 
accounts as no more than a way of 'representing certain known facts about 
[behavior], a mode of representation' only - a critique commonly leveled against 
theories of higher mental faculties, though not insect computation, another 
illustration of the methodological dualism that is so prevalent in critical discussion 






As if he were a behaviorist, Searle is an anti-realist about computational "theories of 
higher mental faculties." But Searle is very explicitly not a behaviorist, with the result 
that he's a realist about those "higher mental faculties" themselves. In effect, then, 
Searle's position is this: yes, higher mental faculties exist, and yes they can constitute 
explanatory theories of a higher level beyond the physics and chemistry of neurons; but 
not if those theories describe computations, because computations aren't physical. I 
believe Searle is involved in an inconsistency. 
This becomes more apparent when we consider that Searle fully agrees with 
Chomsky concerning the existence of an innate mechanism devoted to language 
acquisition. Searle is impressed by Chomsky's starting-point: that children learn language 
automatically, without conscious instruction. The way to explain this fact is obviously by 
postulating an innate mechanism which causes the child to acquire language 
automatically. The study of the nature of the mechanism yields the discovery of 
substantive constraints on possible grammars and syntax, e.g., structure-dependence rules 
as opposed to rules of proximity. And the mechanism has to be computationally sensitive 
to syntax in order to produce such constraints. 
But this just can't be, because, according to Searle, a causal mechanism couldn't 
be sensitive to syntactic relations, because syntax isn't part of physics, and only physical 
entities are subsumed by causal relations. But why admit the existence of a mechanism 
and refuse to believe in its operations? These syntactic operations are certainly at a level 
of description higher than "physics or chemistry." But Searle (2002) admits that you can 





syntactic rules governing symbols in computational processes are observer-relative, i.e., 
they are not, for Searle, "intrinsic" to the organism (34). But if these are aspects of the 
mechanism which is admitted to be intrinsic, why does the nature of the mechanism 
suddenly become observer-relative? The nature of the mechanism, like the mechanism 
itself, ought to be intrinsic. 
Moreover, if syntactic relations can be mechanistically described, they can be 
causally described - hence we can offer a causal explanation of brain function at the 
syntactic level of description. As Fodor (2000) points out, "It was Turing's great 
discovery that machines can be designed to evaluate any inference that is formally valid. 
That's because... you can build them so that they are quite good at detecting and 
responding to syntactic properties and relations" (13). But if that's true, then mechanisms, 
as opposed to consciousness, can perform computations, i.e., manipulate symbols. And 
now if there are innate biological mechanisms which are computationally sensitive to the 
syntax of sentences, then these will perform computations intrinsically because, by 
definition, innate mechanisms do what they do regardless of any observers. The syntactic 
operations of a Turing machine are observer-relative in the sense that the machine 
wouldn't perform those operations if not for the observer, i.e., some consciousness, 
having programmed it to do so; but this isn't true of an innate biological mechanism, 
whose program has a genetic, i.e., non-conscious, origin. 
Searle's (2002) inconsistency, of allowing an explanatory mechanism but not 
allowing it to do any explanatory work, is perhaps the result of a background 





(12). For observe: Chomskyan computations involve rules (e.g., those of structure-
dependence) which are said to be 'known' by the mind that computes. And knowledge is 
an intentional state. But this knowledge is locked away in the unconscious - no one can 
'shift their attention' to the sorts of rules determining their interpretation of the syntax of a 
sentence, at least not in real-time. The best we can do is indirectly theorize about such 
rules. 
To bring it all back to Husserl: a similar case arises in the 1891 essay. There 
Husserl is impressed with a primitive Fodorian fact: thought-processes are typically truth-
preservative. The wonder of this is that no conscious application of a rule of formal 
validity is being applied: the rapid and unconscious flow of thought yields only 
"fragments" of words and images. And this fast-moving train of fragments is the 
phenomenology of thinking24. The deep philosophical wonder is that, at the end, one 
typically has a true conclusion. But one can't introspect and discover the rules by which 
one arrived at the conclusion. In other words, one can't 'shift one's attention' to the rules 
that guide the process, because the process isn't being guided by consciousness. It follows 
that consciousness isn't behind the process; so consciousness can't explain the rapid flow 
of thinking which typically results in true conclusions. As a direct result, the explanation 
has to be something else, something not conscious. And Husserl's explanation is that, 
what's guiding the rapid flow of thinking is the "mechanism of symbolic inference," 
which is a computational mechanism, driven by blind causality and yet sensitive to the 
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syntax of mental representations (as opposed to the semantics of mental representations). 
It has to be a computational mechanism because what is being preserved is truth, and the 
only way to preserve truth, apart from the conscious application of a rule of formal 
validity, is by a mechanical manipulation of syntactic symbols. 
Husserl (1891) is fully aware that one can only indirectly theorize (i.e. 
hypothesize) about such computational states, which are not accessible to consciousness 
(1994:38). The fact that they are not accessible to consciousness is, in turn, precisely why 
such theorizing can explain the phenomenology of thinking: for scientific explanations 
that go beyond the phenomena, i.e. the observables, turn on unobservables (hence Husserl 
notes that "the concepts of the sciences" are, with respect to direct perception, "forever 
denied to us" (1994:38)). If Searle says that intentional states must in principle be 
accessible to consciousness, what he is really saying is that unconscious intentional states 
and processes shall do no explanatory work. For he says that an unconscious intentional 
state is intentional only insofar as it is not an unconscious intentional state simpliciter 
(12). 
In other words, Searle is ruling out by methodological fiat the possibility of 
explaining conscious mental states and intentionality in terms of the unconscious, since 
he is defining the unconscious as part of the field of consciousness. I believe this criticism 
is original to my research. Searle (1982) never gives an argument for this commitment, 
beyond noting "a fact about linguistic usage" (276). This fact is that we linguistically 
happen to ascribe intentionality only to beings with consciousness (ibid). The weakness 





guide to science. It simply doesn't matter with regard to reality whether everyone uses the 
term language in a conventionalist sense. It doesn't even matter with regard to common-
sense: universal grammar - a non-conventional sense of language - used to be common-
sense, at least in ancient Egypt (Herodotus (2015) pp. 127-128). Empiricism and 
behaviorism – like any intellectual trend - can do a lot to change common-sense, which is 
by no means well-defined. Furthermore, it doesn't matter whether we happen to ascribe 
intentionality only to beings with consciousness. This is obviously a contingent fact, not a 
necessary one. For if it were necessary, we couldn’t think of the one without the other; 
yet this is not the case. There is simply no reason beyond initial plausibility why science 
should have scruples related to contingent facts of linguistic usage. 
In sum, I offer two original criticisms of Searle: (1) he admits the existence of a 
language module, but refuses to believe in the most essential property of the module, its 
sensitivity to, and ability to process, syntactic shapes and relations. And (2) by defining 
unconscious intentionality as always in principle accessible to consciousness, he in effect 
denies the existence of unconscious intentionality; hence he denies its explanatory power. 
This is, admittedly, a clever sleight of hand. But ultimately we agree with Chomsky 
(2016) in questioning the very "coherence" of Searle's definition. 
Section VII: Conclusion 
This chapter argued for a controversial claim: namely, that descriptive sciences 
necessarily turn into explanatory sciences, failing which they are not sciences; for the 
essence of science aims at such transformation. I argued that this is Husserl's view. Since 





preparatory to explanatory theory, it follows that the six investigations are incomplete. I 
argue that Husserl had an explanatory theory in the wings (a LOT). And this explanatory 
theory serves to complete a great many of the descriptions which take center-stage in the 
Logical Investigations. At the request of my readers, I then defended the computational 
theory of mind against two prominent critics, on the basis of my reading of Husserl's 
texts. In the next chapter, I will apply the theoretical apparatus we have acquired in the 
course of these first two chapters - i.e., Husserl's computational theory of mind, and the 
way in which it fits into Husserl's methodology. We will use Logical Investigation II as a 
test case for our theory. I will open the next chapter, however, with a review of the 






Chapter Three: Causal Explanation: Associationism, Computationalism, & 
Connectionism 
Husserl operates in the Logical Investigations with a basic distinction between (1) 
what appears to consciousness, and (2) how what appears to consciousness comes into 
consciousness. What appears to consciousness are things that are perceived, remembered, 
or imagined. How those things come to be perceived, remembered, or imagined 
constitutes the theory of the processes through which things are perceived, remembered, 
or imagined. This properly Aristotelian distinction, between that which is (ὅτι) and that 
through which it is (διότι), constitutes the division of labor (if there can be one) between 
phenomenology and cognitive science. 
A theory of causal processes (which Husserl calls a 'genetic' account, following 
Paul Natorp25) corresponds methodologically to the task of explanation: the study of how 
things come to be. With respect to mental and cognitive phenomena, it is the study of 
how things come to appear through "biological or psychological processes" (Yoshimi 
(2016) p.67). Following Husserl (1900) and Fodor (1994), some of these latter 
“psychological process” (namely, the computational) are not to be identified with the 
“biological.” Phenomenology, on the other hand, stands in need of explanatory 
supplements and therefore exists as a data-gatherer for the sake of future explanations26. 
                                                          
25 For more on the influence of Natorp on Husserl concerning the theory of causal processes of the mind, 
see Donn Welton (2003). 
26 This is apparent from Chapter 11 of the Prolegomena, but also from Jackendoff’s Consciousness and the 
Computational Mind (1987), as well as Kim’s reflection that "'phenomenological' relations [are] surface 






Hence insofar as phenomenology qua descriptive science looks to mental and cognitive 
phenomena, it does so with regard to some explanatory apparatus of some sort. 
However, the paradigm explanatory apparatus in psychology, from Locke to 
Chomsky, belonged entirely to the empiricists: associationism. As a result, one might 
think that Husserlian description could only have expected an empiricist explanatory 
supplement (faute de mieux). 
But empiricism could not be the theory by which Husserlian descriptions might be 
ultimately completed. For empiricism "destroys its own possibility as a scientifically 
proven theory" because it is "a genuine psychologism" (2001(I):59-60). As a result, 
Husserl says, "[o]ne has sought in vain since Locke to make headway by means of a 
psychology of knowledge and a theory of rationally valid cognition grounded in it" 
(2001(I):31). Now I am trying to point out that this is because associationism, the 
"psychology of knowledge" in question, reduces ideal unities (e.g. Green) to a similarity 
space in which no ideal unities appear (e.g. more or less green things). But since 
"rationally valid cognition" is dependent on ideal unities as identities, as opposed to 
amalgamations induced from the experience of similar things, it follows that one cannot 
understand the emergence of rationality through associationism, as Husserl correctly 
notes. In particular, one cannot have "a theory of rationally valid cognition grounded" in 
it. Associationism, therefore, cannot be the explanatory apparatus to which Husserl might 





Historically, associationism gave way to computationalism, and computationalism 
gave rise to a renewed associationism: connectionism (Fodor (2008) 103). Insofar as 
connectionism is a form of associationism, it repeats the problems that Husserl identified 
with the empiricists as a result of their associationism. For instance, connectionist 
networks are trained by examples, and their 'knowledge' is entirely that of amalgamations 
of particulars. So, in the first instance, as Churchland (1990) notes, networks are 
"sensitive to similarities," not identities (p.204; cpf. Plato's Camera (2012, p.42)). But 
that, I claim, is precisely the problem. Similarity is not identity (simile not est idem). In 
fact, as Husserl and Fodor repeatedly note, similarity presupposes identity. Consequently, 
on pain of circularity one cannot explain identity in terms of similarity. But this is 
precisely what connectionism, as a species of associationism, proposes to do. Hence this 
circularity objection, together with the infinite regress which follows from ignoring it, 
will be what I will call 'the substantive objection' to associationism/connectionism; it will 
be the task of this chapter to clarify this objection through our examination of Logical 
Investigation II. 
There is, in addition, a properly Husserlian 'methodological objection' to 
associationism/connectionism. According to Husserl, what Hume's associationism lacks 
is a grounding in the descriptive phenomena. In other words, Hume incorrectly begins 
with his explanans, associationism, and proceeds to subsume all explananda under his 
favorite explanatory theory. This is why Husserl argues that "Hume's genetic analyses 
certainly cannot claim theoretical completeness and finality, since they lack a foundation 





meaning-units not in any way based on similarities, cannot show up for empiricist 
theories27. The proper Husserlian procedure is to be sensitive to the phenomena by first 
achieving descriptive adequacy (as, e.g., Chomsky did against Skinner), and then 
proceeding to the explanatory apparatus which best suits the phenomena. 
According to Robert Cummins (2000), a procedure which begins with the 
phenomena to be explained (the explananda), before proceeding to the processes which 
explain the phenomena (the explanans), is called a "top-down strategy" (132). 
Computationalism proceeds in this manner (ibid). On the other hand, connectionism, like 
associationism, is a "bottom-up strategy" that "start[s] with a specification of the 
architecture, and tr[ies] to find a way to make it do the task" (ibid; cpf. Churchland 
(2012) p.35). Hence, if the "task" is to represent universals, both connectionism and 
associationism will fail, according to Husserl, because a "Specific Unity" cannot be 
arrived at through induction from similar particulars (2001(I):244). 
Hence, discarding associationism and connectionism as proper explanatory 
apparatuses for Husserlian phenomenology is necessary if we are to take the Logical 
Investigations at face value. As a result, I recommend an alternative, which happens to be 
something that Husserl already envisioned: a computational theory of mind whose 
computations are defined over syntactic representations in a language of thought. I will 
show that this explanatory apparatus is best suited for completing Husserlian 
                                                          
27 It may be noted that universal meanings and universal species are distinct objects of apprehension. This 
distinction, however, is not relevant for our semantic concerns. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that universal 





descriptions, such as the representation of universals. This is because it does not fall foul 
to the substantive (circularity & regress) and methodological (explanans as opposed to 
explananda driven research) objections which can be seen to be put forward by Husserl in 
the second Logical Investigation. I will review these presently, as part of a close reading 
of the second Logical Investigation. 
Every Husserlian must be interested in our argument. For it is Husserl's thesis in 
the Prolegomena that every description exists for the sake of a future explanation. And 
the Logical Investigations is, as a whole, explicitly not providing a theory or an 
explanation (contra Dallas Willard) of the descriptions it offers; it just offers the 
descriptions, leaving the genetic/explanatory component of a complete theory wide open. 
We defended this thesis in the 2nd chapter. Now I suggest that Husserl's intention in 
limiting himself to descriptions (contra Kevin Mulligan) was specifically to combat 
empiricism, i.e., the theory that our minds are blank slates to be written upon by our 
experience with the sensuous individuals of the world. What Husserl is methodologically 
saying is: if you stick with descriptions you'll see a host of phenomena that cannot be 
explained by empiricism. 
However one may feel about Husserl's anti-empiricism, this much is clear: since 
Husserl is explicitly working with an incomplete theory in the Logical Investigations, one 
must seek to complete the theory. Now, the possible explanatory supplements on the 
current betting-table of science are: (1) computationalism, (2) associationism, or (3) 
connectionism. But the second Logical Investigation shows that (2) is untenable with 





argue that, since connectionism is associationism in new dress (Fodor (2016) 47-52), both 
(2) and (3) are ruled out if we follow Husserl at all closely. Hence it seems we must opt 
for (1). After all, Husserl not only anticipated cognitive psychology (as Hubert Dreyfus 
insisted) but had literally worked out (as I insist) the computational theory of mind by 
reference to a language of thought, as we demonstrated in the 1st chapter. This 3rd 
chapter will examine some of the dire consequences of our demonstration. 
Section I. Transition to an Examination of the 2nd Logical Investigation 
As a preliminary, let us note that the literature has long misunderstood Husserl's 
positive relationship to genetic-causal explanation. Derrida (1962), for instance, suggests 
that there is a "condemnation" of "psycho-geneticism" in Husserl (26). But Derrida is just 
wrong. There is a condemnation of empiricism in Husserl. In particular, Husserl 
condemns the kind of genetic explanation preferred by empiricism, namely, 
associationism, since it is "wholly inadequate" to the phenomena, "and therefore cannot 
account for our appreciation of generality" (A.D. Smith (2008) 93). Our question, 
however, is: what explanatory apparatus is adequate to the phenomena? What form of 
explanation - as opposed to description - can account for "our appreciation of generality"? 
There must be an explanation, on pain of miracle-mongering. Husserl leaves this question 
open (although the Denkmaschine passage seems to suggest a positive answer). The 
possibility, therefore, of Husserlian computationalism filling the gap should be seriously 
considered. 
The above manner of interpretation, which identifies genetic explanation with 





Husserl constantly attacks the British empiricists for substituting accounts of 
psychological genesis for phenomenological analysis, and even suggests that the two are 
mutually exclusive" (37). Husserl nowhere "suggests that the two are mutually 
exclusive." Indeed, he cannot suggest as much, since he is limited to description. Only 
competing explanatory apparatuses can be mutually exclusive, since only one explanation 
(per given phenomenon) can be ultimately correct28. 
Nor is it true to say, stricto sensu, that Husserl "attacks" the empiricists "for 
substituting accounts of psychological genesis for phenomenological analysis." What he 
more precisely says is that "genetic analyses [...] cannot claim theoretical completeness 
and finality, [if] they lack a foundation in an adequate descriptive analysis" (2001:292). 
This is a very different proposition from the one Soffer attributes to Husserl. What 
Husserl is actually saying is that genetic explanation must come second - not that it 
mustn't come at all. Saying that there cannot be a genetic explanation for a given 
cognitive phenomenon would literally be absurd, since that would imply that the 
phenomenon in question is a miracle. What Husserl is actually asserting is simply that 
description must come first. Again, that is very different from the claim (if I read Derrida 
and Soffer aright) that Husserl is arguing against genetic explanation tout court. In fact, 
the idea that description must precede explanation is hardly unique to Husserl: as we saw 
                                                          
28 See for example the classic competition between connectionism (McClelland & Rumelhart) and 






in the last chapter, it is, for Husserl, the basic methodology of science in general (see Ch. 
11 of the Prolegomena). Again, Husserl is not trying to oppose science with miracles. 
Derrida's and Soffer's interpretations need qualification. But this has not been 
noticed. As a result, no one has noticed that these interpretations contradict the 
methodology of the Logical Investigations which absolutely demands explanatory 
supplements to descriptive phenomena. Furthermore, no one has noticed the demand for 
explanatory supplements to descriptive phenomena. On the other hand, Yoshimi's project 
fits rather nicely into our understanding of the methodology. But Yoshimi's preferred 
explanatory supplements can be no more adequate to the phenomena of the second 
Logical Investigation than were Hume's. I hope to show this in the course of the 
development of this chapter. 
Section II. Computationalism and Logical Distinctions in Consciousness 
The second Logical Investigation is the true beginning of the Logical 
Investigations. For it concerns not only the logical distinction between individuals and 
universals, but also the entire domain of pure logic: "meanings as such, i.e. meanings in 
the sense of specific unities, constitute the domain of pure logic" (2001(I):238). What 
makes these the objects of the domain of pure logic, as opposed to psychologistic logic, is 
that these "specific unities" are not derived from experience, and therefore cannot be 
reduced to experience. Hence Husserl is interested in "defending the intrinsic right of 
specific (or ideal) objects" in order that they may "be granted objective status alongside 
of individual (or real) objects" (ibid). But empiricism wishes to reduce the objectivity of 





be reduced to "individual (or real) objects." Now this is precisely "the point on which 
relativistic, empiricistic psychologism differs from idealism, which alone represents the 
possibility of a self-consistent theory of knowledge" (2001(I):238). 
The "idealism" Husserl defends, however, is not empirical or material idealism 
(e.g. Berkeley’s). Rather, it is a formal (or transcendental (or non-empirical)) idealism. 
The empirical reality of this green thing (hic et nunc) is not in dispute. What is in dispute 
are the objectivities that this green thing can sustain. Empiricists say (plausibly) that the 
only objectivity this green thing (hic et nunc) can sustain is its individual, sensuous 
reality - for what else is there? Husserl would agree that the only thing there (external to 
the mind) is the real green individual (hic et nunc). But Husserl insists that, through an act 
(i.e. through an intentional experience of the mind) relating a specific form to the same 
sense-contents, a new specific object, as opposed to the individual object, is created (i.e. 
constituted):   
 
The same appearance sustains different acts in the two cases. In the first case it 
provides the presentative basis for an act of individual reference, i.e. for an act in 
which we apply ourselves to the apparent thing itself, and 'mean' this thing or this 
feature, this part of the thing. In the latter case it provides the presentative basis for 






Now I would argue that, behind the "act of conception and reference" which intends a 
specific (as opposed to an individual) object, is the computational machinery unearthed in 
the 1st chapter. Computational machinery gives us logical distinctions and thereby 
conceptions of logical form. Now the distinction between individuals and universals is a 
distinction of logical form. Therefore, insofar as we are able to graft on to "the 
presentative basis" the logical form of universality, this is solely because we, from a 
causal-genetic standpoint, have innate computational machinery which gives rise to such 
logical distinctions as are nowhere to be found in sensory (as opposed to intentional) 
experience. If so, then this machinery would be the foundation of our ability to think 
logically29. Distinctions of logical form do not float down from heaven into our brains. 
Nor can they be derived from experience (hence Husserl's polemic against the 
empiricists). There is, as everyone agrees, no perceptual primitive corresponding to a 
universal. Hence the only way this logical distinction could have causally-genetically 
entered our experience is through "our thought-machinery," to which, indeed, Husserl is 
committed as an explanatory hypothesis (2001(I):50). 
What I am arguing for may be repugnant to my readers. I can only hope that by 
reviewing the facts we can become more convinced that Husserl had an explanatory 
supplement relevant to the descriptions under consideration. I've already shown that he 
had this supplement; the rest of my dissertation shows its relevancy. I ask you: is the 
"mode of apprehension constitutive of the intuitive presence of the [Species]" a genetic 
                                                          





function of the perceptual experience itself, or a function of the mind that has the 
experience? It cannot be the perceptual experience itself, since all that is there is "the 
same appearance" of this real individual thing (e.g. a green thing hic et nunc). Therefore 
the experience of the universal is in virtue of our mind's peculiar "mode of 
apprehension." This "mode of apprehension" is, as Husserl admits, properly "an act of 
conception" (2001(I):239-240). At one time, the individual thing is "individually treated," 
and at another time it is "specifically treated" (2001(I):240). When it is "specifically 
treated," we have "an act of conception30" (2001(I):239-240). In other words, it is not an 
act of perception, which only perceives the particular sensuous qualities of real 
individuals, but rather an act of intuition that has been given a "specific" form by our 
logical "conception." It is only because our mind gives the form to the material or 
perceptual experience that we are able to refer to a universal ideal object on the basis of a 
real individual thing. 
Now I ask, what is the causal-genetic mechanism behind this giving of the form to 
our experience? It cannot be associationism. For on the basis of associationism, the 
empiricists rightly claim that we cannot really mean universals, because, strictly 
speaking, there are no universals. More precisely, there are no universals in the world of 
sensory experience; and the world of sensory experience (mundus sensibilis) is the only 
                                                          
30 Hence properly conceptual contents are behind all founded acts. “The doctrine,” according to Adorno 
(1956), “comes down to the fact that, if someone observes a red object and becomes conscious of this 
object as something red – though the relation between these two moments is unclear – then he has not only 





one we've got31. So if association is the machinery by which we arrive at all our 
conceptions, including universals, then we must admit that we do not really have a 
genuine conception of universals (as Berkeley and Hume realized). But, Husserl counters, 
we do have a genuine conception of universals, because universals are a part of scientific 
law. Moreover, we are able to give our conception an intuitive basis through a real 
individual. As Husserl insists, we plainly are able to encounter real individual green 
things, and treat the individual instances as examples of the species Green, to which 
intuitive presence is given by the individual (2001(I):240). The very possibility of our so 
doing reflects a "distinction," which, "like all fundamental logical distinctions, is 
categorial" (2001(I):240). Now what explanatory machinery can account for the logical 
form (the logical syntax) of the experience of universals? There's only one candidate, as 
far as I know, consistent with both current science and Husserl's textual corpus: the 
computational theory of mind. 
As a result, I seriously put forward the thesis that the seeing of the universal on 
the basis of a sensuous individual on the descriptive level is the more or less direct result 
of the computational theory of mind on the genetic. The idea is this: when presented with 
an observable sensuous entity, the mind, through an act of conception and reference, 
represents the individual as universal. Now how does the mind do this? And where does 
the representation come from? Remember: a universal cannot be the output of the sense 
organs - for only features of a given individual can be their output. For example, some 
                                                          
31 If you'd like to make a bid for the real existence of the mundus intelligibilis, one may do so; but I'd 






particular shade of green can be the output of one's sense organs coming into contact with 
some green individual. But the universal essence of the green thing - Green - is not, in the 
same manner, picked up by any sense, since universals are, strictly speaking, not 
observable by our senses. Hence Husserl says, "The notion of Green can indeed not be 
seen, whether this be the notion in the sense of the meaning of 'green', or the notion in the 
sense of the attribute green, the Species Green" (2001(I):256). The only things truly 
observable are individuals - that's why these need to serve as the basis (in a founding act) 
for universals (in a founded act). Therefore, the representation of the universal in our 
experience is the output of some function internal to the cognitive mind (as opposed to 
the sensorium - these being the only two options). Hence it is precisely in virtue of "our 
thought-machinery" - insofar as this is productive of categorial-syntactical distinctions - 
that we are able to categorially intuit universal objects and be intentionally directed 
toward them; and this explanatory apparatus is adequate to the phenomena, unlike the 
associationistic apparatus. 
I have proposed that the computational theory of mind is the explanation behind 
why logical distinctions appear in conscious experience. In particular, I propose that 
categorial intuition, first sketched in the second Logical Investigation, is functionally 
derived from a hidden computational process, which takes the representation of a 
sensuous individual as input and yields a universal representation as output. Something 
like this really must be the case, since "[c]oncepts for such entities [as universals] are not 
themselves the output of sense organs" or environmental stimuli and therefore cannot be 





Species Green cannot be defined in terms of, and therefore cannot be learned from, the 
many green individuals one has encountered in one's perceptual experience. Since 
associationism and connectionism say that the concept Green is learned from experience 
by means of relevantly similar individuals (i.e. similar with respect to Greenness), and 
since Husserl denies this, it is necessary to consider his words, so as to better see that 
computationalism should be the preferred explanatory option for phenomenology. 
Section III. Arguments Against Associationism (/Connectionism) in the 2nd 
Investigation: Part I 
Husserl offers his substantive criticism against associationism (a fortiori 
connectionism) shortly after the passages examined above. Husserl writes:  
 
It would of course appear as a total inversion of the true state of things, were one 
to try to define identity, even in the sensory realm, as being essentially a limiting 
case of 'alikeness'. Identity is wholly indefinable, whereas 'alikeness' is definable: 
'alikeness' is the relation of objects falling under one and the same Species. If one 
is not allowed to speak of the identity of the Species, of the respect in which there 
is 'alikeness', talk of 'alikeness' loses its whole basis. (2001:242)  
 
Since "'alikeness'" - i.e. similarity - just is "the relation of objects falling under one and 
the same Species," the very concept of "one and the same Species" - i.e. identity - is 





similarity on pain of circularity (footnote: This asymmetry - that similarity depends on 
identity but not identity on similarity, first pointed out by Husserl - is likewise an 
argument against empiricism for Fodor (1998): "It looks as though a robust notion of 
content similarity can't but presuppose a correspondingly robust notion of content 
identity. Notice that this situation is not symmetrical; the notion of content identity 
doesn't require a prior notion of content similarity" (32).). But that is precisely what 
associationism tries to do because experience does not present us with anything identical. 
Experience only presents us with more or less similar individuals. Husserl's argument is, 
then, that similarity presupposes identity, and therefore on pain of circularity one cannot 
explain identity in terms of similarity. But associationism proposes to explain all our 
concepts in terms of the experience of similarity. So associationism is false. 
Here's a related argument: If associationism is the true theory of genetic 
explanation, we do not really have the concept of identity (a fortiori universal identity). 
But now if associationism is true, we must have the concept of identity, since one can 
only associate similars on the basis of a known identity. Indeed, associationism betrays 
its empiricist credentials since it presupposes that we must innately possess the concept 
of identity, insofar as similarity is the basis of all learning. But similarity presupposes 
identity. Therefore, associationism entails that we both have, and do not have, the 
concept of identity. This contradiction shows that associationism - the preferred 
explanatory apparatus of empiricism (to this day) - is false. 
From a phenomenological point of view, we must accept that we have the concept 





phenomenology? Here's my argument: Identity is, according to Husserl, a logical 
concept. And identity is not learned from experience since experience only presents us 
with more or less similar things. Therefore the concept of identity is a priori - i.e., it 
exists in the mind prior to experience (indeed, like all logical concepts). Hence the 
genetic explanation of how we arrive at this concept must involve something innate and a 
priori. Now I speculate that the concept of identity arises from the generative processes 
of "our [logical] thought-machinery." For our thought-machinery must treat concepts as 
identical - otherwise, it could never make a valid inference. But it does make valid 
inferences: the whole reason why we think we have thought-machinery is that we 
regularly make valid inferences without intending to do so (which throws off our 
intuitions about inferences being intentional processes). So the concept of identity comes 
built-in to the operations of the machinery. The conception of identity arises, therefore, 
from the operations of this innate, logical machinery (i.e. with computational machinery 
(CTM)). 
The above is my explanatory supplement to Husserl's phenomenology with regard 
to logical concepts like identity. I think something like this story can be generalized for 
all logical concepts and distinctions, since, according to Husserl, formal logic as a 
"system" (as opposed to a collection of conventional signs) arises, with regard to 
"psychological and historical origination," through "blind natural laws" appertaining to 
our innate computational mechanism of thought (Hua XII:367-8 / 1994:46). Hence 
systematic distinctions (e.g., between individual and universal) arise naturally (not 





three systems that arise in this manner - from computational operations - are logic, 
arithmetic, and language (ibid). 
These three systems, moreover, are central to our cognitive life; they are 
phenomenologically more basic than anything else in our rational experience (2001, 60). 
This assertion is often denied by connectionists who do not possess an account of the 
origin of these systems, since all involve formal inference. For instance, Smolensky 
(1991) says, "Many proponents of connectionism would be content to claim that formal 
inference is a specially trained, poorly practiced skill that is far from central to cognition, 
and that therefore we can afford to put off worrying about providing a connectionist 
model of it for a long time" (294). But this is precisely what Husserl denies. Far from 
being "specially trained," formal inference is something that arises "right from the 
beginnings of life and thought" (Hua XII:358 / 1994:37). Hence formal inference is 
precisely not "specially trained." Similarly, Yoshimi (2016) is sanguine about the 
prospects of explaining "the constitution of formal and mathematical structures like 
numbers" in terms of a "learning rule" which employs hypothesis formation (50-51 / 29-
30). But Husserl insists that these structures arise through "indigenous [i.e. innate] 
mechanical processes" which are not learned. In particular, "arithmetical operations, 
insofar as they are formative of numbers," are functions of "the system of arithmetic," 
which is not the product of conscious deliberation and instruction but is, with regard to its 
genetic origin, rather "a product of blind natural laws" that hold of our "psychology" 





properly understood, which are rather the results of Husserl's "indigenous [i.e. innate] 
mechanical processes" - in particular, the successor function. 
As Chomsky (2012) points out, in accord with Husserl's point of view above, 
"there happen to be very simple ways to get arithmetic from Merge," which is the 
computational mechanism currently hypothesized to account for the syntactic structures 
involved in our knowledge of language: 
 
Take the concept Merge, which simply says, take two things, and construct a thing 
that is the set of the two things; that's its simplest form. Suppose you restrict it, and 
take only one thing, call it "zero," and you merge it; you get the set containing zero. 
You do it again, and you get the set containing the set containing zero; that's the 
successor function. (15) 
 
Hence Merge - one of the, to use Husserl's phrase, "indigenous [i.e. innate] mechanical 
processes" crucial with regard to sign-system constitution - might actually be the source 
of our access to arithmetic, as well as language. That's because it's easy to get the 
successor function from Merge. Hence Chomsky concludes that "[w]hen you've got the 
successor function, the rest comes" (ibid). In other words, arithmetic, as a sign-system, 
just falls out from the recursive property of this computational mechanism. But if 
arithmetic arises from our innate "thought-machinery" in this way, it cannot properly be 





"learning rule" would be in a non-empiricistic, properly Husserlian explanatory account. 
As a result, I believe Chomsky's sort of story is much closer than Yoshimi's to Husserl's 
actual views concerning the "psychological and historical origination" of "the system of 
arithmetic" (Hua XII: 367-368 / 1994:46). 
Indeed, any attempt to account for the concept of identity through hypothesis 
formation and testing on the basis of similars is incompatible with the phenomenology of 
the second Logical Investigation. For learning through hypothesis formation and testing 
assumes what is to be demonstrated (the identities to be acquired) and is thus circular (see 
Fodor (2008)). There is no way to identify the respect in which a group of similars is 
similar without already knowing the identity in respect of which the group of similars is 
similar. It's a variation on Meno's paradox to point out that there's simply no way to 
arrive at identities (a fortiori concepts of specific unities) on the basis of similars without 
at the same time presupposing the identities on the basis of which one distinguishes the 
groups of similars. So much, I claim, has been pointed out by both Husserl (1901) & 
Fodor (2008). In the next section, I'll examine Husserl's specific words on this point, and, 
in the process, I'll show specifically why connectionism is no alternative to 
associationism with respect to proper explanatory supplements to Husserlian 
phenomenology. 
Section IV. Arguments Against Associationism (/Connectionism) in the 2nd 
Investigation: Part II 
After having pointed out that similarity presupposes identity, and cannot therefore 





attempt to deal only with sensibly similar objects, as the only 'real' entities of our 
experience, is not only circular but entails a regressus ad infinitum. Husserl writes: 
 
The conception we are criticizing [i.e. associationism] operates with 'circles of 
similars', but makes too much light of the difficulty that each object belongs to a 
plurality of 'circles of similars', and that we must be in a position to say what 
distinguishes these of similars' among themselves. It is plain that, in default of a 
previously given Specific Unity, we cannot avoid a regress in infinitum. 
(2001(I):243-244)  
 
Now, with regard to, say, the Specific Unities of colors, we are naturally "in a position to 
say what distinguishes" one group of similars from another only insofar as color concepts 
are "previously given" (cpf. Churchland (2012, p.11)). What allows one to see the many 
similarly green individuals as Green is, of course, the identical concept Green. If one 
didn't already have this concept as a specific unity, one would never be able to acquire it 
on the basis of "'circles of similars'", since an asymptotic approximation to the concept - 
through circles of similars - is not the identity in question. It follows that one must 
already have the identical concept prior to one's encounters with similar instances. A 
basic logical point, but one that has unwelcome consequences. For this of course means 
that, according to Husserl (of all people), all concepts as Specific Unities must be 





the basis of similarity. And learning on the basis of similarity is precisely the account 
offered by associationism/connectionism. 
Given the popularity of neurophenomenology, which seems to want to pair 
Husserlian phenomenology with connectionism32, it becomes more than a little important 
to point out how Husserl's objections to associationism apply just as much to 
connectionism. 
First, recall that connectionism is the view that our concepts are constituted by 
their positions in a neural network. These positions are not symbolic mental 
representations that can instantiate type-identical contents again and again; a fortiori, 
they're not symbols which can enter into logically valid computations (since you need 
identical concepts - univocality of meaning - for validity). Rather, these positions are 
neuron-like nodes that are merely stipulated to have representational power. These nodes 
are, in accordance with their neuronal plausibility, either inhibited or excited as a 
function of the current sensory state and the strengths of their connections (i.e. 
associations) with other nodes. Since the current sensory state and the activation weights 
of the nodes are constantly changing, one can never instantiate the same content twice in 
a lifetime. Interestingly, this is not a straw-man but an actual consequence of the theory 
(Churchland (2012) p. 20; Fodor & Pylyshyn (2016) p. 55). From a Husserlian 
perspective, however, this consequence is a sufficient refutation of the possibility of 
connectionism for modeling our cognitive thought processes, since it is a basic lesson of 
                                                          






Husserlian phenomenology that one can instantiate one and the same content 
innumerable times (within the life of the same individual and across individuals). This 
lesson coheres with Fodor’s atomistic semantics, as Hopp notes (2011). 
However, Churchland (2012) - not aware of the reductio lurking in the 
background - cheerfully affirms that, even if you could have the same sensory state twice, 
"the brain's dynamical state - its all-up pattern of current neuronal activation-levels - 
provides an ever-moving, never-repeating cognitive context into which its every sensory 
input is interpretively received" (20). Churchland seems to think that a reduction of one's 
mental life to "the brain's dynamical state" is a virtue of the connectionist account. But 
notice that Churchland's view rules out in principle the kind of categorial intuition 
described by Husserl, since Husserl needs a static, context-free account, not a dynamical 
account, of concept individuation in order for one and the same species to be instantiated 
at different times. Hence categorial intuition is strictly impossible if one's "never-
repeating cognitive context" determines the interpretation of "every sensory input." 
Churchland's view is bad news for phenomenologists who want to be 
connectionists and vice versa. The reason, per above, is that categorial intuition requires 
a context-free type-token relation to identical concepts of specific unities: otherwise, one 
has conceptual amalgamations of more or less similar particulars grouped by a similarity 
metric. These amalgamations change from moment to moment, based on the brain's 
dynamical fluidity (Churchland (2012, p.17). But categorial intuition quite seriously 
demands a context-free instantiation model of precisely the sort that Hopp (2011) defends 





connectionist, since connectionism demands that every interpretation of every sensory 
input be contextually based on the brain's current dynamical activity (indeed, concepts 
are identified with activation patterns, which are regularities based on similarity). It 
follows that every interpretation of every input can only be more or less similar to every 
other, since no context of a dynamical system ever shows up twice; a fortiori no concept 
determined by a cognitive context (which is every concept according to connectionism) 
ever shows up twice (cpf. Heraclitus on the rather bleak identity conditions of rivers). So 
if you're a connectionist, there's no categorial intuition, because there are no categories. 
For categorial intuition requires context-free conceptual identities. But if you can't 
conceptually token the same content from one moment to the next, you've directly 
contradicted, according to Husserl, the logical phenomenology. So connectionism 
contradicts the logical phenomenology. 
What Husserl needs, of course, is not any sort of dynamical-system approach, but 
rather a non-changing or static computational approach. Categorial intuition, in order that 
for it to apply to our experience, requires the tokening of one and the same content in the 
form of a mental representation (e.g. a concept) in relation to a given sensory input, not 
the dynamical realization of a fluid concept of a similarity space. For this reason, I argue, 
similarity spaces - the conceptual foundations of connectionism33 - are explicitly 
repudiated by Husserl. Since we do in fact represent the sensory input as one and the 
same species (e.g. the content dog via one's self-identical concept DOG) from moment to 
                                                          





moment and from occasion to occasion, this counts for Husserl against the empiricist's 
claim to meet the phenomena. 
The moral of our argument is this: the only explanation that preserves the 
phenomenology is the computational language of thought explanation. Cain (2016) 
provides the foundation for our point, as against Churchland:  
 
[In a connectionist network] different activation patterns will be instantiated on 
different occasions when the DOG concept is applied. Thus, in contrast to Fodor's 
language of thought approach - which conceives of concepts as being symbols in 
the language of thought so that, whenever a given concept is applied, one and the 
same mental representation is instantiated - application of one and the same concept 
can involve the instantiation of different representations (in the form of activation 
patterns) on different occasions. (48)  
 
For connectionists, concepts are reduced to "activation patterns" among groups of 
neuron-like nodes in a nodal network. As a result, the content of concepts is a function of 
those patterns: the content dog in one's concept DOG (or green in one's concept GREEN) 
is determined by, and is a function of, all of its contingent relations to all of the other 
concepts (other activation patterns) that happen to be a part of the network. In the final 
analysis, then, the content dog may, in fact, be constituted by its similarity and difference 





follows that if one is thinking about dogs, and a cat suddenly appears, it follows that one's 
thoughts about dogs are no longer quite the same, even though a cat is a token of a 
completely different species-unity from that of a dog. 
Why in the world should the constitution of these concepts affect one another? 
Answer: we strongly associate, on the basis of similarity, dogs and cats, and the 
connectionist account of the content of the concepts of these animals is based on their 
being differentiated by means of similarity spaces (as opposed to the identity of their 
meanings). Hence, on this properly holistic view of content (which is really just a 
skeptical relativism, and so no real account of content), one cannot instantiate the same 
content before the appearance of a relevantly similar object and after the appearance of a 
relevantly similar object, because, for the connectionist (as for the associationist) 
similarity constitutes identity: the content in question will have altered slightly as a 
function of the different "activation patterns" caused in part by one's experience of 
relevantly similar objects (and, unfortunately, all objects are more or less similar). But for 
Husserl, meanings do not change as a function of experience (hence his polemic against 
the empiricists). I therefore once again assert that connectionism cannot be the 
explanatory supplement behind Husserl's phenomenology of categorial intuition 
(footnote: which is bad since categorial intuition is arguably the intentional experience 
which distinguishes Husserlian phenomenology from sense-based empiricism). 
In case one wishes to dwell on our thesis (otherwise skip this paragraph), consider 
Churchland's discussion on pages 38-45 of Plato's Camera (2012) of "the acquisition of 





the subject of the second Logical Investigation, so it might be worthwhile to compare the 
two accounts rather closely. Churchland thinks "categorical perception" can be explained 
by "training the network" of nodal connections by exposing the network to more or less 
similar instances of objects discriminable according to type - for example, "dogs and 
cats" (38, italics removed). The process of training "consists in making ... a large number 
of small changes to the weights of [the network's] various synaptic connections" (38). 
Eventually, two strongly weighted groups of connections emerge, represented by two 
"hot spots" or "prototype regions" on a warped grid (44)34. Now the (rather hasty) 
reductionist/eliminativist motivational assumption behind all of this is: these tightly 
clustered activation patterns just are the concepts DOG and CAT. And since these 
patterns are constantly being re-weighted by context-sensitive experience on the basis of 
similars, one and the same concept is never tokened twice, "not [even] twice in a 
lifetime" (Churchland (2012), p. 20). But that literally means my thinking of cats today is 
only more or less similar to my thinking of cats tomorrow. And that really does beg the 
question against the guy who says thinking of cats involves the instantiation of the 
relevant context-invariant, identical content. 
In defense of Churchland (et al.), the reason why the Fodorian/Husserlian 
instantiation account of content might not be the true account is that, well, it ain't 
neurobiologically plausible. The brain is a dynamical, ever-fluctuating system: its states 
are never quite the same, so talking in terms of discrete identities cannot be a very 
                                                          






accurate way of characterizing its nature. And (here's the slippery slope) the mind's locus 
seems to be the brain. So perhaps (and here begins the hand-waving) one should model 
the mind on the nature of the brain. 
That's all well and good if one isn't too concerned about having a theory of 
content. And connectionists/associationists apparently aren't too concerned, since they 
don't have one: "connectionists/associationists have no theory of conceptual content" 
(Fodor & Pylyshyn (2015) p.51). But if so, they can't hope to intuit any self-identical 
categories in the Husserlian sense, which requires an instantiation model as a necessary 
condition on a theory of content. For connectionists/associationists, the specific meaning-
unit I token today is not the same as the one I token tomorrow, because "the meaning or 
semantic content of one's personal cognitive categories .... derives from their determinate 
place in a high-dimensional neuronal activation-space, a space of intricate and 
idiosyncratic similarity relations..." (28). But, besides directly implying psychologism, 
this obviously contradicts Husserl, who does not believe meaning can be "derive[d] 
from... similarity relations." Anyone who holds the connectionist view faces decisive 
regress and circularity arguments, which follow from attempting to "derive" meaning 
from similarity. The Husserlian/Fodorian circularity argument is, again, this: similarity 
presupposes identity, i.e., the respect in which similar things are similar (2001(I):242). 
Therefore, to explain the identity of content in terms of the experience of similars - 
similars that presuppose the identity in respect of which they are similar - is to be 





The regress argument directly follows from the circularity argument. Husserl 
writes:  
 
An object A is similar to other objects, to one object in the respect a, to another in 
the respect b etc. But such 'respects' do not imply [according to the empiricist] that 
a Species is there, which effects unity. What then unifies the circle of similars 
determined, e.g., by Redness, as against the circle determined by Triangularity? 
The empiricistic conception only says: These are differing similarities. If A and B 
are similar in respect of red, and A and C in respect of triangularity, these 
similarities must differ in kind. But here we again come up against kinds. 
Similarities are compared, and form genera and species, just as their absolute 
members do. We should then have to have recourse to similarities of such 
similarities, and so on in infinitum. (2001(I):244)  
 
That is, having once assumed that our concepts are based on similarities, the empiricist 
cannot say "that a Species is there, which effects unity." The regress argument is a 
development of the circularity objection inasmuch as a regress starts only because the 
empiricist - as a matter of dogma - cannot refer similarities to identities on pain of a non-
empiricistic entailment (e.g., a language of thought entailment). Hence the empiricist, 
with shifting eyes, can only say: "These [identities] are [really just] differing similarities." 





similarities." But then what unifies the "similarities of... similarities"? Answer: 
similarities of the similarities of similarities. And "so on in infinitum." To stop the 
regress, one has to "come up against kinds" - the rather discrete identities in respect of 
which similars are similar. But empiricism (i.e. connectionism/associationism) cannot, 
without abandoning itself, appeal to kinds due to its prior commitment to explain things 
in terms of sensory experience, wherein things are only more or less similar. So the 
attempt to explain identity in terms of similarity results not only in circularity but also in 
regress. 
These arguments were brought forward by Husserl well over a hundred years ago, 
and, as Fodor has shown, apply just as much to connectionism as associationism. The 
words "personal" and "idiosyncratic" - used by Churchland above in speaking of meaning 
- are to the point: for connectionism, as for associationism, there are no meanings in 
specie that we can all share stricto sensu because concepts are identical to activation 
spaces in ever-shifting (i.e. dynamical) neural networks. But that means that 
connectionism, as a species of associationism, cannot, in Husserl's phrase, "seize what is 
specific" - cannot therefore result in categorial intuition or an intentional reference to the 
species (as opposed to the individual). Churchland's "categorial perception" is, therefore, 
nothing of the sort, and completely fails to explain how the mind gets "meanings as such, 
i.e. meanings in the sense of specific unities" (2001(I):238). That is why Fodor & 
Pylyshyn (2015) say that "connectionists/associationists have no theory of conceptual 
content" (51). Unfortunately, "meanings as such [i.e. contents]... constitute the domain of 





access to pure logic. Connectionism, therefore, cannot be the explanatory apparatus that 
might complete the phenomenological descriptions of the Logical Investigations. 
By contrast, the explanatory apparatus of the language of thought explains why 
we can have access to meanings as such, and consequently why we are able to 
categorially intuit (or mean the species on the basis of an individual). The properly 
Husserlian reason (see chapter 1) is that our thoughts have syntactic structure: the 
sentence, "Some apples are red," expresses a corresponding thought containing the 
concepts RED and APPLES (meaning red and apples respectively). Similarly, the 
sentence, "The fire is red," expresses a corresponding thought with the concept RED as a 
constituent - arguably the very same concept instantiating one and the same content 
which is also instantiated in the previous sentence/thought. Now, how could that be, if 
one couldn't think the same content "twice in a lifetime" due to the ever-shifting context 
of one's semantic network, in which one's concepts are said to be constituted (Churchland 
(2012) p.20)? The Fodorian answer is, it just couldn't be. But that looks like a reductio. If 
one takes the evidence of logic more seriously than the evidence of neuroscience, the 
self-identity of meanings - their context-invariant character - is a sine qua non for any 
theory of content – assuming one doesn’t simply wish to hastily eliminate content (e.g. 
eliminative materialism). Hence Husserl writes:   
 
[E]ach such meaning certainly counts as a unit in our thought and... on occasion we 





and distinguished from them. It can be an identical subject for numerous predicates, 
an identical term in numerous relations. It can be summed together with other 
meanings and can be counted as a unit. As self-identical, it can in its turn serve as 
the object for many new meanings. (2001(I):241)  
 
The reason why I can predicate RED of both APPLES and FIRE is that my concept RED 
is a discrete unit that can, therefore, appear as "an identical term in numerous relations." 
The only explanatory apparatus currently on the market that allows a mind to do this is 
the language of thought explanation. Because thoughts constitute a combinatorial system 
of discrete meaning-units, I can "sum" a unit "together with other meanings" and the 
result itself "can be counted as a unit." The phenomenon of the recursive productivity of 
thought - more than a little hinted at by Husserl - is thereby explained: for the constituent 
character of concepts - their unitary structure - is why my concept treated "as self-
identical... can in its turn serve as the object for many new meanings." 
In sum, connectionism/associationism falls victim to circularity and regress 
arguments. That's because connectionism/associationism can only appeal to more or less 
similar objects in explaining the nature of concepts. Husserl knew better: the nature of 
concepts involves the instantiation of self-identical meanings. Hence the logical 
phenomena reveal that our thoughts must have constituent structure which respects 
identities, if we are to have access to the phenomena. Now we do have access to the 





structured mental representations. I encourage us to choose the explanatory apparatus 
which makes sense of how minds can have access to such logical phenomena as are made 
manifest (or described) by Husserlian phenomenology (and Husserl demands that you 
choose: see chapter 2 on the necessity of explanatory supplements to descriptive 
phenomena). 
Section V. A Methodological Objection to Associationism/Connectionism 
Phenomenology naturally lends itself to computationalism for another reason: 
both are, in the phrase of Robert Cummins (2000), "top-down strateg[ies]" (p.129). A 
top-down strategy (or methodology) for investigating mental phenomena begins by (1) 
identifying a capacity to be explained. Arguably, phenomenology exists at the level of 
(1). Computationalism then takes over, and (2) specifies this capacity as a computable 
function. This sequence is important, because if we proceed in bottom-up fashion, 
beginning with the presupposition that the mind/brain, we are very likely to miss out on 
the descriptively apparent computational phenomena of the mind, since "[m]ost 
dynamical systems found in nature cannot be characterized by equations that specify a 
computable function" (Cummins, 130). Lastly, (3) one must characterize the computable 
function as a mechanical procedure, one that can operate through blind causality (as 
opposed to being guided by consciousness step-by-step). Arguably (see chapter 1) 
Husserl does all three of these in his 1891 essay "On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)." 
The point here, however, is that the 2nd Logical Investigation defiantly opposes a 
"bottom-up strategy," upholding instead a "top-down strategy" as the only strategy that 





(2000), 129). A bottom-up strategy, however, specifies an explanatory apparatus (e.g. 
associationism/connectionism) in advance of the descriptive phenomena and then tries to 
get the apparatus to become adequate to the phenomena. If the apparatus reproduces the 
phenomenon, i.e. performs a specified task, the apparatus is said to have explained the 
phenomenon (this is obviously how artificial neural networks proceed). The dark side of 
this strategy, highlighted by Husserl, is that phenomena resistant to explanation in terms 
of the favored apparatus are ipso facto eliminated from the purview of science35. That's 
why Hume is actually forced into saying that nobody (not even you) has a genuine idea of 
a universal object. For universal objects, as specific unities, cannot be arrived at on the 
basis of similars36. 
The thesis and argument for this brief section is as follows: Husserl's 
methodology is top-down. After all, phenomenology begins by identifying a phenomenon 
                                                          
35 Hence eliminative materialism - an apt phrase - discountenances propositional attitudes and mental 
acts/intentional experiences in general. That’s because you would need mental representations in order to 
explain them, and mental representations are only very abstractly related to material brains (try, e.g., 
looking at a brain and spotting the mental representations it generated). If one is prepossessed in favor of 
looking at mental phenomena in terms of how brains work (a dubious strategy) one will miss out on a host 
of phenomena otherwise descriptively available. The subject matter of the Logical Investigations - which I 
take to be the description of intentional experiences relating to the domain of pure logic broadly construed 
so as to include universal grammar - is, from the eliminativist POV, discountenanced and for all practical 
research purposes eliminated from the purview of science. 
36 Hume fully admits this consequence. Compare Churchland's misleading exposition in his Plato's Camera 
(2012) which actually should be titled Kant's Camera. Churchland slides from talking about "similarities 
and differences" on page 49 into talking of "samenesses and differences" by page 63, not realizing to what 
extent he is begging the logical points at issue with regard to what can be meant on the basis of similarity. 
It is also my duty to report that Churchland on page 61 claims that artificial neural networks and human 
beings "learn/employ roughly the same coding strategy" (italics added) with regard to the face-recognition 
capacity. But the very next paragraph finds Churchland more sanguine: suddenly neural networks and 
humans employ, without qualification, "th[e] same coding strategy." The deceit on Churchland's part is 
probably unconscious: artificial neural networks, in accordance with their bottom-up methodology, 
constitute a procrustean bed in terms of which any and all mental explananda must be cast, on pain of 






to-be-explained (an explanandum). This contradicts connectionist methodology, which 
begins with an architecture to do the explaining (an explanans) and then and only then 
proceeding to the phenomena to-be-explained. If one starts from the explanans, then 
many explananda will be denied their rightful status as explananda (because not 
conformable to the explanans), and consequently left out in the empiricistic cold (cpf. 
Chomsky's complaints against Skinner). Insofar as connectionist methodology reproduces 
this cardinal error of empiricist methodology - singled out for criticism by Husserl in his 
descriptive complaints concerning the inadequacy of associationism - connectionism, like 
associationism, is to be rejected, on the grounds that it adheres to an anti-
phenomenological methodology and is therefore guilty of a husteron proteron with 
respect to a proper apprehension of what is to-be-explained. 
The soundness of my argument is clear from a close reading of chapter 5, section 
34 of the 2nd Logical Investigation. Therein Husserl reveals his rationalist credentials, 
and highlights the inadequacy of associationism (and by extension connectionism):   
 
That general presentations have emerged genetically out of intuitive, individual 
ones is generally accepted. But though the consciousness of the universal is 
repeatedly kindled by individual intuition, and derives clarity and self-evidence 
from the latter, it is not therefore a direct product of individual intuition. How then 
did we ever manage to go beyond individual intuition, to mean something quite 





and yet not really contained in it? And how did we get all those forms which 
diversify the objective relations of the universal, and constitute differing logical 
kinds of presentation? If associative connections are now brought in to explain this, 
we are at once introduced to dispositional groups of similars and the signs we 
externally attach to them37. (2001(I):292; italics added)  
 
Husserl regards this appeal to associationism as absurd; the next paragraph calls it "an 
extreme case of error" (ibid). Husserl thinks this, I argue, because of the arguments 
earlier canvassed in this chapter. We know that "groups of similars" cannot be used by 
associationists/connectionists to explain the facts in question - facts concerning our 
thinking of and experience of universals - because of the above circularity and regress 
arguments which forever block similarity from "genetically" explaining our concept of 
identity and how our minds come to think of and experience universality. Indeed, all 
logical phenomena - on which phenomenology is based - are beyond the ken of 
empiricistic explanation. "Individual intuition" - to which empiricism does have access - 
can give us "clarity" and "self-evidence." This is the reason why examples are helpful. 
But they cannot explain how we come by "all those forms" which are nowhere to be 
found in immediate experience from a genetic point of view (i.e. an explanatory point of 
view). Those forms, which are rather to be explained by innate computational processes 
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consciousness of the universal, we are at once introduced to dispositional groups of network nodes and the 





and mechanisms, can only be "kindled" in the mind by the more or less similar 
individuals of immediate experience. So, although it is true that they have "emerged 
genetically" from experience with individuals, it is not true that they have "emerged 
genetically" solely from experience with individuals. Therefore, again, 
associationism/connectionism is not the explanatory apparatus to explain the phenomena 
that Husserl is singling out for our phenomenological attention, because 
associationism/connectionism can only appeal to "groups of similars" (or 'prototype 
regions' etc.). 
The methodological issue, however, does not lie solely in the substantive, 
explanatory appeal to similars. Rather, the issue lies in failing to find the explanatory 
apparatus suited to the logical phenomena. What is coming under criticism 
methodologically is this: a certain explanatory apparatus comes first, and the phenomena 
come second. Consequently, if the phenomena don't fit the apparatus, they're tossed aside 
(or in our day eliminated). This is why Husserl says of Hume that "Hume's genetic 
analyses certainly cannot claim theoretical completeness and finality, since they lack a 
foundation in an adequate descriptive analysis" (2001, 292). Notice that "Hume's genetic 
analyses" - i.e. Hume's associationism - could "claim theoretical completeness" if it were 
founded "in an adequate descriptive analysis." But that would mean agreeing with Kant's 





with experience, it does not therefore "arise" from experience. If it did, then identity 
could be explained in terms of similarity, which is absurd38. 
Section VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that if we are to be phenomenologically sensitive to the 
logical phenomena, we must be careful not to try to explain everything in terms of 
"groups of similars." But the way to do this is to eschew any and all "bottom-up 
strateg[ies]" which do not seek explanations suited to the phenomena. Only "top-down 
strateg[ies]" can do this. If we begin with our categorial intuition and genuine thinking of 
universals and all the forms of our logical thought, all of which cannot be derived solely 
from similars/prototypes, we will seek an explanatory apparatus suited to these 
phenomena. That apparatus is computationalism, which Husserl had already envisioned 
(see chapter 1). 
  
                                                          





Chapter Four: Formal Semantics & Empirical Explanation in the 4th Logical 
Investigation 
In our 1st chapter, we discovered that Husserl had postulated a computational 
theory of mind embedded in a language of thought in order to account for the fact that 
mental processes typically preserve truth. In our 2nd chapter, we discovered that Husserl 
had claimed that the very essence of science demands that all descriptive sciences (e.g. 
phenomenology) aim to become explanatory sciences (e.g. computationalism); therefore I 
propose, following Jackendoff (1987), that phenomenology and the computational theory 
of mind should be seen as reciprocally founding each other (more on this in the 5th 
chapter). In our 3rd chapter, we discovered that the explanatory apparatus of 
associationism/connectionism is fundamentally inadequate to categorial phenomena39. By 
contrast, we discovered that a computational language of thought is adequate to the 
categorial phenomena, and is therefore capable of explaining the intuition of the 
phenomena pointed out by Husserl as against the empiricists. In this our 4th chapter, we 
shall continue the application of our theory and argue that a computational language of 
thought should be seen as the necessary psychological foundation for the sorts of a priori 
phenomena examined by Husserl in the 4th Logical Investigation (as was argued by 
Fodor (1975) in relation to Chomsky's linguistics (1957)). 
What this chapter argues is this: Computational transformations on syntactic 
representations are necessary to account for the infinity of sentences that can be 
                                                          
39 The categorial phenomenon of identity, for example. Cpf. Plato's Phaedo on the form of the Equal (74-





understood as correct (i.e. as following from rules) by any competent speaker of any 
natural language. This is the phenomenon of productivity, which is Husserl's ultimate 
concern in the 4th Logical Investigation, insofar as everything leads up to a discussion of 
universal grammar40. I'm claiming, in short, that a computational language of thought is 
necessary to explain the phenomenology of productivity. That's, of course, not to say a 
priori phenomena like productivity are ipso facto psychological; but it is to say that, were 
it not for a language of thought, productivity would never be a "fact" for our 
"consciousness," as Husserl says it is (2001, 70). Without, in other words, a language of 
thought, our finite tabulae rasae would be quite incapable of producing the infinite set of 
correct sentences expressive of the infinite concatenative power of thought. Accordingly, 
empiricism is ruled out on account of productivity alone, since an infinite capacity cannot 
be the product of any (necessarily finite) experience. 
With a view to arguing the above, we'll examine how the 4th Logical 
Investigation clearly anticipates Chomskyan linguistics (especially as regards pointing to 
productivity as the essence of language). That Husserl anticipated Chomsky is not, 
however, in doubt. This has been noted without dissent several times in the literature, 
most importantly by James Edie (1977). However, Edie's discussion did not go far 
enough. In particular, Edie failed to note that Husserl, like Chomsky, explicitly 
                                                          
40 I think, in fact, that productivity is the concern of every single one of the Logical Investigations, as 
against empiricism/psychologism. One can find Husserl referring to productivity throughout the book, from 
the 1st Investigation (2001(I):227) to the 6th (2001(II):311). This makes sense from a language of thought 
perspective. Judson Webb (2017) hits upon our idea when he says, “[T]he purely mechanical use of 
symbolic thinking produces ‘an economy which leads imperceptibly to formal generalizations of our 
original thought trains,’ leading almost effortlessly to infinite deductive horizons” (11). This is a way of 





envisioned "universal grammar" as being connected with certain psychological 
"foundations" to which the theorist may appeal for "explanatory purposes" (2001(II):73-
4). Edie neglects this because he thinks it entails psychologism (151). This is a Very 
Serious Error, arising from the lack of a proper distinction between (phenomenological) 
description and (psychological) explanation. As this distinction is crucial for 
understanding everything we have to say, not only in this chapter but in our entire 
dissertation, it is necessary to enter into a preliminary polemic with Edie before we 
advance to the substantive theses of our present chapter: that productivity is the subject of 
the 4th Logical Investigation, and that only a language of thought can explain the 
phenomenology of productivity. 
Section I. Critique of Edie 
Edie begins his discussion of universal grammar by noting that Husserl and 
Chomsky share the same descriptive assumptions. A theory of universal grammar, Edie 
says, "[f]or Husserl ... delimits (i.e., describes and defines) the whole infinite set of 
possible well-formed sentences thanks to a finite system of a priori laws which state the 
necessary (but not always sufficient) conditions of meaningfulness" (150). Similarly, 
Chomsky (1965) notes that "knowledge of a language involves the implicit ability to 
understand indefinitely many sentences. Hence, a generative grammar must be a [finite] 
system of [a priori] rules that can iterate to generate an indefinitely large number of 
structures" (14). Edie therefore correctly notes that Husserl and Chomsky are agreed on 





Crucially, however, the finite system of a priori rules which makes possible the 
infinite range of well-formed sentences will not be inducted from "empirical coincidence 
or statistical regularities" (Edie (1977) p. 150). Therefore, this (syntactic) system, for 
both Husserl and Chomsky, will reflect the "ideal necessities of all human thought as 
such" (ibid). It is easy to see, therefore, that empiricism (associationism/connectionism) 
cannot explain why we all have this recursive syntactic system in our heads, since it is 
not inducted from experience. It is this system which allows us to intuit certain sentences 
as correct (e.g. 'Colorless green ideas sleep furiously') and others as incorrect (e.g. 
'Furiously sleep ideas green colorless') (Chomsky (1957) p. 15). These eidetic intuitions 
are the phenomenological intuitions that are expressive of the rules constituting the a 
priori system of grammar. 
At this point, however, Edie proceeds to deny that Husserl could ever have 
countenanced the way in which Chomsky explains our obvious possession of the 
syntactic system which yields the intuitions that make up the descriptive study of 
Chomskyan linguistics and the 4th Logical Investigation. Edie makes the serious error of 
believing that, if the syntactic system generative of our intuitions had any basis in our 
psychology (i.e. an innate basis), then psychologism would directly result:  
 
Like Plato and Descartes, Chomsky seems to feel that from the very fact that it is 
possible to locate and describe certain a priori (and therefore universal) features of 





constituents of the human organism. Husserl would certainly never draw such a 
conclusion, because it would involve him in the kind of "psychologism" which he 
spent the first half of his philosophical life learning to avoid. (151) 
 
Edie gives the game away when he, a few lines down, admits that Chomsky is, in this 
respect, talking about "the acquisition of language." But we see that Husserl cannot 
possibly be in disagreement with Plato, Descartes, and Chomsky on this point. For 
Husserl makes a distinction (see chapter 2) between description and explanation; and "the 
acquisition of language" concerns the explanation of how we come to psychologically 
possess the system without which we would have no intuitions of well-formed sentences 
vs. deviant sentences (the phenomenology of language). Indeed, every person who does 
not believe in magic will admit that the acquisition of language is an explanatory 
problem. Moreover, every person will also admit that if the acquisition of language is not 
the result of any induction on the basis of experience, then the system must be innate 
(because not inducted from experience). The fact that Edie thinks this inference entails 
psychologism concerning the objective properties of human language - which are 
descriptively independent of the explanation of language, i.e., how we acquire the 
recursive system called 'language' - means he has not quite appreciated the distinction, 
employed by Husserl, between description and explanation. 
This failure becomes even more apparent when Edie attempts to suggest that 





other. In particular, Edie reassures the reader that "if one hesitates to jump to Chomsky's 
conclusion that such [phenomenological] considerations as these necessitate the 
postulating of 'innate ideas,' one might well be tempted to give them the weaker 
Husserlian framework." (155) This sentence, I think, misreads both Husserl and 
Chomsky. It misreads Husserl because, as we saw in chapter 2, the essence of science, 
with which Husserl aligns himself, positively demands that descriptions be presented as 
data for future explanations; and when we're talking about the contents of consciousness, 
these explanations will concern how those contents came to be in consciousness (whether 
innately or empirically). In other words, the collecting of descriptions is a preliminary 
task to the development of theories in the true (and only) scientific sense. This is true 
even if the practitioners of a descriptive methodology (e.g. Husserl) pursue their trade 
without making the connecting links explicit. It suffices to show that these are not truly 
competitive methodologies by pointing out that Husserl countenances theoretical 
supplements to his phenomenological descriptions. It is, therefore, simply wrong to say 
that Husserl has a "weaker framework" in presumable contrast to Chomsky's 'stronger' 
one. That's because they have the same framework. The difference is, Husserl's is 
incomplete, Chomsky's is complete. To speak correctly, Edie should have said that one 
might be content with Husserl's 'incomplete framework.41' But of course saying this 
                                                          
41 This is a bit like saying one could be content with the fact that we experience objects – i.e. Reid’s 
philosophy - without a Kantian account of the conditions of the possibility of our experience of those 
objects. But this is, in the theoretical nature of the case, absurd. Hence Schopenhauer claimed that Reid’s 
implicitly descriptive philosophy serves as a negative proof of Kant’s more explanatory philosophy. One 
could extend this to say Husserl’s explicitly descriptive philosophy serves as a negative proof of Fodor’s 





would have given the game away: one cannot be satisfied with something that is 
incomplete. 
The basic fact is this: both Husserl and Chomsky think it is phenomenologically 
obvious, on the basis of intuitions of well-formedness, that there is a system of rules - a 
universal grammar - that constitutes the conditions of the possibility of our knowledge of 
grammar. The properties (e.g. infinite recursivity) exhibited by this system in our 
experience go well beyond (in principle beyond) sense-experience, and therefore show 
the inadequacies of empiricism. Both Husserl and Chomsky are united on this point. Now 
I will show shortly hereafter what Edie did not know (or suppressed): that Husserl even 
anticipated Chomsky in acknowledging that there are psychological foundations that may 
be brought in for the purposes of explanation for this otherwise a priori study. 
It is, I think, rather obvious why scholars should have neglected this textual fact 
for so long. For one thing, as the example of Edie shows, scholars for a long time 
believed that if there were subjective conditions (e.g. nativism) of objective knowledge, 
the integrity of the objectivity of knowledge must be compromised. Clearly, Edie's 
misunderstanding of psychologism is a case in point42. For example, Edie seriously 
believes that one can replace Chomsky's nativism with some sort of non-existent 
explanatory transcendentalism with regard to the explanation of how one acquires 
language. This is simply conceptual confusion, if not miracle-mongering. 
Transcendentalism is about the justification of (non-empirical) knowledge. Nativism is 
                                                          





about the possession of (non-empircally derivable) knowledge. These two approaches are 
not competitive, as Kant pointed out. In particular, justification does not explain how we 
(subjectively) know things a priori: it demonstrates the legitimacy (or objective validity) 
of this knowledge with regard to our experience. Plausibly, Chomsky's rules of 
transformation can be interpreted in this (transcendental) light. But the justification of our 
intuitions does not even come close to explaining how we came to possess this 
knowledge, which is a separate question, though it must ultimately be asked for the sake 
of theoretical completeness43. This is especially true of the philosopher whose main 
object of concern is the overlapping of subject and object. To deny the subjective 
conditions of knowledge would be to renounce philosophy and, inadvertently, to deny 
knowledge. After all, if there were no subjective conditions of knowledge, there would be 
no knowledge, since knowledge is a relation between subject and object. Hence the 
question - How does the subject know? - can always be asked in addition to asking - What 
does the subject know? It is simply to Chomsky's greater theoretical credit that he was 
willing to ask and answer the former question in addition to the latter. If people, however, 
are satisfied with not asking theoretically relevant questions, that is their prerogative. But 
I would timidly point out that putting one's head in the sand is not a competitive 
                                                          
43 It also must be asked in order to make sure our descriptions are not getting out of hand. Our descriptions 
of, for instance, grammatical knowledge can conceivably get so complex that it would be psychologically 
unrealistic to ascribe this knowledge to any mind that we know of (Smith & Allot (2016) p. 71). As a result, 
phenomenological description ultimately cannot be hermetically sealed off from psychologico-explanatory 






methodology. In any case, doing so contravenes Husserl's essence of science (see chapter 
2). 
Section II. The Explanatory Component in the 4th Investigation 
Having disposed of Edie's error, it is now necessary to argue for the truth of what 
he feared, namely, that there are empirical / psychological foundations to a priori 
knowledge. In particular, the a priori knowledge of universal grammar - revealed to us in 
phenomenological description - implies a computational mechanism that would explain 
our possession of said knowledge (Bianchin (2018)). Both italicized theses may be 
attributed to Husserl, though the latter is merely implicit (and therefore speculative). 
Our initial thesis may be easily demonstrated on the basis of Husserl's text. After 
declaring his recognition of "the undoubted soundness of the idea of a universal 
grammar" - tracing the idea, in the manner of Chomsky's Cartesian Linguistics (1967), 
back to "the rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth century" - Husserl makes a 
series of startling theoretical comments which directly anticipate Chomsky's 
revolutionary insights:  
 
The notion of universal grammar can of course be carried beyond the a priori 
sphere, if the somewhat vague sphere of the universally human (in the empirical 
sense) is brought in. There can, and must, be a universal grammar in this widest of 
senses [....]. One must realize that a universal grammar in this widest sense is a 





explanatory purposes findings whose theoretical place lies in essentially different 
theoretical sciences, in empirical sciences, on the one hand, and in a priori sciences, 
on the other. (2001(II):73)  
 
According to Anglo-American intellectual history, it was Chomsky's Aspects of the 
Theory of Syntax (1965) which extended the a priori universal grammar of Syntactic 
Structures (1957) to "the somewhat vague sphere of the universally human (in the 
empirical sense)." This move was controversial in the 60's, but it should be noted that 
Husserl uses the word "of course" precisely with reference to this extension, as if the 
broadening of universal grammar to encompass the psychological cannot be considered 
controversial at all (contra Edie (1977)). As a result, Husserl acknowledges "universal 
grammar in this widest sense" - as I claim, in the Chomskyan sense - as encompassing not 
only the a priori but also the empirical (for explanatory purposes). Note also that, 
precisely because there can be an empirical component, the science of universal grammar 
will be "concrete" - that is, universal grammar will not merely be an abstract, a priori 
study in the manner of Syntactic Structures. Since it is a concrete science in the sense of 
having an empirical component, it will combine findings from the empirical and a priori 
components "for explanatory purposes." This is a general methodological point that holds 
for "all concrete sciences," that is, for all sciences that have a basis in experiential 
phenomena. The rational a priori is extractable - in the Kantian sense - from the 
experiential phenomena. But the explanation of the experiences is always a desideratum 





empirical with the a priori for the sake of explanation (as opposed to phenomenological 
description). 
The reason why universal grammar is a concrete science with an explanatory 
subcomponent is because it is based on a concrete experiential phenomenon, i.e., speech 
(and, by extension, hearing). Universal grammar, according to Husserl, finds its 
theoretical seedbed here. For it is from "the 'rational' in speech," as Husserl says, that we 
have, on the one hand, the a priori study of formal semantics (syntax) and, on the other, 
the empirical study of psycholinguistics (unconscious processing of syntax). The two are 
obviously not unrelated in a still deeper sense. For it is precisely in virtue of the latter that 
intuitions of the former are empirically possible in the first place. The interesting point to 
be gathered here is the claim that study of the a priori structures of consciousness with 
regard to possible combinations of meaning-forms yields constraints on empirical 
psychological theorizing. 
Hence we find Husserl trying to turn the attention of empirically focused 
linguistics to phenomenological distinctions and descriptions. These descriptive facts - 
outlined in LI IV - are the same ones that Chomsky would later discuss in terms of 
"subcategorization rules" (prohibiting Husserlian 'nonsense') and "selectional rules" 
(prohibiting Husserlian 'counter-sense'), along with recursive operations like 
nominalization (discussed by Husserl as an analogue of suppositio materialis and 
arithmetical transformations in general (see Chomsky (1965) ch. 4; cpf. Husserl (2001(II) 
pp.65-67)). All of which leads Husserl to make a point about the theoretical juxtaposition 






If I am right, it is of basic importance for linguistic investigations that they should 
become clear as to the distinctions provisionally shadowed forth here. They should 
possess themselves of the insight that the foundations of speech are not only to be 
found in physiology, psychology and the history of culture, but also in the a priori. 
The latter deals with the essential meaning-forms and their a priori laws of 
compounding or modification, and no speech is conceivable that is not in part 
essentially determined by this a priori. Every investigator of language operates with 
notions stemming from this field, whether he is clear on the matter or not. (2001, 
74; italics added) 
 
Husserl is referring to Chomskyan formal universals like Nouns, Verbs, etc., and our 
analysis of sentences in terms of these forms which linguists presuppose without 
necessarily understanding their place in a universal grammar. Husserl is referring also to 
Chomskyan substantive universals which were originally the transformational rules 
behind meaning-compounding and are now the operations of Merge which result in 
structural dependence. I merely claim that the "compounding" and "modification" of 
"meaning-forms" in thought and language cannot occur without a mental mechanism 
performing the operations of "compounding" and "modification." Without such a 
mechanism, it would literally be a miracle that our cognitive processes (of both thought 





One must simply read the above passage in context with the Husserlian/Chomskyan 
notion of "universal grammar in th[e] widest sense." Accordingly, if we read carefully, 
we obtain the following results: there are, on the one hand, empirical foundations of the 
rational phenomenon called 'speech,' which foundations are partly discovered in 
"psychology" and explain the productivity of thought and language. There are, on the 
other hand, a priori foundations with respect to the same phenomenon with regard to the 
system of our intuitions concerning what can and cannot be compounded and modified in 
productive fashion. And, finally, "for explanatory purposes" these two otherwise isolated 
endeavors can be brought together - that is, for the purposes of explanation we can 
explain the rules of compounding in terms of the laws of the mechanism which constrain 
our intuitions one way and not another. So if we want to understand how it is that we 
have a priori intuitions of the rational in speech, we will seek the psychological 
foundations (e.g. computationalism) of those intuitions. If, on the other hand, we wish to 
understand what those intuitions are intuitions of (what a priori principles are being 
invoked) we will seek the a priori foundations of those intuitions (e.g. structure 
dependence rules). Insofar as our knowledge of a priori principles can be explained by 
combining these two lines of inquiry, there will be psychological foundations of the a 
priori, the objective validity of which, however, is not thereby impugned. 
One must, therefore, not be afraid to admit that there are psychological 
foundations to phenomenological intuitions. Of course there are. The problem is to find 
the right explanation for the rational phenomenon in question, one that does not distort 





empiricism does not countenance rational phenomena as genuine explananda (due to the 
fact that rational phenomena are not reducible to sense-experience without thereby 
becoming irrational phenomena), empiricism cannot hope to explain the phenomena in 
question. Arguably, however, and as Husserl knew, a computational psychology can deal 
with rational phenomena without deriving logical phenomena from sense-experience (e.g. 
productivity, systematicity, rational coherence, etc.). And since universal grammar is 
phenomenologically basic, stemming from an elementary rational phenomenon 
(according to Husserl the 'rational' in speech), phenomenology will demand a 
computational psychology, not an empiricist psychology, precisely because only 
computationalism (embedded in a language of thought) can help explain how we come to 
have these intuitions concerning linguistic rationality (e.g. productivity). 
The above methodological point generalizes: the rationality of any 
phenomenologically given phenomenon - which (by definition) goes beyond the 
explanatory capabilities of empiricism - may be isolated for the sake of a properly 
rational psychology (i.e. cognitive psychology) or for the sake of an a priori study (i.e. 
the phenomenology of the phenomenon, e.g., transformational grammar, abstracted from 
its psychological implications). In the latter case, one might achieve "descriptive 
adequacy," though not "explanatory adequacy" (Chomsky (1965) p. 30)44. 
                                                          
44 The answer to the above question was already given by Husserl: descriptive sciences (like 
phenomenology) must aim at becoming explanatory sciences (like computationalism), failing which the 
former are not sciences. Chomsky (1965) makes a similar point when he says, "[A]ny far-reaching concern 
for descriptive adequacy must lead to an attempt to develop an explanatory theory [...]" (42). Wherein, one 
may ask, lies the necessity of the "attempt"? For Husserl, as we saw in Ch.2, the necessity lies in the very 
essence of science. Why? Because descriptive sciences constitute a set of descriptions without a unifying 





Section III. Reading Husserl’s Formal Semantics with an Explanatory Supplement 
Now that we have seen that there must be psychological foundations to the 
phenomenologically rational in speech, i.e., in language, and that these psychological 
foundations may be brought together with a phenomenology of grammar for explanatory 
(as opposed to descriptive) purposes, it is now necessary to do precisely this, i.e., bring 
these two together for explanatory purposes. In other words, we will attempt to explain 
the 4th Logical Investigation just as we did the 2nd, on the basis of the explanatory 
apparatus we developed in our first two chapters. We will attempt to show that, for 
explanatory purposes, a computational theory of mind embedded in a language of thought 
is, in fact, necessary to explain the intuitions that Husserl outlines in the 4th Logical 
Investigation. Empiricism is once again inadequate to the phenomena because, as A.D. 
Smith (2008) pointed out, empiricism is "blind to the nature of thought." Specifically, 
only phenomenology and Fodorian computationalism can bring out the fact that "the 
nature of thought" is structured like a language (101)45. 
                                                          
loosely conceived property, e.g. intentionality. This is opposed to explanatory unification, which has 
internal justification deriving from principles showing the precise way in which all the phenomena are 
interconnected, e.g. intentionality being exhibited in many different (un)conscious mental acts in virtue of 
the principles governing the operation of some computational/causal mechanism. The grouping of 
intentional experiences would be the descriptive part, and the explanation of them would be the explanatory 
part. The latter task might even suggest a better grouping, as sometimes happens in biology due to 
discoveries concerning genotypical traits. 
       The above is my reading of Husserl, but Chomsky seems very much to agree with this point of view. 
Consider p. 42 of Aspects. 
45 I remind the reader that, if associationism/connectionism is the whole truth about the mind, then the 
proper thing to do, as Churchland correctly suggests, is eliminate the recalcitrant phenomena (e.g. the 
Husserlian/Chomskyan linguistic phenomena), just as one eliminates from one's scientific conception of 
reality one's erroneous common-sense belief that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones. Galileo 
showed that this is a false intuition or perception, stemming from our failure to properly abstract from the 
phenomena of our experience. In other words, if there is no viable cognitive psychology in the Fodorian 
sense, it is intellectually safe (and even responsible) to entirely ignore the phenomena detailed in the 





I am obliged to mention once again that I am, here as elsewhere, following in the 
footsteps of Adorno, who pointed out the necessity of my reading of Husserl's Logical 
Investigations. In his Against Epistemology (1956), he points out that the "the split 
between genesis and validity" - which I might add is properly Kantian not Husserlian - 
was developed by Husserl "polemically against empiricism" (73). It directly follows that 
Husserl was committed to a descriptive methodology because of his anti-empiricism 
(contra Mulligan (1996)). This is because Husserl thought that empiricism leads to 
"psychologism," which denies that there are cognitive (i.e. phenomenological) 
phenomena to be held apart in their purity from sense-experience, thereby denying the 
possibly innate origin of such phenomena. But, of course, simply opposing 
empiricism/psychologism (or associationism/connectionism) does not absolve the future 
cognitive scientist from explaining the Natorpian 'genesis' of the non-empirically 
derivable phenomena: "It in no way follows from the fact that the generation and 
justification of judgements should not be confused ... that the explication of the sense of 
validation features does not refer back to genetic moments as their necessary condition" 
(73). This is very true. In fact, these words of Adorno’s reflect the whole impetus behind 
our dissertation. And I believe that Husserl concedes Adorno's point (contra Derrida and 
Soffer) in the above-cited passages concerning psychophysical individuals forming the 
foundation of the rational in speech; whence, in turn, we get a phenomenology of 
grammar. However, Adorno only refers to Husserl's transcendental philosophy as 
"tacitly" conceding his point, namely, that the split between genesis and validity is a mere 





that Husserl explicitly acknowledged the merely methodological nature of the split 
(between generation and intuitive validity) long before he realized the substantive 
problems that such a split poses. 
We will now attempt to bridge that Adornean gulf. The argument for this section 
goes like this: productivity shows up phenomenologically. To explain productivity, you 
have to assume a language of thought. So the phenomenology demands a language of 
thought. Of course, a little bit of innatism follows from this; but notice that no 
psychologism follows (contra Edie). 
The key section in LI IV is section 13. Husserl begins by noticing an analogy with 
arithmetic. Like language, arithmetic has certain "formal laws of combination" 
(2001(II):68). These laws "give rise to new numbers" ad infinitum (ibid). The same 
should hold for language, insofar as language is a combinatorial formal system. This 
comparison implicitly refers back to the 1891 essay, in which we discovered that 
arithmetic and language are both combinatorial formal systems arising out of an 
unconscious computational mechanism of the mind, which Husserl calls the mechanism 
of symbolic inference. This also anticipates Chomsky (2012) who suggests that 
arithmetic and language may be dual products of the same computational mechanism of 
the mind, which Chomsky calls Merge (see Ch. 3). 
Husserl proceeds to draw a sketch of a formal/syntactic theory of (linguistic) 
meanings. Since it is relevantly like arithmetic, it too will have primitive forms and laws 





Furthermore, the combinatory laws will apply recursively, so that the property of 
productivity will phenomenologically emerge from the system, giving us insight into the 
system's essence:  
 
If we now make gradual substitutions in the primitive forms [i.e. the independent] 
set forth, and for a simple term repeatedly substitute a combination exemplifying 
the same forms, and if we always reapply our primitive existential law [e.g. of 
combination], we arrive at ever new forms, of deductively proven validity, 
encapsulated in one another with any degree of complexity. [....] We see at once 
that the compoundings go on in infinitum, in a manner permitting comprehensive 
oversight [....]. Instead of constantly reapplying the same mode of combination, we 
can plainly vary our procedure at will, and combine different forms of combination 
in our construction, always within legally allowed limits, and so conceive an 
infinity of complex forms legally engendered. (2001(II):70; italics added)  
 
Productivity means the infinite set of sentences (thought-forms) producible by the 
speaker of a language (i.e. the thinker of thoughts). These sentences are producible by 
combinatorial operations on "primitive forms" - independent meanings like tree and 
green. It's phenomenologically obvious that through an act of "nominalization" - as 
Husserl says - the sentence the tree is green can become the green tree (2001(II):66). It's 





is tall. For Husserl, it's just a "fact" of "consciousness" that this process can go on "ad 
infinitum" (2001(II):70). Hence we can have endless embeddings46 of meanings, 
"encapsulated in one another with any degree of complexity" - which refers to the fact 
that subordination can be created without limit. It follows that the representations may be 
arbitrarily far apart; this point will become important in a moment. For now, the point is: 
productivity is a phenomenological fact about language in particular and cognition in 
general. 
But now what sort of explanatory mechanism of the mind allows us to think this 
way? Phenomenology reveals productivity. And productivity reveals a priori laws of 
essence that pertain to universal grammar and formal semantics. Productivity entails, for 
example, that conceptual words (independent meanings) are the "primitive forms" of the 
syntactic and/or semantic analysis of language and thought47. This is all well and good, 
but laws of essence aren't causal. So if the above is true, and our minds are subject to 
causal laws, there's an explanatory account that will supplement the Wesensschau. 
(Unless, of course, the essences mysteriously stream into your mind from on high.) I 
propose that the explanatory account has to be the language of thought because only a 
language of thought has the representational structure to account for productivity. That's 
because the language of thought is structurally isomorphous with language, the 
phenomenological essence of which stands revealed as productivity. 
                                                          
46 Not to be directly identified with the property of recursivity. 





It follows, in accordance with our finding in chapter 3, that the explanatory 
account to supplement the phenomenological descriptions on offer in the 4th Logical 
Investigation cannot be associationism/connectionism. And that for a very simple reason, 
alluded to above (e.g. infinite embedding; arbitrarily distant related elements). Please 
allow Fodor (2008) to explain:  
 
Chomsky argued that the mind is sensitive to relations among interdependent 
elements of mental or linguistic representations that may be arbitrarily far apart. 
Since association is contiguity-sensitive such relations can't be associations. The 
connection with issues about productivity is straightforward: To say that a relation 
can hold among arbitrarily discontinuous parts of a representation is to say that 
there can be arbitrarily many such representations; so the same considerations that 
argue for the productivity of complex (mental or linguistic) representations thereby 
argue against an associative account of the structure of the representations. You can 
have associationism or you can have productivity but you can't have both [...]. (104)  
 
Notice the similarity to Husserl: "the mind is sensitive to relations among interdependent 
elements... that may be arbitrarily far apart." Husserl put it this way: "we arrive at ever 
new forms, of deductively proven validity, encapsulated in one another with any degree 
of complexity" (2001(II):70). But this is a direct effect of productivity: semantic elements 





dependent on other elements in a syntactic structure no matter how far apart. That's a 
problem if you want to explain conceptual articulations in terms of similarity spaces 
because structure dependency (because it can be stretched to infinity) isn't contiguity-
sensitive but similarity spaces necessarily are. According to associationism / 
connectionism, the degree to which I can think one element in relation to another element 
is the degree to which these elements are near to one another (contiguous to one another) 
in the arrangement of my similarity spaces. If the thinking of elements is, in this sense, 
dependent on their "appropriate distances from one another" - as Churchland (2012) says 
- productivity has to be an illusion (178)48. But productivity is a phenomenological "fact" 
revealed to "consciousness" about the recursive contents of thought and language 
(2001(II):70). 
We, therefore, have a dilemma. Either we are committed to what the 
phenomenology reveals or we are committed to our favorite explanatory apparatus (e.g. a 
Hebbian framework of activation patterns in a network determined by a similarity 
metric). What we, I think, ought to do (following Jackendoff (1987)) is create 
explanations that suit the phenomenology (e.g. productivity) not, per impossibile, the 
                                                          
48 Productivity asserts that the empiricist determining forces - contiguity, similarity, frequency - are 
irrelevant to the structures of thought, which are productive in virtue of the recursive reapplication of rules 
upon a finite set of primitive elements in the manner of a formal system, just as Husserl relates. But 
because associative networks are essentially finite - not recursive in the relevant sense of the reapplication 
of rules to representations - it follows that associationism/connectionism can at best asymptotically 
approach productivity, in which case productivity, like identity, would then be defined as a limiting case, 
thereby contradicting the logical phenomenology. In other words, associative networks can only 
"approximate productivity, in effect by listing finite subsets of the infinite outputs that bona fide recursive 
capacities can produce. Since it appears that human cognition routinely exhibits such infinite capacities 
(notoriously, the set of well-formed English sentences is infinite) our minds can't be networks of 





other way around. If that's normative then the 4th Logical Investigation shows that 
associationism/connectionism is not the explanatory supplement Husserl is seeking. 
Instead, the explanatory supplement Husserl is seeking is a language of thought. 
That's because Husserl is interested in the productivity of meanings and their lawful 
combination: he sees language as a mirror of mind in this regard since language is the 
outward expression of meaning. This is why, in the 4th Logical Investigation, the 
distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic expressions - a grammatical 
distinction - corresponds (though not strictly) to the semantic distinction between 
independent and non-independent meanings. The point is clear: what holds formally of 
language must likewise hold of meaning (though the forms may interact differently due 
to differing laws). Just as there are a priori laws regulating the syntactic combinations of 
words into sentences for all languages - the study of universal grammar - so there are 
formal laws regulating the syntactic combinations of concepts into thoughts. This latter 
combinatorial system is called the language of thought. 
The language of thought explains why our concepts, the primitive forms of the 
system, and the thoughts they compose through recursive procedures are productive. An 
infinity of meaningful representations must belong to the system of thought just as an 
infinity of sentences must belong to a given language if both are to be understood as 
formal combinatorial systems. And Husserl insists that the phenomenology demands we 
understand things in this way. But for our ability to think combinatorially in this fashion, 
we would not have the kind of mind that is capable of speaking a language as an infinite 





semantics (i.e. syntax) would not be phenomenologically available to us. There would be 
no study of universal grammar. But the opposite is evidently true, as Husserl attests, and 
as Chomsky has long argued. 
The language of thought not only makes explanatory sense of the 4th Logical 
Investigation but, arguably, of the whole of the Logical Investigations. For the point of 
this book is that our acts of meaning go well beyond the individual presentations of 
perception, and this in such a way that empiricism has no grip on the explanation of how 
we are able to do so (A.D. Smith (2008) p.101). Empiricism wants to say that our 
representations of the categorial-syntactic properties of objects (states of affairs) must be 
reducible to sense-experience. If they are not so reducible, they must be illusory: for 
everything in our minds is inducted from experience with more or less similar objects on 
the basis of our sensory organs; hence our concept of identity must really be a limiting 
case of our concept of similarity, etc. However, if we have an innate language of thought, 
it suddenly becomes clear how we can have "propositionally structured modes of 
consciousness" with recurring identical elements, the mere existence of which, according 
to A.D. Smith, is Husserl's main point as regards ideational abstraction (ibid). That we do 
have "propositionally structured modes of consciousness" and, consequently, states of 
affairs as objects of experience beyond sense-experience (though founded on sense-
experience) seems to be the main thrust of the Logical Investigations. 
But if that's so, as I believe it is, then we have an ideal candidate for the 
explanatory component deliberately left blank by Husserl's descriptive methodology. 





thought (see ch. 1). We are therefore doubly justified: we are not only scientifically but 
also exegetically motivated to connect the dots. 
With regard to the 4th Logical Investigation, this is easy to do. The 4th Logical 
Investigation is explicit that semantics is combinatorial (e.g. 2001(II):61-62). There are 
laws constraining the possible forms of meaning combination. For these laws to apply, 
thoughts must be structured entities, with concepts as constituents. That's because these 
laws pertain to the formal movement of the constituents (their transformations like 
nominalization) which are "not unlike [those] of arithmetical talk of 'transforming' 
arithmetical patterns" (2001(II):65; cpf. Ch. 1). The way to explain our ability to think 
productively in terms of a formal combinatorial semantics - the phenomenology of which 
is evident - is to assume that thoughts have constituent structure. But, now, that's the 
language of thought. Therefore, the descriptive phenomenology demands that one posit 
"for explanatory purposes" a language of thought (2001(II):73). 
Notice that this explains very well Husserl's antagonism with empiricism (as 
Adorno (1956) pointed out), since a bit of innatism is, after all, going to have to be 
assumed here with regard to the computational mechanism of symbolic inference that 
causally manipulates the symbolic representations of the internal system (i.e. the 
language of thought). That is, it will have to be assumed that each one of us has an innate 
representational system capable of computationally generating an infinity of distinct 





Notice also that Husserl is quite fine with a language of thought since he, like 
Fodor, believes that thought and language structurally mirror one another. They're both 
combinatorial systems exhibiting recursive productivity. Hence Husserl says that if we 
contemplate the primitive elements of the system along with "the operational laws of 
meaning-compounding [...] we recognize the undoubted soundness of the idea of a 
universal grammar conceived by the rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century" (2001, 72). The historical wonder of this insight is that Husserl did not have to 
wait for the specific work on the foundations of mathematics which essentially informed 
Chomsky's work on universal grammar. Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax 
(1965) begins with a discussion of "the rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century." But he concludes that the feasibility of work on universal grammar was 
dependent on (then) recent mathematical work:  
 
Although it was well understood that linguistic processes are in some sense 
'creative,' the technical devices for expressing a system of recursive processes were 
simply not available until much more recently. In fact, a real understanding of how 
a language can (in Humboldt's words) 'make infinite use of finite means' has 
developed only within the last thirty years, in the course of studies in the 






This refers to the work of Church, Kleene, Post & Turing, all of whom developed 
"equivalent" notions of what it is to be an effective procedure or a computing algorithm 
(Bernhardt (2016) p. 62). A computing algorithm is a step-by-step process that 
determines the output of a function given an input. Since this process can evidently be 
repeated on the output, an effective procedure will also be a recursive procedure. The 
important point is that, with these notions having been made precise, a "system of 
recursive processes" could be developed in order to show mathematically that languages 
are productive, i.e. that languages computationally generate infinite sets (of sentences). 
What's philosophically interesting is that Chomsky used this result to argue against 
empiricism, since associationism cannot explain how we have this capacity. That's 
because the computational power of the mind is infinitely productive, whereas 
"associative networks are systems with intrinsically finite capacities" (Fodor (2008) p. 
104). Husserl seems to have intuitively noticed that if productivity follows from the 
existence of a primitive set of (linguistic) elements and the combinatorial operations that 
(meaningfully) compound them, there must be a universal grammar comprising the 
formal laws of meaning-compounding. 
It’s time to draw the moral: Productivity is phenomenological. Only LOT explains 
productivity. So only LOT can be theoretically combined with the phenomenology of 
productivity. Productivity is based on a recursive property of the mind. Hence Husserl 
had to be thinking about recursive functions and their generative capacities at this time. 
Chomsky refers to the work of Turing for the historical explanation of his insight. But 





to lend evidence to Centrone’s finding (2006) that Husserl had discovered a class of 
functions extensionally equivalent with Turing’s, which consequently led to interesting 
reflections on productivity. This finding had been presaged by Webb (1980). Indeed, we 
can now see why Webb (2017) connects “the purely mechanical use of symbolic 
thinking” to “infinite deductive horizons” (11). Unlike Centrone and Webb, however, I 
have connected Husserl’s thought regarding recursivity and productivity to the 
psychological-causal explanation of phenomenological structures of consciousness in the 
manner of Fodor (1975), whose language of thought hypothesis was anticipated by 
Husserl in his 1891 essay “On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic),” precisely in order to 
explain our psychological access to logic, arithmetic, and language (qua universal 
grammar). 
Section IV. Critique of Loar 
Our 4th chapter has argued that Husserl discovered that universal grammar may 
have an empirical explanatory component. In this, he anticipates Chomskyan cognitive 
science and the division of labor set up in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965). The 
descriptive component of the 4th Investigation consists just in this: recognizing the well-
formedness or lack of well-formedness of sentence structures. From this a priori study, 
the phenomenological intuition arises that meaning-combinations are strictly determined 
in accordance with a set of principles constituting a universal grammar. How these 
principles may be instantiated in the human mind, so that we may have 
phenomenological access to these intuitions, is a matter for the explanatory component. 





see here, then, that Husserl's methodology accords a certain kind of labor to a priori 
description, which then feeds into and guides the development of explanatory theory, 
leading ultimately to a causal explanantion of our psychological access to universal 
grammar. Since Brian Loar directly contradicts this picture, it is necessary that I criticize 
his view. 
In his paper "Can We Explain Intentionality?" (2017) - which is a criticism of 
Fodor's atomistic semantics - Loar contrasts the description/explanation distinction with a 
special kind of "description," which he alleges is sui generis. "The intentional notions 
invoked in the present paper," Loar claims, "should be taken as reflexive or subjective 
notions, arising not within an objective or impersonal framework of description and 
explanation, but from subjective reflection on how our own thoughts appear to us" (236). 
By means of this distinction, Loar opposes Fodor, who wants our descriptions of 
intentional experience to feed into a psychological (e.g. computational) model of how 
those intentional experiences might arise in us. Loar objects to this methodology. 
Loar's reasoning behind the above view is given in another paper entitled 
"Subjective Intentionality" (2017). There he says that "[i]t is true that one does regard 
one's thoughts as having intentional objects apart from one's reflexive attention. But, I 
want to suggest, the intentionality we find there is in fact a product of the reflexive 
perspective, or rather of its possibility" (177). There is a good sense to these words, 
consistent with everything that has been said in this dissertation so far. For example, in 
the famous Denkmaschine passage in the Prolegomena, the reason why our thought-





Loar's reason: it is always possible for us to descriptively apprehend the justificatory 
relations that are being blindly honored by the computational mechanism. This possibility 
is extremely relevant for knowledge and its descriptive apprehension. But, contra Loar, 
the intentionality revealed by description is not "a product of the reflexive perspective." 
That is an extreme error, which would mix up the two levels of causal explanation and 
intentional description. The kind of thought, according to Husserl, which reveals 
justificatory relations - Loar's reflexive perspective - "could be the product of ... thought-
machines, but ideal evaluation and causal explanation would none the less remain 
disparate" (Hua XVIII:A67-B67 / 1970:50). Here we see Husserl directly contradicting 
Loar. Ideal evaluation does not have causal powers. It therefore cannot explain the arising 
of intentional thoughts or conscious contents. The computational theory of mind - which I 
identify with Husserl's Denkmaschine - can result in such intentional products, although 
they are not revealed as intentional, nor are they semantically evaluable, apart from the 
"reflexive perspective." This, however, does not make these states contentless. It only 
means that the justification of these states must await the inspection of ideal evaluation. 
Loar's methodological move is, I claim, rather unmotivated. Subjective 
description is ipso facto scientifically available for objective, causal explanation. This is 
the basic methodological relationship between phenomenology and psychology found in 
Husserl's Logical Investigations. It is also found in Chomsky's Aspects (1965), where at 
one point he considers the objection that his use of subjective description - in the 
ascertainment of well-formedness - counts as unscientific. “One may ask,” Chomsky 





speaker excludes it from the domain of science” (19). Insofar as intuitions constitute a 
source of data like any other, the question becomes an “essentially terminological 
question” and as a result has “no bearing at all on any serious issue” (19). If Loar is 
attempting to remove the relevant, consciously accessible data from the possibility of 
causal explanation in terms of a computational mechanism, he is simply denying that 
intuitions can be data for the explanation of their generation. What we need from Loar is 
a substantive (not merely terminological) reason for this move. 
The closest Loar (2017) comes to giving a reason for his methodological 
maneuvre, relevant to this dissertation, is when he actually considers the "thought-
machines" that play a part in psychological explanation. He claims that the internal 
properties of the Denkmaschine do not include truth conditions, which would therefore 
nullify the guiding clue that put Husserl on the path toward the discovery of the 
computational theory of mind:  
 
[T]ruth conditions can spread from observational thoughts to the rest only if mental 
logical connectives and forms have suitable truth-conditional properties - only if a 
certain mental connective has the truth-table for 'or,' a certain mental analogue of 
concatenation means predication, a certain structure means existential 
quantification. Whence such semantic properties? You cannot just say: these 
features of thought behave like disjunction, negation, existential quantification, 





semantic interpretations on that basis. (Can there not be purely 'syntactic' systems?) 
(167)  
 
Now we know, from our 1st chapter, what Husserl's answer to the substantive question 
would be: the "point" of "assigning semantic interpretations" on the basis of the 
mechanism's syntactic operations is to figure out why the results of the mechanism of 
symbolic inference are typically true. But truth is a semantic notion. Therefore, from the 
fact that mental processes are typically truth-preserving, we get the "semantic properties" 
which are involved in inferences among unobserved thoughts. This is the answer to 
Loar's query. 
But Loar cannot get himself to believe that real, objective mental processes are 
typically truth-preserving. Nevertheless, he comes close in the following passage:  
 
Given a constraint that certain inferences be deemed truth-preserving, we could 
say: the tendency to infer 'p$q' from p alone and from q alone and so on, gives $ 
the truth-table for 'or.' But what internal facts would warrant such a constraint, 
failing a general motivation for assigning truth-values to non-observational 
thoughts on internal grounds? ... [W]hat in the internal 'inferential' relations among 
observational and non-observational thoughts would warrant assigning truth 
conditions to the latter collectively? Given only the internal facts, there seems no 





among myriad contentless states with causal relations to the observational thoughts. 
If such internal states play a role in psychological explanation, then would that not 
show merely that psychological explanation can, to that extent, abstract from truth 
conditions in favor of functional properties? (167)  
 
Loar assumes these questions are decisive for skepticism concerning the Denkmaschine 
and cannot be answered (175). Loar is, however, assuming the truth of his skeptical 
premise: that the Denkmaschine cannot be productive of conscious contents and their 
systematic (inferential) relations. It follows that truth conditions cannot apply to the "non-
observational thoughts" - consequently, we are forced "to count [these] as merely some 
among myriad contentless states with causal relations to the observational thoughts," the 
ones that appear in consciousness. 
I can only repeat my objection to Loar's skepticism by citing Husserl, who, with 
open-minded clarity, does not cut off explanation by fiat, as I believe Loar does by 
arbitrarily distinguishing subjective description from objective description and setting up 
a firewall between them. According to Husserl:  
 
In every case, the source for the conventional modes of procedure lies in the natural 
ones. If, through reflection, the power of the latter to produce truth is brought to 
specific consciousness, then - given the power of the will over the psychological 





invention and purposeful application of analogous, but now conventional, methods. 
Hence we find that, also in this regard, our contention that the analysis of the natural 
modes of procedure must precede that of the conventional is justified. (Hua XII:366 
/ 1994:44, italics added)  
 
Here we acquire a number of responses to Loar's queries. The internal motivation for 
assigning truth conditions to the set of unobserved thoughts and their relations within the 
mechanism is founded upon the objective fact that the Denkmaschine can "produce 
truth." This fact is brought to consciousness "through reflection" but this recognition is 
causally inert: the "conventional modes of procedure" founded upon reflection do not 
"produce" intentionality ab ovo (this contradicts Loar ((2017) p. 177)). For if it did, the 
conventional modes of procedure could not find their "source" in the natural modes of 
procedure. But they do find their "source" here. Therefore, their source does not lie 
(circularly) in "reflection." The only features which the conventional modes of procedure 
add to the Denkmaschine are "the assuring of knowledge" and "the expansion of 
knowledge" (Hua XII:366/1994:44). 
The above considerations, I believe, are decisive against Loar, whose work, 
however, is of great value. It is interesting to read his essays in order to see how many of 
his intuitions stem from the belief that "the phenomenological intentionality of perception 
is to be explained via 'directedness,' which is itself a phenomenal notion" (314). This 





distinction between subjective description and objective description. This distinction 
requires motivation, which, however, we have not been able to discover in Loar's work. 
For this distinction contradicts the methodology of cognitive science that Husserl 
anticipated. 
Section V. Critique of Kriegel 
Kriegel's book The Sources of Intentionality (2011) attempts to reveal, as the title 
indicates, the sources of intentionality. Like Loar, Kriegel believes that this source must 
lie in conscious experience as opposed to something prior to experience (e.g. Husserl's 
natural modes of inferential procedure). Hence Kriegel wishes to explain - not describe - 
a defining feature of consciousness in terms of conscious experience itself. "I will argue," 
Kriegel promises, "that our conception of intentionality is grounded in our grasp of 
experiential intentionality, and that to that extent, experiential intentionality is the origin 
of all intentionality" (9). Now I wish to be as charitable as possible. I think there is a 
good sense to the thesis that "our conception of intentionality is grounded in our grasp of 
experiential intentionality." This might be true (though I believe it is not (see Carey 
2009)). However, I believe it does not follow (in any sense) that "to that extent, 
experiential intentionality is the origin of all intentionality." For that to follow, we would 
need to assume that concepts reveal explanatory (causal) origins. Please note that this 
already contradicts Husserl's basic methodology in the Logical Investigations, which is 
not prima facie different from that of cognitive science. One can describe the contents of 





consciousness. At most, the results of one's descriptions can lead to the rejection of 
certain explanatory apparatuses as inadequate to the phenomena described. 
Kriegel proceeds, however, to defend his assumption, that our concepts reveal the 
origins of things. For this to be true, there would have to be a priori conceptual 
constraints on what nature can reveal with respect to explanatory origins (e.g. a priori 
constraints on genetic theory). This is precisely what Kriegel believes. Unfortunately, I 
believe this is false. On the one hand, science has contradicted this assumption literally 
for centuries; and Husserl - circa 1906 - even directly notes this fact and affirms its 
correctness (Chomsky (1969) does likewise in a polemic against Goodman). And, on the 
other hand, recent psychological research even suggests that human beings do not 
common-sensically believe in this assumption (Keil 1989; Carey 2009). I am forced, 
therefore, to conclude that this is an arbitrary assumption, without any support in reality. 
As a result, Kriegel's argument collapses. I shall try to convince the reader that I am 
correct. 
Kriegel (2011) begins by introducing a model of concept formation - which he 
hopes will engender his assumption - called 'the anchoring-instance model.' "I propose a 
general model of the formation of natural kind concepts - or more accurately, of a certain 
kind of formation of a certain kind of natural kind concept - that I call the anchoring-
instance model" (10). Note that Kriegel is not proposing a "general model" of concept 
formation since he restricts his discussion to natural kind concepts, which purport to refer 
to kinds (genera) and sorts (species) in nature. He restricts his discussion further by 





kind concept" is observational with respect to the manifest features, or phenotypical 
properties, of denoted instances. "[M]y concern," Kriegel avers, "is with observational 
natural kind concepts, where a natural kind concept is observational (relative to a subject 
S) just in case it is nomologically possible (for S) to observe instances of the concepts" 
(11). An example is the concept of a horse. "[T]he concept of a horse is an observational 
natural kind concept" (11). Likewise for concepts of other animals. 
Kriegel then tells the empiricist's story about the formation of the concept 
MAMMAL on the basis of experience with more or less similar instances (for problems 
with such an account, see Ch. 3). "A subject," Kriegel says, "goes out into the world and 
encounters many particulars, including animals. Among some subsets of those particulars 
she notices certain systematic and apparently objective similarities, and she therefore 
groups them together" (11). Now Kriegel himself believes this cannot be the whole story 
because whales are mammals despite their apparent lack of similarity to others of the 
same genus. This was a scientific "discovery" (12). As a result, "[T]he concept of a 
mammal appeals to certain hidden features of mammals that are taken to go more deeply 
into what makes them belong together" (12). Kriegel correctly assumes that our animal 
concepts appeal to "hidden features" that disregard phenomenal appearances for the sake 
of grouping and recognition. Kriegel does not note that this is true whether or not the 
person employing the concept is aware of genetics (Keil 1989). 
Kriegel now attempts to pull on the reins to find a middle position between 
concepts which pick out instances on the basis of similarity (a dubious theory; see Ch. 3) 





underlying-nature model.' "In the underlying-nature model, too much is discoverable. 
Thus, further research could turn up evidence that, initial appearances (and studies) 
notwithstanding, dogs, cats, and horses do not have G [i.e. a common underlying-nature]" 
(13). In effect, this would mean that, due to scientific discovery, we could in principle 
find out that species that are strongly associated in our minds on the basis of phenomenal 
similarity are not in fact related. Kriegel believes this to be an "absurd consequence" (13). 
With all due respect, I must deny this. For it is neither absurd from the point of view of 
science nor common-sense. 
Once we accept the principle that science can contradict common-sense, we 
cannot doubt a scientific discovery just because it is counter-intuitive; we cannot shout 
'absurdity!' when discovery contradicts our concepts or, more accurately for Kriegel, 
when science contradicts the empiricistic associations congealed around our concepts. It 
is unclear, moreover, why Kriegel would think such a Humean account could dictate to 
nature in Kantian fashion in terms of "a priori restrictions" (13). According to my 
knowledge of the history of philosophy, the original reason for abandoning empiricism 
was precisely that you cannot get a priori, necessary relations (or restrictions) 
determinative of nature out of empiricism’s account of concept formation. Aware of this 







For human beings in the natural state, things are given in perception and experience, 
and the task is to know these things, just as they are given there, in terms of their 
permanent properties, in terms of their changing characteristics, in terms of the 
patterns they conform to in acting and reacting. Now, howsoever scientific 
knowledge extends beyond the conceptions and decrees of the natural, naive 
worldview, however much it rejects as appearance what the latter accepts as naked 
truth, it nonetheless continuously maintains common ground with it. It step by step 
modifies the conceptions of reality previously given to it and countenanced by it 
itself on other levels to the extent that theoretical adherence to them and pursuit of 
them leads to contradictions and empirical incommodities. To the extent that this is 
not the case, it adheres to what is previously given without subjecting it to closer 
examination. (2008, 94)  
 
What Husserl says here is a scientifically responsible account of the relationship between 
"scientific knowledge" and common-sense, which Husserl calls "the natural, naive 
worldview." Science begins from common-sense (e.g. contact physics), but very quickly 
departs from it (e.g. Newtonian gravity). In the process, science often turns the "naked 
truth" into mere "appearance" (the classic case being Copernicus turning the "naked 
truth" of the sun's rising into a mere "appearance"). However, science "continuously 
maintains ground" with common sense, which remains science's default setting, until 
there are "contradictions and empirical incommodities" (e.g. Einstein's discovery that 





what we common-sensically think must be the case due to our naive concepts (e.g. our 
naïve concept of time). In Kriegel's case, if science discovers that phenomenally similar 
objects do not share an underlying essence (via genetic theory), one cannot protest on a 
priori (more accurately: common-sense) grounds. When Kriegel says "there are some a 
priori restrictions on what can in principle be discovered regarding the extension of the 
concept of a mammal," this must simply be denied, in light of the principle (inter alia) 
that science can "contradict" common-sense (e.g. genetic theory can say that what we 
think of as instances of the concept 'mammal' are not instances because of considerations 
based on their DNA) (13). Once we allow this, however, Kriegel's argument seems 
problematic. 
In light of the fact that Kriegel may not accept our principle, let us be as 
charitable as possible – let us bend over backwards - and look at what Kriegel himself has 
to say about why (contrary to our opinion) common-sense can contradict science. Kriegel 
does provide an argument - based on his anchoring-instance model of concept formation - 
as to why we must accept the results of science only up to a certain point with respect to 
the content of our common-sense concepts as regards biological classification:  
 
It can in principle be discovered that, surprisingly, dogs do not qualify as mammals. 
But it cannot be discovered that dogs, cats, horses, cows, goats, and every other 
manifestly similar animal a subject encountered during the formation of her concept 





an early stage in which certain animals are grouped together and used collectively 
as an anchor for the construction of a kind category. (13-14; italics added) 
 
For this argument to work, two assumptions need to be true: (1) it would have to be 
psychologically (empirically) true that the formation of a kind concept actually is formed 
on the basis of observable “manifestly similar” features; and (2) it would also have to be 
true (a priori) that we necessarily think of the essence in reality picked out by that 
concept as essentially related to those observable “manifestly similar” features which 
help us to identify instances in classification tasks. But neither assumption appears to be 
true. Assumption (1) requires concept formation on the basis of similar instances. On this 
view, similar phenomenal features would make the concept what it is. That is why 
Kriegel thinks there must be "a priori restrictions" on what genetic theory can discover, 
since otherwise it's possible for genetic theory to discover that many "manifestly similar" 
creatures are not in fact related (13). But notice that this would contradict our kind 
concept only if we conceive of our concepts as being constituted by similar features. But 
– shouting from the rooftops now - this appears not to be the case. First, Kriegel's view is 
simply a revival of the Humean empiricism that we criticized in Ch. 3: kind concepts 
cannot be formed on the basis of similarity on pain of circularity and infinite regress (it’s 
in doubt that any concepts can be formed on this basis). Second, Husserl's criticism of the 
empiricists in this regard has been recently vindicated in cognitive science: for Kriegel's 
account of kind concepts is particularly questionable in light of the research paradigm 





undermines assumption (2): we, as a matter of fact, do not necessarily (hence we do not a 
priori) think of the essence in reality picked out by a concept as essentially related to 
those observable features which help us to identify instances in classification tasks. 
Frank Keil (1989) was the first to provide data for the thesis that human beings do 
not individuate kinds on the basis of observable features. Commenting on this discovery, 
Carey (2009) infers the following:  
 
What makes an animal a skunk or a raccoon [or a mammal] are not the properties 
that one ordinarily relies upon in classification tasks, nor the properties that account 
for the prototypicality structure of animals in feature listing experiments, nor 
similarity to stored exemplars of skunks and raccoons, but, rather, something 
deeper, something essential, something inherited from a creature's parents. We need 
not know what this essential property is. (Something to do with DNA is our current 
best guess, but even biologists do not yet know exactly what it is about DNA that 
distinguishes skunks from raccoons.) Psychological essentialism reflects our 
assumptions about natural kinds, showing that we deploy our concepts of them in 
the absence of knowledge that would allow us to categorize entities under them. 
(500-501)  
 
Here we see that science has vindicated the phenomenology (as opposed to empiricistic 





natural kinds transcend those phenomenal similarities that were said by the empiricists 
(and Kriegel) to constitute our concepts. Indeed, we now know that we "deploy our 
concepts ... in the absence of knowledge that would allow us to categorize entities under 
them," e.g. "similarity to stored exemplars." Hence the causal explanation of our kind 
concepts - which Husserl does not provide, though he showed the correct path foward - 
must involve "some mechanism of reference fixing that is independent of any of the 
known properties of the referents of the concept" (501). This means that the phenomenal 
properties of instances are ultimately irrelevant for determining the content of kind 
concepts, which are not formed on the basis of similars. This line of reasoning directly 
contradicts Kriegel (2011); in particular, it undermines his argument for pulling on the 
reins of genetic theory. For genetic theory cannot be stopped by appeal to manifest 
similarity with respect to our (kind) concepts, since, as Carey (2009) points out, manifest 
similarity is irrelevant with respect to the deployment of our (kind) concepts. Kriegel's 
"absurd consequence" transforms, in light of the psychological evidence, into a matter of 
course (13). I therefore conclude that there are no "a priori restrictions" on the extension 
of our kind concepts with respect to phenomenal similarity (13). 
If I am correct, Kriegel's project - of determining the sources of intentionality 
from the phenomenal similarities constitutive of the concept in conscious experience – 
would appear to be misguided, since the same arguments we have just reviewed apply to 
the concept of intentionality. There is, in general, no path from phenomenal similarities 
in conscious experience to the essence of a kind. This is one of Husserl’s most important 





ipso facto anti-empiricist. Moreover, psychological essentialism has provided evidence 
that our (kind) concepts do not work in the way that Kriegel needs them to in order to 
motivate his project. For it looks like our concept of genus is a place-holder concept 
(Carey 2009). This helps to explain why our intuitive taxonomies actually don’t line up 
with reality. Even if this weren’t true, it is still always nomologically possible that the 
laws of genetics won’t line up with our intuitive taxonomies. That is, I think, not absurd. 
The charge of absurdity implies a contradiction. But there is no contradiction in the idea 
that whales being mammals is the normal case (a distinct possibility). Kriegel at best can 
say this is counter-inuitive – which of course it is, given what is actual. That doesn’t 
mean it couldn’t be (a priori) an accurate statement concerning reality. For normalcy isn’t 
a function of analytic connections but, rather, of synthetic ones. And the relevant 
synthetic connections have to do with DNA, which is not discoverable through the 
analysis of concepts assumed to be constituted by resemblance/similarity. I think the 
same can be said of intentionality’s sources. As a result, I am forced to conclude that the 
explanation - or the uncovering of the sources - of intentionality will not be in terms of 







Chapter Five: A Language of Thought Explanation for the 5th & 6th Logical 
Investigations 
The language of thought is a hypothesis in empirical psychology. The word 
'hypothesis' is Greek, and, in its primary sense, means "foundation." Since we are, 
throughout our dissertation, arguing that the language of thought is the explanatory 
hypothesis that explains the key cognitive phenomena that show up for phenomenology 
(over and above empiricism) in the Logical Investigations, we are at least etymologically 
justified in asserting that the language of thought is the foundation of phenomenology. 
We are also exegetically justified since Husserl does describe the computational 
procedure that he outlines with respect to the unconscious as the "foundation for ... higher 
investigations" concerning logical phenomenology (Hua XII: 465 / 1994: 44). In the 
Prolegomena, Husserl reaffirms this commitment by saying that a "psychological 
foundation" (of the computational variety) for logical phenomena is justified when one is 
"concerned with questions as to the origin of mathematical representations" (Willard 
(1984) 117). As long as we understand this explanatory foundation as giving us insight 
into the origin of formal concepts (e.g. universal, identity, etc.), then our thesis, according 
to Husserl, can only "promote clearness and instruction" (ibid). At the end of the present 
chapter, we will also briefly show that we are conceptually justified in referring to the 
language of thought as the foundation of phenomenology. 
In our second chapter, we wished to prove - as if Husserl's words (above) could 
leave us in any doubt - that there is exegetical and methodological room for the properly 





We not only proved this but also showed that the very essence of science (according to 
Husserl) demands a hypothetical foundation for descriptive phenomena. We concluded 
that phenomenology really must complement and serve as a data-gatherer for those 
computational mechanisms which explain the origins of (Husserlian) phenomenology. In 
particular, these must be language of thought mechanisms, if we want to explain the 
phenomenology of identity, productivity, and rational coherence. 
In our third chapter, we argued that the language of thought must be at the 
foundation of phenomenology in its intuitions of essences. That's because every essence 
exists over and above the particular, with which empiricism is exclusively concerned. 
Hence in order to access such phenomena, the language of thought must be assumed to be 
at the foundation of phenomenology. For associationism/connectionism cannot be the 
explanatory apparatus behind Wesensschau, since the consciousness of (logical) identity 
can never arise on the basis of similarity. It follows that, insofar as an explanatory 
supplement is demanded, only the language of thought can provide the necessary 
resources for a consciousness of identity. That's (again) because only the language of 
thought can explain mechanistically how one and the same type of mental representation 
can be tokened on multiple occasions of sense-experience involving, strictly speaking, 
merely more or less similar individuals. The reason, of course, is that we don't learn the 
concept of identity (or any other formal concept with which phenomenology goes beyond 
empiricism) on the basis of more or less similar individuals since the learning of such a 
concept isn't even a logical possibility (see Ch. 3). With the language of thought, then, we 





In our fourth chapter, we argued that the phenomenology of semantic/linguistic 
productivity was discovered by Husserl. This caused him to see the a priori necessity of a 
universal grammar. Just as a universal grammar explains linguistic productivity, so the 
language of thought explains semantic productivity. That's because the language of 
thought is a combinatorial system of meanings and their lawful compounding. We 
therefore discovered here another proof of the correctness of our assertion that the 
language of thought is the foundation of phenomenology. 
Now in our fifth chapter, what I want to do is go through the computational 
underpinnings of the last two investigations. I shall show how a language of thought has 
the resources to causally explain the act-qualities and act-matters of the 5th Logical 
Investigation. I'll conclude that, but for a language of thought, intentional essences would 
never appear to us. I will also argue that, but for a language of thought, nominal acts 
would be inexplicable. For the act of nominalization is a recursive act, which only a 
computational underpinning could explain. I will then show how the language of thought 
enters into the explanation of categorial intuition in the 6th Logical Investigation. Since 
the groundwork for this has already been accomplished in the 3rd chapter, I'll merely link 
our previous discussion with pertinent quotations. With these things accomplished, the 
computational foundations of phenomenology will, I think, have been demonstrated. At 
this point, I will close my dissertation with a brief discussion of the implications of my 





Section I. A Language of Thought Explanation for the Productivity of Act-Matters 
& Act-Qualities 
A causal explanation of the arising of conscious contents is necessarily an appeal 
to entities and forces beyond conscious awareness. That's because the causal processing 
behind all mental states is unconscious. This is both methodologically unsurprising - the 
generalizations of explanatory science are usually defined over unobservables - and 
ontologically appropriate: consciousness and its contents come at the end of a long chain 
of causal processing. This has been known ever since Weber & Fechner practically 
demonstrated against Kant that psychology could be an objective science. Cognitive 
science continues to confirm this assumption. For example, we now know that object 
recognition and object location are processed separately and, at a later time, cognitively 
synthesized before entering consciousness, at a still later time, as a unified phenomenon - 
all of which processing takes place in the unconscious (Cain (2016) 177-178). 
The 5th Investigation, however, is concerned specifically with what shows up in 
consciousness, without paying attention to the unconscious causal sources of what shows 
up in consciousness, i.e., "without regard ... to genetic connections" (2001(II):112). These 
"genetic connections" refer to the "unnoticed, unconscious grounds" of our knowledge 
(2001(I):303). In particular, they refer to the "obscure, hypothetical events in the soul's 
unconscious depths" (2001 (II):105) - the existence of which, however, is not to be 
denied. On the conscious level, however, Husserl is concerned to show that Brentano's 
eliding of the distinction between content and object, though not completely unjustifiable, 





consciousness. We are not interested in this polemic per se but only as it may be used to 
illustrate how a language of thought may inform and explain Husserlian phenomenology. 
Husserl ends up distinguishing, in the 5th Logical Investigation, between the 
object presented in experience and the object as it is represented (2001(II):113). This is 
the desired clarification of Brentano's elision of object and content: the presentation is the 
object of an experience, whereas the representation is the content of the experience. One 
can, for example, think of Henrik Ibsen judgmentally as "the principal founder of modern 
dramatic realism" (2001, p.119). The object of this judgmental assertion is, according to 
Husserl, Ibsen himself. But the content is that "Ibsen is the principal founder of modern 
dramatic realism" (ibid). This is in contrast with other contents, which may also have 
Ibsen as a presentative object, e.g., "Ibsen is a Norwegian playwright," etc. Husserl calls 
content in this sense "the matter (material) of judgements" in contrast with the "quality" 
of the act of judgment itself (ibid). Notice one need not necessarily relate to a content 
judgmentally: one could, if one were suitably patriotic and Norwegian, desire that Ibsen 
be Norwegian. This is a fun fact about contents (act-matters) and the ways (e.g. judging, 
desiring, etc.) in which our minds relate to them: they mix and match. From this follows 
the productivity of the attitudes - a computational explanandum κατ' εξοχήν.  This 
productivity allows Husserl to say that "we can affirm the principle that, ideally regarded, 
any objectifying matter can be combined with any quality" (2001(II):162). Although we 
may doubt the details of Husserl's analysis (e.g., concerning whether Ibsen really is the 
(intentional) object of a judgmental assertion concerning him), all that needs to be 





matters (the contents on the right-hand side of an intentional experience) and act-qualities 
(the propositional attitudes on the left hand side of contents) can be combined 
(computationally) in mix-and-match fashion. In other words, phenomenology reveals the 
productivity of the propositional attitudes. 
Now with this phenomenological result in hand, we can readily see how to use the 
descriptive distinction - between contents and relations to them - as an explanandum for 
LOT qua explanans. The LOT story that we tell, with a view to an explanation of the 
productivity of the attitudes, is this: when Husserl thinks the (instantiated) thought Ibsen 
is the principal founder of modern dramatic realism our explanation is the following: in 
Husserl's head, there's a representation (a mental symbol capable of entering into causal 
relations) that has the content entertained by the thought. In particular, the concepts that 
compose the thought (the instantiated proposition) are (computationally) brought together 
to form the predicative assertion. And this content can be transformed and matched with 
other attitudes in acts of (recursive) embedding to potentially yield an infinite number of 
sentences/thoughts. 
Since we discovered that Husserl believed these mental representations to exist in 
a language of thought, it follows that the symbols that allow us to think our thoughts must 
have the same structure as sentences. That means there's an isomorphism between the 
structures of sentences we descriptively apprehend and the structures of thoughts that are 
instantiated in our minds. This isomorphism directly gives the clue to the explanation of 
the phenomenology; indeed, we have already seen that it comports well with Husserl's 





designators" (Hua XII:363/1994:42). To explain their productive effects in 
consciousness, we assume they have syntactic structure and therefore fit into indefinitely 
many syntactic formations. This explains why the symbolic representations on the 
content side can be computationally moved into various configurations with the attitude 
side ad infinitum; hence why in consciousness we're not stuck - as a function of 
empiricistic-associationistic frequency - with one act-qualification toward a given 
content: these two sides can be mixed-and-matched, as one would expect if a 
computational mechanism were behind the process (cpf. Fodor (2000) p. 16, where Fodor 
argues that, if associations (connections) were behind this process, it would not be 
evident why we can ever change our attitudes toward propositions). 
The above, moreover, accords with Fodor's proposal as to how to explain act-
matters and act-qualities (i.e. the propositional attitudes) in his original treatment of the 
language of thought (1975). "Cognitive psychology," Fodor insists, has as its 
"fundamental explicandum... the organism and its propositional attitudes: what it 
believes, what it learns, what it wants and fears, what it perceives to be the case" (198). 
Fodor goes on:  
 
Cognitive psychologists accept, that is, what the behaviorists were [and what 
connectionists are] most determined to reject: the facticity of ascriptions of 
propositional attitudes to organisms and the consequent necessity of explaining 






Husserl's methodology presupposes "the facticity of ascriptions of propositional 
attitudes," that is, that these are intentional experiences that really occur in our mental 
lives. Consequently, it was the original point of phenomenology to make sure these 
cannot be ignored by an excessively empiricist psychology (e.g. Wundt's). It would 
follow, if I'm right, that not only behaviorists but also eliminative connectionists (e.g. 
Churchland (2012)) are out of step with Husserlian methodology (a fortiori cognitive 
science). For what shows up descriptively (e.g. propositional attitudes and their 
productivity) must be explained, as Fodor insists; although this explanation will not be 
proper to phenomenology but, rather, to a phenomenologically informed psychology: 
today's "cognitive psychology." 
Husserl recognizes that the explanation of the propositional attitudes is not given 
with their description. Consequently, if their mix-and-match productivity - 
phenomenologically recognized - can serve as a guiding clue, the following explanation 
suggests itself: "having a propositional attitude is being in some relation to an internal 
representation. In particular, having a propositional attitude is being in some 
computational relation to an internal representation" (198). Fodor goes on:  
 
The intended claim is that the sequence of events that causally determines the 
mental state... will be describable as a sequence of steps in a derivation if it is 





relations between organisms and internal representations, and causally interrelated 
mental states succeed one another according to computational principles which 
apply formally to the representations. .... It is, in short, of the essence of cognitive 
theories that they seek to interpret physical (causal) transformations as 
transformations of information, with the effect of exhibiting the rationality of 
mental processes. (198)  
 
So to consider Husserl's example again: the mental process which led Husserl to judge 
that Ibsen is the founder of modern dramatic realism - the process which led him to 
entertain that true proposition - is assumed to be a rational process. This process must be 
governed, therefore, by computational - as opposed to associative/connective - principles. 
That is, the process which led Husserl to make this judgment was not a function of the 
irrational strength of the connections this judgment had to other judgments, but was 
rather a function of the formal relations this judgment had to other judgments. It is the 
formal relations among judgments which, according to our first chapter, explain, 
according to Husserl, our pre-logical tendency toward arriving at true judgments like this 
in the rapid flow of thinking. But the rapid flow of thinking is a blind, causal process. 
Hence, insofar as this result really is rationally explicable a computational mechanism 
must be doing the work. Husserl thinks this must be the case because judgments, 
considered as the paradigmatic propositional attitude or act-quality, entail the truth 





Here we touch upon Husserl's original argument for LOT. It should be noted that 
Husserl's argument is extremely similar to, though not identical with, Fodor's argument. 
Fodor (1975) argued that computational mechanisms, over which the laws of modern 
psychology quantify, must be computing in some medium or other. For there can be no 
computation without computational elements. There must, in other words, be 
representational elements that are computationally transformed; otherwise, there can be 
no computation. Hence the Fodorean slogan: no computation without representation (cpf. 
Milkowski (2013)). 
Once one grants the above argument, LOT immediately follows. For if we 
proceed to characterize the elements of the computation, we realize the elements would 
appear to be representations. And if these representations are to be computationally 
transformed in accordance with formal rules (per above), they must have a certain formal 
structure. Specifically, their structure must be formally akin to words in sentences in the 
sense that, just as words concatenate according to rules to form sentences, so concepts 
must concatenate according to the laws of meaning-formation to form thoughts (as in the 
4th Investigation). It would seem to follow, then, that mental representations, from an 
explanatory point of view, must be symbols in a language of thought. 
Many people, of course, object to Fodor's argument. Hatfield (2009), for example, 
claims that there is "a prodigious leap from representation to symbolization" (74). That's 
because connectionist networks, de facto, are representational but not symbolic: they 
have algorithms that are "directly implemented in a computational net, rather than being 





from the point of view of Husserlian phenomenology, a major problem. Precisely 
because connectionists do not have "a symbol system that has its own functional 
architecture," the basic phenomenological facts concerning content - productivity, 
systematicity, and the rational coherence of thought - are out of explanatory reach 
(McLaughlin (2014)). In this sense, connectionism reproduces, as I have argued, all the 
problems that Husserl had identified with associationism in the Logical Investigations. 
But these explanatory problems demonstrate the opposite of Hatfield's conclusion: they 
show that representations really must be symbolic. Otherwise, the basic phenomenology 
of thought becomes illusory, despite all the evidence regarding the phenomenological 
laws of meaning-compounding. 
Hatfield does not show, I think, just how representations that are computationally 
processed fail to be symbols that have constituent structure. But he does clearly propose a 
dilemma: we can "treat computational devices as symbol crunchers [....] [or] simply as 
engineered devices" (73). In the latter case, "we lose the sense of internal symbols." 
Hatfield thinks the latter option - the connectionist alternative - clearly preferable. But, 
again, that would be an unmitigated disaster from an explanatory point of view. It would 
also essentially deny logical phenomenology its pride of place in determining what there 
is to explain with regard to the mind. This, then, would be to deny my interpretation of 
the Logical Investigations as erecting a new explanatory agenda. We would then lose the 
possibility of a genuinely scientific psychology - a cognitive science - one that truly 





not actually go beyond these historical precedents with respect to what show up as 
explananda and what must be deemed illusory (e.g. universal presentations). 
As an aside, we should note that this concern - overcoming empiricism - is a 
theme throughout Husserl's writings: "The psychology of cognition, beginning with 
Locke, has completely failed - even as a properly psychological investigation - because of 
its countersensical sensualism" (Formal & Transcendental Logic p. 14). The concept of 
the transcendental in Husserl is the concept of the non-empiricist cognitive structures that 
are now the subject of post-Chomskyan cognitive science. This is the science of how 
objectivity arises for us in subjectivity beyond the fictionalism of Hume's sensualized 
cognitive structures. Connectionism and its fellow travelers (e.g. Kriegel (2011)) 
reproduce the failures of Locke and Hume by re-sensualizing the mind's structures 
through a similarity metric necessarily based on sense-experience (see Ch. 3). Hence the 
same complaints Husserl leveled at the empiricists apply to connectionists mutatis 
mutandis (e.g. psychologism). All of this is overcome when we realize that rationality 
and objectivity can arise for us "because syntactically specified operations can be truth 
preserving insofar as they reconstruct relations of logical form" (Fodor (2000) p.19). 
Doubts concerning the physical realizability of such operations are finally put to rest by 
the very existence of Turing machines, which show that "local structure can encode not 
only grammatical relations among sentences, but inferential relations as well" (ibid). We 
saw in Ch. 1 that Husserl anticipated precisely this insight, which Fodor (2000) attributes 
to Turing. But in a footnote, Fodor qualifies: "To be sure, Turing was greatly indebted for 





scholarship, I'm not required to mention that" (108). Due to what we discovered in Ch. 1, 
it may be necessary to regard Husserl as the fountainhead of the "tradition" that Fodor 
here mentions as the seedbed for Turing's insight into "local" (as opposed to global) 
computational structure. 
Now it's this formal feature of representations - their constituent structure, or their 
susceptibility to rule-manipulation - that explains, I believe, their phenomenologically 
evident productivity: the endless concatenation of meaning-forms, of parts into wholes 
which in turn can be parts of larger wholes ad infinitum (see 3rd Investigation). The 
constituent structure of mental representations also explains their phenomenologically 
evident systematicity, which, in the words of Husserl, "takes over none of the material 
specificity of relations and of their members, and [....] will perhaps say in the simple case 
of dyadic relations: If a certain A stands in a certain relation to a certain B, this same B 
stands in a certain corresponding (converse) relation to that A; A and B are here quite 
freely variable" (2001 (II), 20). The systematicity problem for 
associationism/connectionism, of course, is that A & B are not "freely variable" if 
"dyadic relations" are determined in thought by connection strength as a function of 
experience. For there could be a human mind for which the equivalence of (A + B = B + 
A) and (B + A = A + B) was not immediately evident simply because the one ordering 
might be more highly weighted as a function of experience than the other. 
Connectionism, given its assumptions concerning weighting and frequency strength, 
either cannot solve this problem or must bring in further assumptions (Fodor & Pylyshyn 





Turing-style architecture. But this problem is avoided entirely by LOT which has 
systematicity built in due to the formal structure of its representations. I therefore argue 
that, since logical phenomenology makes evident the immediacy of such logical relations, 
over and above empiricism, it proportionally goes a long way toward recommending a 
language of thought. 
If this line of reasoning is correct, then we are theoretically licensed to interpret 
intentional acts in terms of LOT, as I have done above. We do not thereby impugn the 
validity of phenomenological analyses of the differences among intentional acts. On the 
contrary, we are safeguarding these from a logically undisciplined empiricism 
(connectionism & prototype theory). Churchland (2012) wishes to reduce or eliminate all 
such analyses. But this is not the goal of the language of thought. This fact is not widely 
recognized among phenomenologists. For instance, Zahavi (2019) pairs Fodor as a 
reductionist with eliminativists like Churchland and contrasts both with phenomenology 
(2019, p.49). According to Kim (2010), Zahavi is incorrect: 
 
Jerry Fodor's 'Special Sciences' was the canonical source of the anti-reductionist 
arguments in the latter half of the 20th century. As is widely known, Fodor's 
antireductionist argument, based on the so-called multiple realizability [i.e. 
transcendentality] of psychological and other special-science properties, played a 
pivotal role in creating what Ned Block has aptly dubbed the antireductionist 






This "consensus" just is the view that "reduction is not possible anywhere" (210). That is 
Fodor's view49. So Zahavi (2019) would appear to be misleading a generation of 
phenomenologists concerning the precise nature of Fodor's philosophy and its possible 
relation to phenomenology - namely, the relationship of a direct link. For it follows from 
LOT (and only from LOT) that the validity of phenomenology - the fact (not the 
epiphenomenal illusion) that we all have intentional experiences - is secure on the 
descriptive level, the level of phenomenological discovery of the a priori structures of 
consciousness. But, as Husserl in the Logical Investigations acknowledges, there is 
always a question, with regard to "all descriptive differences" that arise in consciousness, 
just how they are connected to the "obscure, hypothetical events in the soul's unconscious 
depths" (2001(II):105). Since filling in this hypothetical component - the explanatory 
supplement to phenomenology - is demanded by the very essence of science, we not only 
are rationally required to acknowledge the question, but are also required to answer it 
(see Ch.2). And this answer will be of phenomenological benefit insofar as we can, by its 
means, denounce all Schlickian skeptics of Husserlian phenomenology. As Husserl says, 
"The added knowledge due to hypotheses that have proved workable, enables us to press 
ever deeper into the 'true essence' of real being: we progressively correct our conceptions, 
more or less tainted with inconsistencies, of phenomenal things" (2001(II):160). Hence, 
                                                          
49 “Rather than attempt to reduce content to something non-intentional, [Fodor] seeks to specify lower-level 
non-intentional properties that are capable of exhaustively generating the kinds of contents that our 
intentional states have” (Cain 2002, p. 114). Cain says this in a commentary on Ch. 4 of Psychosemantics. 





with this hypothesis, we can confidently assert that Schlick had misperceived the 'essence 
of cognition' as consisting entirely of empiricistic processes. For LOT's hypothetical 
appropriation of Turing's insight concerning constituent cum causal structure allows us to 
confidently assert something concerning the "'true essence' of real being" with respect to 
the arising of conscious contents. I therefore would reassure my readers that the working 
out of the connection between phenomenology and the (anti-empiricist) discovery of the 
mechanism of symbolic inference will redound to the benefit of phenomenology by 
making it a scientific theory. 
The above sketch concerning judgment as an act-quality generalizes to all 
intentional experiences (e.g. beliefs, desires, etc.). When I have a belief, a desire, etc., 
what is going on, according to the computationalist, in my temporally-bound/causally-
bound head, is the tokening of a mental representation which is capable of entering into 
causal relationships (Cain 2016). We want to hypothesize in this manner concerning the 
causal genesis of intentional mental acts because these arise in us without any conscious 
intention or 'authentic' guidance. For example, the waxwork figure seen as a person is 
realized to be a waxwork figure, not because Husserl consciously intended to see a person 
transform into a waxwork figure (this would be a plain misreading), but because, as I say, 
the computational process behind his intentional acts categorized the visual experience as 
illusory based on the processing of incoming sensory input. This is my proposed 
explanation behind phenomenological shifts in consciousness, and is put forward in 
accordance with what Jackendoff (1992) calls the 'Correspondence Condition': "Every 





distinction" (88). Jackendoff comments: "This condition essentially says that 
consciousness is not magic - that its content proceeds in a principled way from 
underlying information structures and the processes that operate on them" (88). We 
believe that Husserl understood that "consciousness is not magic" and that its "content" 
must arise from "underlying information structures and the processes that operate on 
them." Indeed, this is the subject of his early 1891 essay, examined in our first chapter. 
But as these issues involve hypotheses concerning, in Husserl's words, the "soul's 
unconscious depths," they lie behind descriptions, and so beyond the ken of the 
descriptive phenomenologist. Since Husserl had already put forward the language of 
thought thesis, which is a computational thesis, we see no impediment to applying this 
explanation to the various phenomenological descriptions (e.g. propositional attitudes) on 
offer in the 5th Logical Investigation. Indeed, we would, following Jackendoff (1992), 
like to emphasize their natural alliance as a way of integrating "phenomenology" and 
"cognitive science" (88). 
Section II. Critique of Cobb-Stevens & Zahavi (& 'All Phenomenologists') 
But I can hear the clamor at my door. Did not Husserl deny the existence of 
mental processing? In particular, did not Husserl eschew mental representations (RTM) 
standing behind conscious mental states? These questions would be asked by that neo-
Aristotelian interpretation, which has been imposed on the text of the Logical 
Investigations, removing the book from its context in late 19th-century psychological 
researches. Richard Cobb-Stevens (2003) represents this view, who complains that prior 





the term 'contents' in an ambiguous fashion, sometimes to refer to ill-defined mental 
representations and sometimes to refer to things in the world in so far as they are known" 
(98). Now I must disagree with our distinguished professor in referring to "mental 
representations" as "ill-defined" - certainly this is not Husserl's opinion. And this 
ambiguous usage can be justified because ambiguous usage is not ipso facto incorrect. 
For instance, meaning-fulfilment is ambiguous with respect to meanings and objects; but 
this, in fact, presents no problem, because object-recognition and meaning-fulfilment are 
two sides of the same coin. Likewise, mental representations and the things represented 
are two sides of the same coin. I believe therefore that Cobb-Stevens' point is misguided. 
But to defend Cobb-Stevens a little: Husserl did eventually come to believe (over 
the course of the 1890's) that the explanatory positing of mental representations was not 
relevant to epistemological description, which should take place prior to choosing an 
explanatory apparatus, so that we may not unduly reduce phenomena in the empiricist 
manner to sense-experience (see Ch. 3). Hence I must again insist that Husserl's 
"ambiguous" usage is by no means objectionable, provided we understand what is 
asserted for the sake of description, and what is asserted for the sake of explanation50. 
Cobb-Stevens' viewpoint is not a little undermined by a failure to notice the 
description vs. explanation distinction and how it preserves the modern understanding of 
                                                          
50 This confusion may be the original source of Frege's criticism of Husserl's alleged psychologism, despite 





the need for mental representations51. As a result, an interpretation of the text has been 
given in the following fashion:  
 
There is no evidence that [Husserl] engaged during these years [i.e. the 1890's] in 
any serious study of medieval or later scholastic literature on the topic of 
cognition or that he was influenced by a reading of the relevant texts of Aristotle. 
Yet he was able, by dint of a disciplined return zu den Sachen selbst, to achieve 
what amounts to a reconstruction of the pre-modern notion of the intentional 
continuity between mind and nature. (98)  
 
In accordance with the empirical fact that Husserl does not seem to have studied the 
medievals, there is no evidence that I can ascertain with my humble powers that any 
"reconstruction of the pre-modern notion of the intentional continuity between mind and 
nature" is effected in the Logical Investigations. This is already apparent from Husserl's 
acceptance of the description vs. explanation distinction. For if by "intentional continuity 
between mind and nature" Cobb-Stevens means that Husserl denied the existence of 
mediating mental representations in the unconscious depths of our soul as a possible 
hypothesis for explanatory purposes, then he would have been going beyond the 
descriptive limits imposed by his method. In other words, Husserl cannot put forward any 
                                                          






doctrine concerning the arising of the contents of consciousness, since Husserl explicitly 
limits himself to description, which lies on the other side of causal-genesis. We can 
therefore assert with all due modesty that Cobb-Stevens' thesis is incorrect on the quite 
evident ground that Husserl is describing conscious mental states, not explaining how our 
mental states come to be the way that they are in consciousness (which is the proper 
domain for mental representations). Again, Husserl, as a matter of principle, does not 
pronounce upon the nature of mental processing in the Logical Investigations. If the 
nature of mental processing demands the existence of mental representations, the positing 
of them is a matter for explanation, not description. In sum, the description vs. 
explanation distinction alone shows that Husserl had no "pre-modern" thesis in mind, 
since it allows one to explain the distinctions that appear in intentional experiences in 
terms of LOT which, surprisingly, Husserl himself had envisaged. Moreover, we have 
shown the feasibility of this approach throughout our dissertation. 
Now I believe the worry may be that positing mental representations impugns the 
objectivity of knowledge, and since Husserl seems to talk a lot about the latter, he really 
must be against the former. But this reasoning is quite mistaken. One can know all sorts 
of things about, e.g., cats which are epistemologically independent of the mental 
representations that enable one to know all sorts of things about cats. That doesn't mean 
one can't have mental representations of cats; nor does it mean one's knowledge is about 
cat representations. Indeed, the most likely story is that I have cat representations because 
there are cats in the world, ones that impress on my sense organs in all the right ways to 





about the intentional continuity of mind and nature, if that continuity is supposed to be 
understood as not involving mental representations. For it is generally assumed that the 
course of processing from one's sensory organs to one's conscious mental states is pretty 
long and complicated. The precise details for philosophy are unimportant; it's sufficient 
to note that phenomenology has nothing to say about all this unconscious processing in 
an explanatory regard, precisely because phenomenology is concerned with merely 
describing the effects of this processing with a view toward knowledge. At best, 
phenomenology can show that our favorite explanatory apparatus is inadequate. 
Phenomenology can never provide a refutation of an explanatory apparatus (cpf. Zahavi 
(2019) who seems to think that phenomenology has refuted RTM). 
With regard to our theses, then, we may here note that if one is able to make the 
distinction between intending an object and the object intended, then we already have the 
(phenomenologically apperceived) idea of a mental representation, since the object 
intended may or may not exist, and therefore is distinct from the representation (97). That 
we are "ordinarily preocuppied with things and their properties" and not on our 
representing them, as Cobb-Stevens correctly notes, is not to the point (105). If, noting 
this, we go on to allow that there may be explanatory hypotheses concerning the 
unconscious arising of intentional acts (as Husserl explicitly does), there's no reason at all 
why we should not have causally manipulated representations of objects. We might even 
believe - as this dissertation has attempted to make plausible - that the causal-symbolic 
view is even the most likely hypothesis by Husserl's own way of thinking, since Husserl 





computer" (2001(I):50). He even claims, I think, that phenomenological insight “could be 
the product” of the computations of "our own thought-machine.” But these computations 
(CTM) will be defined over symbolic mental representations (RTM) which will be the 
intermediary vehicles of conscious thought. 
According to Zahavi (2019), the above claim, concerning intermediary mental 
representations, is rejected by "all phenomenologists" (20). Interestingly, Zahavi thinks 
this rejection goes back to Husserl's Logical Investigations. There Husserl argues that 
symbols only acquire their function as symbols in conscious intentional experiences that 
intend their objects to be used symbolically. Therefore, to explain conscious intentional 
experiences in terms of symbolic mental representations is to reverse the 
phenomenological order of explanation (21). 
Zahavi’s appeal to Husserl in this context is reminiscent of Horst’s against Fodor. 
We have already seen that this is no argument against CTM (a fortiori against RTM). 
Instead, however, of rehearsing my arguments from chapter 2, let’s quote a 
phenomenologist (McIntyre (1986)) who contradicts Zahavi, so that we may show that 
Zahavi (2019) is wrong to make the blanket statement that RTM (& CTM) must be 
rejected by “all phenomenologists”:  
 
The 'sign-theory', Husserl says, fails to explain mental representation, and for the 
very same reason that the traditional 'image-theory' of ideas cannot. The 





'image-theory' in favor of a computationalist version of the 'sign-theory'. What 
saves this latter theory from Husserl's objection is that computationalism is 
precisely designed to show how mental symbols can do their work without 
functioning as symbols, i.e. independently of their semantic or representational 
properties. (107) 
 
McIntyre correctly points out that Fodor’s mental representations are symbols without 
functioning as symbols. This corresponds to the fact that they exist at the explanatory-
causal level, not at the descriptive-conscious level. Symbolic mental representations are 
part of the mechanism of thought, but this mechanism functions without recognition of 
the symbolic contents of the symbols processed. Such recognition is the prerogative of 
consciousness, as Husserl correctly points out in the Denkmaschine passage. Hence 
Husserl says that “our own thought-machine might very well function similarly [to a 
computer], except that the real course of one kind of thought would always have to be 
recognized as correct by the insight brought forward in another” (2001(I):50). This 
recognition of correctness is the recognition of the “semantic or representational 
properties” alluded to by McIntyre (1986). The fact that consciousness must be brought 
in to recognize symbolic mental representations as functioning symbolically is no 
argument against the hypothesis that mental representations are symbolic. 
My interpretation evidently opposes the view that Husserl put forward some sort 





properties in consciousness. This anti-RTM thesis is, I claim, a misreading of the 
methodology of the Logical Investigations. Husserl does not investigate the causal-
explanatory component behind the descriptions of the Logical Investigations; that's why 
I'm now connecting the dots between a computational LOT (which Husserl discovered in 
1891) and phenomenology. With these dots connected, however, we can see how CTM, 
and the RTM on which it is based, can help to constitute a fully functioning 
phenomenological theory. The fact that symbols function as symbols only in 
consciousness is explicitly regarded by Husserl as compatible with mental representations 
being symbols for a computational theory of mind (2001(I):50). This is, in my view, a 
conclusive argument against Cobb-Stevens (2003), Zahavi (2019), and, according to the 
latter, “all phenomenologists” (20). 
Section III. A Language of Thought Explanation for Nominalization 
The computational theory of mind (CTM) embedded in a language of thought 
(LOT) not only explains the act-qualities and act-matters of the 5th Investigation, but also 
all those acts of nominalization which allow us to intuit the priori laws of essence 
regarding the dependence of attributive acts on predicative ones. In making these claims, 
please note that, contra Zahavi (2019), no "reduction" is implied. Bonjour (2005) actually 
makes this clear: "Access to the a priori of course involves having mental states, but what 
is thus accessed is not merely features of those [mental] states" (239). We are considering 
the "access" issue - what Kant calls the issue of the "possession" of an intellectual 
capacity for transcendental, i.e., non-empiricistically derived, ideas (A87/88 / B119/120). 





phenomenology, which also deals, as a descriptive endeavor, with the quaestionem iuris. 
Without addressing the explanatory issue, however, every rational member of the 
scientific community can respond to Husserl in the manner of Schlick (1985, p. 82). 
Schlick essentially claimed that we do not have a good scientific theory of access with 
regard to the intuitions that Husserl was pointing out as against the empiricistic theory of 
"cognition" (ibid). Hence, prior to cognitive science, it was in some sense de facto 
legitimate to dismiss Husserl's descriptions. Schlick was in some sense being rational in 
his historical circumstances. But these circumstances have completely altered since 
Chomsky (1957, 1965), and we are now historically in a position to scientifically ground 
Husserl's intuitions in terms of an explanatory theory concerning the possession 
conditions of phenomenological knowledge. 
Husserl describes nominal acts at length (2001(I): pp. 152-4, p. 159, p. 161, pp. 
169-171). But I ask: what is explanatorily required for nominalization? I argue that 
nominalization is a capacity of the human mind in virtue of the property of recursion, 
which falls directly out of CTM. For CTM computes an output in virtue of some input; 
and nothing prevents an operation on the output, turning it into an input and yielding a 
new output ... and so on ad infinitum. 
Consider, by way of example, the sentence, 'The knife is on the table.' This is a 
predicative binding of the elements 'the knife' and 'the table' through the preposition 'on.' 
But now this predication can be nominalized. The whole sentence can become the logical 
subject of a new sentence. And this new sentence can, in turn, become the logical subject 





of units into units, with these units then being related to other units iteratively. The form 
is revealed in the sequence S, N(S), N(N(S)) ad infinitum (mutatis mutandis for objects 
and representations of them (2001(II):163)). 
The reason why one has to forget about associationism here, from an explanatory 
point of view, is that associations do not iterate. At least, they do not iterate on the basis 
of form: associations relate to similar contents and not form. Consequently, there is no 
way associationistically to proceed to unify elements on the basis of mere form. There is, 
then, no way for the associationist to formally compute from S to N(S). One might 
associate S and N(S) - but that would not yield the experience of the necessity of the 
dependence of the attributive relation (e.g. 'the knife on the table...") on the predicative 
(e.g. 'the knife is on the table'). For the association yields a contingent relation, not a 
necessary one. But the phenomenology of nominalization reveals a necessary a priori 
relation and does not reveal a sensuous relation between contingently experienced 
particulars. In other words, the phenomenology points to a formal relation among 
symbolic elements capable of exhibiting necessary (logical) dependency. And this 
relation is explained by supposing a mental architecture that can recursively apply rules 
independent of context and temporal contiguity (mutatis mutandis independent of the 
strengthening of synaptic connections). 
Again, nominal acts exhibit recursivity and this is a formal operation on symbolic 
elements. But the explanatory apparatus of empiricism is not sensitive to formal relations 
but rather sensuous relations among experienced particulars by means of a similarity 





of empiricism is inadequate to the phenomena.  For if the relations are formal, they 
cannot be empirical, and are hence not susceptible to empiricistic explanation (cpf. 
Willard (1984): "If they are formal, they of course cannot be empirical or factual..." 
(209).) Now a computational mechanism, embedded in a language of thought, is adequate 
to the phenomena; for formal iterability ad infinitum is precisely what LOT explains (i.e. 
productivity). Consequently, if we want an explanatory apparatus for these phenomena, 
and according to Husserl we must want this (secundum scientiam; see Ch. 2), we should 
accept LOT as phenomenology's preferred explanatory apparatus with regard, inter alia, 
to nominalization effects in mental acts. 
Section IV. A Language of Thought Explanation for Categorial Intuition 
The doctrine of categorial intuition is perhaps the most famous of the Logical 
Investigations. It certainly appears to be the culmination of the whole work. The 
fascination of this doctrine, which is derivative of Kant's doctrine of the application of the 
categories to sense experience, consists in its "broadening" or, more precisely, its 
metaphorical extension of the concept of "perception" (Moran & Cohen (2012) p. 59). 
Empiricism historically sought to reduce all forms of intuition to sense-perception for the 
sake of approximating to a tabula rasa. But the doctrine of categorial intuition states that 
there is a species of intuition which, although it is based on perception, is not reducible to 
perception. It is, in fact, precisely the formal idealism of Kant which leaves empirical 
reality untouched (2001(II):308). Categorial intuition contains moments that are literally 
not to be seen (e.g. the predication of properties). Those moments, as Kant pointed out, 





There is, I think, a great lacuna in the literature about what exactly is 
psychologically required for there to be categorial intuition. Whatever this turns out to be 
will constitute the explanatory component behind the descriptions pertaining to categorial 
intuition. But we currently have a reasonable hypothesis for the "hidden mental 
mechanisms" underlying this achievement (Leistung) in consciousness (2001(II):203). 
That reasonable hypothesis is LOT. This, I think, is the right hypothesis, since categorial 
intuition 'shows' us logico-grammatical relations (e.g. conjunction) in intuition (a 
metaphorical extension of sense-perception). But, plainly, according to Husserl, the 
conjunctive form is not present in, and so is not derived from, the real object, if by 'real' 
object we mean the sensuously constituted one. Hence one cannot depict a conjunction 
(Sokolowski (2003): "Nobody can paint a conjunction, or a predication..." (120)). Hence 
a categorial intuition is a founded act upon sensuously founding contents (just as Kant 
supposed). The categorial-syntactic forms that 'show up' in categorial intuition must be 
ideally imposed by the mind upon the real object. Otherwise, we would have a form of 
intellectual intuition of the Fichtean/Schellingian/Hegelian variety; but this has been 
more than adequately criticized by both Kant and Schopenhauer. Following in the latter's 
train, Husserl says that "the thought of a straightforward percept of the founded object, or 
of its presentation through some other straightforward intuition, is a piece of nonsense" 
(2001 (II) 308). But since logico-grammatical relations fall directly out of LOT 
(according to Husserl himself (!): see Hua XII:367-368/1994:45-46), it seems that we 
must accept that these relations are able to appear to consciousness as a result of 





manifests itself phenomenologically in experience through categorial intuition. Husserl 
described this phenomenon. Now, how do we explain the phenomenon? Whence, in other 
words, the syntax of categorial intuition? Answer: LOT. 
The literature, however, is already opposed to this explanation. Dahlstrom (2003) 
for instance says that "to see or, better, to register a state of affairs (Sachverhalt) - like the 
car's being red - is not to create it" (10). This, however, directly contradicts Husserl: "It is 
quite different in the case of categorial forms: The new objects they create are not objects 
in the primary, original sense [of straightforward perception]" (2001(II):308, italics 
added). This passage shows that Husserl understands what we are saying: that the 
syntactic formation of a state of affairs really has to be "create[d]." Otherwise you are 
committed to the view that there is "a straightforward percept of the founded object" 
which, however, is a piece of Fichtean/Schellingian/Hegelian "nonsense" (2001(II):308). 
Interestingly, Jackendoff (1992) echoes Husserl’s sentiment when he decries anti-
computationalists as believers in magic. Consider a conjunction or a predication - which 
are logico-grammatical relations - of properties in experience (resulting in a complex 
intentional act); these forms are not available in the sensory input. The proof of this is 
that these forms cannot be represented visually (Crane (2014) p. 223). Therefore, to 
"register a state of affairs" necessarily involves "creat[ing]" what Husserl calls "a new 
object" founded upon the really existing object (the sensuously constituted one). In 
descriptive phenomenology, we only behold the finished product (the ὅτι): the object "in 





reveals the nature of this creative process (the διότι) which is not available for descriptive 
phenomenology proper. 
Inadvertently, Sokolowski (2003) hits upon our thesis: for Sokolowski says that 
"[t]he logic expressed in syntax... enters into the manifestation of things." We could not 
have said it better! We only ask the further (διότι) question: how does syntax enter 
experience? The options are, according to McGinn (2015): empiricism, nativism, magic 
or God. Obviously this syntactic "manifestation" arises not through an empiricistic 
explanatory apparatus which is, as we have argued, inadequate to the phenomena (Hua 
XII:358/1994:37). Disregarding magic and the possibility of God’s intervention into our 
mental affairs, we turn to the nativist explanatory hypothesis of the language of thought 
since this is precisely a syntactic explanatory apparatus. The easy answer therefore - the 
one we offer - is that syntax enters our experience as a reflection of the constituent 
structure of our mental representations. There is an isomorphism between the descriptive 
apprehension of syntax and the (transcendental) structure of thought. 
Husserl makes the description/explanation distinction precisely in order to leave 
room for unconscious processing which results in the objects of conscious experience. 
But phenomenologically he is concerned with describing objects and states of affairs with 
a view toward knowledge. He makes no claims as to how these things enter 
consciousness; he is not concerned with the psychologically real basis of our knowledge. 
Arguably, this methodological blindspot - which Husserl regarded as necessarily 
temporary (see Ch. 2) - was self-imposed in order to more effectively chart the 





systematicity, etc.). This would explain his commitment to description in the face of the 
tyranny of associationism. 
The fact that states of affairs are (in one sense) creations or products of the forms 
in the mind (as opposed to forms in heaven) working in tandem with sense-experience is 
neglected by Willard's reading. Willard says: "That there are essential constraints upon 
which objects and acts may come together in cognition does not mean that the individual 
or collective mind in any sense produces the categorially formed and value-laden world 
which it finds before it in cognition..." (236). This, however, directly contradicts Husserl, 
who says that our conscious recognition of a priori structures “could be the product” of 
CTM (2001(I):50). There is a real question - beyond appeals to magic and heavenly 
emanations - about how our minds are able to access these structures: how it produces 
categorially formed objects. The existence of this question and its possible answer by 
LOT does not mean that categorially formed objects, or syntactic analyses of input, are 
merely subjective. The study of universal grammar does not fail to be an a priori science 
because it has an explanatory, empirical supplement - as Husserl himself pointed out 
(2001(II):73). 
We seem, in noting these contradictions between Husserl and his interpreters, to 
have discovered a properly Husserlian poverty of the stimulus argument. For Husserl 
notes the following: “A state of affairs, even one concerning what is sensibly perceived, 
is not, however, an object that could be sensibly perceived and apparent (whether to our 
‘outward’ or to our ‘inward’ sensibility)” (2001(II):139). But if this is true, then the 





then there is a poverty of the stimulus. And if there is a poverty of the stimulus, then the 
mind of the perceiver of the object must pick up the slack. In other words, we have a 
properly Husserlian argument for the claim that the mind forms syntactically structured 
objects in experience – those objects discovered in founded acts via categorial intuition. 
That this poverty of the stimulus argument has taken so long to notice perhaps 
stems from an implicit denial in the scholarly literature that psychological explanation 
stands behind phenomenological description at all. This is once made explicit in 
Gurwitsch (1982):  
 
The consciousness of identity cannot be accounted for in terms of Hume's theory 
of Ideas, that is to say, on the grounds of the traditional conception of the mind. 
Hence a totally new and radically different conception is required in which the 
consciousness of identity no longer appears as an explicandum but, on the 
contrary, is made the defining property of the mind, that essential property 
without which the mind could not be what it is. (60)  
 
We saw in our third chapter that, indeed, "the consciousness of identity cannot be 
accounted for in terms of Hume's theory of Ideas," i.e. Humean associationism. But it 
does not follow that the consciousness of identity "no longer appears as an explicandum" 
- unless the only explanatory apparatus you can think of is some form of associationism. 





similarity while silently presupposing it to interpret similarity. But, as McGinn (2015) 
points out, "abstract concepts" like "identity" are "not even candidates for being derived 
from perception of objects" (110). Husserl’s poverty of the stimulus argument (see 
above) shows that Husserl recognized this fact. But as Husserl also maintains, even if the 
consciousness of identity were an essential property of the mind, that would not absolve 
us from explaining how the consciousness of identity arises. We believe that, from an 
explanatory point of view, identity must be regarded as an innate concept (following 
McGinn (2015)). Hence, in one sense Gurwitsch is right, identity is a "defining property 
of the mind" - just like, we might add, systematicity. There could, in other words, not be 
a mind without it52. These are essential properties "without which the mind could not be 
what it is." But saying as much does not resolve the explanatory issue, which, however, is 
preliminarily resolved with LOT. 
In conclusion, neither in itself, nor as a reading of Husserl, can it be maintained 
that categorial intuition does not require psychological explanation. Categorial intuition, 
insofar as this is the intuiting of the combinatorial possibilities of properties of objects 
and their relations, can be explained easily by supposing LOT, which is our innate 
combinatorial system of thought. I already showed that Husserl discovered LOT (Ch. 1), 
and much of the phenomena of the Logical Investigations can be explained through LOT 
(Ch. 3, Ch. 4, Ch. 5). And we cannot shirk our scientific duty to supply explanations for 
                                                          
52 Hence if connectionism argues that there could be minds without these essential properties (since identity 
and systematicity are not essential to a connectionist network), we are allowed to infer that connectionism 
cannot be the correct explanatory apparatus for these essential properties; for if it were the correct account, 





our descriptions of consciousness (Ch. 2). Therefore, we should assume that there is an 
intimate relationship between LOT and phenomenology. Indeed, if I'm right, the 
phenomenology - as against empiricistic associationism/connectionism - demands LOT. 
Specifically, we should assume that they reciprocally found one another. I will close my 
dissertation with a brief discussion of this thesis. But first I must deal with an objection. 
Section V. Objection: Doesn't the Empty/Filled Distinction Refute the Possibility of 
a Language of Thought? 
There is a difference between thinking of something and perceiving it. When I 
merely think of something, I do not have the thing I think actually before me. Indeed, that 
is the reason why mental representations are symbolic - they stand in for the real thing. 
Hopp (2011) calls the distinction between thinking and perceiving "the most fundamental 
distinction among intentional acts" (103). I agree. Both thinking and perceiving, as kinds 
of intentional acts, intend objects, but the former does so inauthentically, whereas the 
latter does so authentically. This is just another way of saying that perception gives us the 
thing itself, whereas thinking gives us a surrogate of the thing. 
The point of emphasizing this is presumably to say that when we think of 
anything, what we really want, with a view toward knowledge, is to perceive it. After all, 
knowledge is concerned primarily with actualities (not merely thought-of possibilities), 
and "perception is the sole mark of actuality" (Kant (1781) A226). Although we've 
'known' for some time that Einstein's theory is correct - that is, represents things as they 





empirically recorded, and so became, in a sense, perceptually available, putting the theory 
beyond all doubt. 
Getting clear on this relationship, then, is of some moment if one assumes that 
intuition - either categorial or perceptual - is of the essence of all knowledge. I personally 
do not doubt this and neither does Husserl: "Knowledge always has the character of a 
[meaning-]fulfilment and an [object] identification: this may be observed in every case 
where we confirm a general judgement through subsequent intuition, as in every other 
case of knowledge" (2001(II):275). 
But does this mean that there cannot be a language of thought? Scientific theories 
typically contain theoretical posits that are unobservable. These do not come up for 
intuitive fulfilment for creatures with our kind of sensory apparatus. It is a feature of 
scientific theories that this is so: they posit things that cannot (for us) come up for 
intuitive fulfilment. The justification for this procedure lies in the essence of science, 
which demands that explanation, in terms of unobservables, follows upon description, in 
terms of observables. 
The case of the Logical Investigations is no exception. Husserl knew as much. 
Hence he says that "one would certainly not wish to assert that all psychic being is 
perceived, or is even perceptible (i.e. in the sense of a real possibility)" (2001(II):91). It is 
possible that God can see the language of thought. What we see, however, is brain matter, 
basically indistinguishable from other hunks of brain matter belonging to other species to 





language). The language of thought is never going to come up for intuitive fulfilment for 
a creature like us. 
But that is no reason to think it isn't the most likely hypothesis. Indeed, I'm in 
effect claiming that it's the one hypothesis that is phenomenologically informed (taking 
the Logical Investigations to be pointing to things like productivity, which only LOT can 
explain, as opposed to an empiricistic apparatus, based on a similarity metric). If you 
need a hypothesis about the workings of the mind, and you take Husserlian 
phenomenology seriously, LOT is, I argue, the best candidate. 
Given what Husserl says about knowledge being related to intuitive fulfilment, 
and given what I've just said about LOT's not being intuitively fulfillable53, doesn't it 
follow that LOT isn't a candidate for a knowledge-claim? If this were so, it would be an 
argument against all our best scientific theories. But that's a clear reductio of the 
assumption. For our best scientific theories constitute our best claims to knowledge. If 
this were not true, science could not contradict common-sense. But science can contradict 
common-sense (see Husserl's 1906-7 lectures on logic and epistemology). The 
knowledge that mammals are typically furry and four-legged isn't going to help you if 
DNA reveals that this is false (contra Kriegel (2011)). Moreover, it is simply a fact that, 
just as "it is a goal of science to explain features of the natural world rather than merely 
to describe them" so also "in the course of explanation scientists often postulate 
theoretical entities. These are things that are not observed but are invoked to explain 
                                                          






phenomena that are observable. Prominent examples, include genes, microbes, atoms, 
quarks and photons" (Cain (2016) p. 109). But we are ontologically committed to the 
existence of the entities that our scientific theories quantify over even if we cannot 
perceive these entities. This applies also to mental representations in a language of 
thought. 
But isn't Husserl committed to everything being intuitable or perceivable? Yes, 
but not necessarily by us: "Certainly ... nothing exists that cannot be perceived. This 
means that the actual performance of actual acts on the ground of just these 
straightforward intuitions is in the ideal sense possible" (2001(II):309). To this we have 
nothing to object. We only add that this is absolutely consistent with Husserl's other 
statements concerning the limitations on our ability to perceive "obscure, hypothetical 
events in the soul's unconscious depths" and "hidden mental mechanisms" (2001(II): p. 
105, p. 203). This is all in keeping with the fact that, inter alia, categorial intuition 
requires explanation as much as any other kind of intuition; and since this intuition sets 
up combinatorial forms among sensuous objects, it is phenomenologically warranted to 
assume a syntactic LOT. If one does not assume LOT, the fact that logico-grammatical 
syntax manifests itself in our experiences of real objects would be without explanation. 
The only options are: (1) to deny the phenomena as in some sense illusory, or (2) to 
accept the phenomena as genuine and try to explain them. (1) is the course chosen by 
eliminative connectionists with regard to intentional phenomena like categorial intuition. 





the phenomena described by Husserl in the Logical Investigations. The distinction 
between empty and filled acts poses no objection to this reasoning. 
Section VI. The Foundational Relation between the Language of Thought & 
Phenomenology 
In the 1891 essay, "On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic)," Husserl appears to claim that the 
computational theory of mind is the "foundation" of the "higher investigations" into the 
phenomenology of logic. Directly after discovering the computational theory of mind, 
embedded in a language of thought (i.e. a mechanism whose operations are defined over 
syntactically structured symbols), Husserl says the following:  
 
To the logic of symbolic representations and judgments we now turn with a few 
reflections. The carrying out of such a logic would set two goals for itself: It would 
seek to get to the bottom of the function of symbolic representations and judgments 
in the activity of theoretical judgment, and above all, to provide logical illumination 
for those algorithmic modes of procedure which on such a wide scale become the 
vehicles of progress in the exact sciences. And it would seek to formulate the rules 
for testing and devising such methods. Investigations of the type that we have 
undertaken above for the natural practice of judgment would, of course, have to 
provide a foundation for these higher investigations. For in fact logical procedure 
is, vis-a-vis the corresponding natural one, not something toto genera different. 





considerable extent, they make use of the same ones. (Hua XII:365/1994:44; italics 
added)  
 
The phrase - "[i]nvestigations of the type that we have undertaken above" - refers to the 
immediately preceding analyses (see Ch. 1) concerning "the natural psychological 
mechanism of symbolic inference" (Hua XII:363/1994:42). The computational 
mechanism is in fact the hypothetical solution to the phenomenology of judgment. 
Husserl discovered the problem - later investigated by Fodor in Psychosemantics (1987) - 
of everyday inference: how is it mechanically possible for us to typically arrive at truth 
"in the natural practice of judgment"? The solution - discovered by Husserl in 1891 
(anticipating Fodor's solution by almost 100 years) - is the computational theory of mind, 
whose operations are defined over symbolic mental representations of the classic 
Cartesian type (i.e. are not vectorial representations of the Smolensky type, which bear 
merely numerical content). The reason why we typically arrive at truth is that we are 
spontaneously constrained by nature ("naturwüchsige") through the logico-syntactic 
formations of the language of thought, which mechanically preserves truth in mental 
processing (Hua XII:361-362). In the above quote, therefore, Husserl is asserting that 
accounts of the language of thought are (1) to provide the "foundation" for higher level 
phenomenological analyses of logic in the sense that we cannot properly theoretically 
account for the latter without first accounting for the former. This accords with the 
methodological division between description and explanation: LOT is the explanatory 





necessary because substantively "the same psychological laws of our nature" determine 
both subpersonal and personal levels. In accordance with these points, I hypothesized that 
the Logical Investigations is not only complementary with but even presupposes a 
computational theory of mind embedded in a language of thought. This hypothesis 
explains why it is so easy to discover LOT properties like productivity, systematicity, etc. 
arising in consciousness for Husserl as against empiricistic 
associationism(/connectionism). 
What are the implications for the relationship between phenomenology and 
cognitive science? The first implication is obviously that all Husserlian phenomenologists 
must be committed to LOT as their favorite cognitive architecture. The journal 
"Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences" edited by Gallagher and Zahavi has never 
even contemplated the possibility. I hope to have shown that this is not only a possibility 
but even a necessity, given the declarations of consciousness in the Logical Investigations 
that I have outlined which together demand (along with the essence of science) a LOT. 
This discovery is both unexpected and probably unwanted, given the anti-representational 
flavor of Gallagher and Zahavi's journal. But knowledge does not care about our desires. 
The second implication is that we have vindicated Jackendoff's understanding of 
the relationship between phenomenology and the computational theory of mind. 
Jackendoff first proposed the relationship in 1987 under the title "Hypothesis of 
Computational Sufficiency: Every phenomenological distinction is caused by/supported 
by/projected from a corresponding computational distinction" (24). In 1992 he referred to 





the relationship (96-102). Therein he pointed out that "[i]t makes no sense to say... that a 
mind (in the computational sense) is conscious of information that it's processing. [....] 
From the computational perspective, there are only data structures (or 'mental 
representations') in there, being manipulated by computational processes" (100). Now if 
mental representations are unconscious, how can they help us make sense of 
consciousness? The answer is that, in accordance with the above hypothesis, we seek to 
find "particular patterns of... information manipulation... correlated with... particular 
aspects of experience" (101). This research program is not only "tractable" but is in 
actuality "the subject of vigorous research" (101). Pursuing this program means asking 
"from the computational perspective: Is being conscious of things a special property of 
certain forms of data structures [i.e. mental representations] and information 
manipulation?" (101-102). With respect to Husserl's 1891 psychosemantic problem we 
see the application of this concern: we are conscious of true conclusions without being 
conscious of the data structures and information manipulation that led to them. In 
response to this state of affairs, Husserl assumes the existence of a computational theory 
of mind embedded in a language of thought (i.e. the data structures being 
computationally processed have a syntactical format). This point can be generalized to 
the phenomenological facts of the Logical Investigations, as our dissertation has argued. 
The third implication is that, within the phenomenological tradition, it appears 
that only Husserl has the resources to deal with what virtually everyone thinks is 
empirically undeniable: the existence of unintrospectible unconscious processes. Husserl 





distinction between description and explanation. It follows that phenomenology and LOT 
are actually not in competition: they are on scientifically separate levels, that is, in 
theoretically distinct divisa. This is the precise reason Husserl refrains from directly 
attacking the Humean explanatory apparatus of associationism (2001(I):293). Now if 
associationism still existed and some say it still does in the guise of artificial neural 
networks, then it would be in competition with LOT. Hence Husserl would have 
refrained from specifically criticizing LOT on methodological grounds. But we have 
reason to believe that Husserl not only discovered LOT but that the phenomenology of 
the Logical Investigations points to LOT and is psychologically grounded in LOT. If so, 
then LOT is descriptively adequate and is, therefore, to be recommended on 
phenomenological grounds. The same cannot be said for associationism/connectionism 
(see Ch. 3). 
The moral of our story is this: LOT is the real psychological foundation of 
Husserlian Evidenz. The ideal conditions of Evidenz remain for descriptive analysis. But 
the descriptive analysis feeds into the explanatory apparatus. A distinction of 
phenomenology will reappear computationally for the sake of the explanation of the 
former's appearance (and its effects) in consciousness. This point of view is what our 
dissertation has sought to make plausible on the basis of our discovery that Husserl 
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